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International Journal of Korean History > Volume 21(1); 2016 > Article
요동지역에 대한 조선인의 인식

국문초록

요동은 지금의 遼寧省 동남부 일대를 말한다. 이 곳은 삼국시대 고구려 영역이었고 고구려가 멸망한 이후에는 발해의 영역이었다. 그러나 발해가 거란에 의해 멸망되면서, 요동은 중국에 넘어가게 되었다. 이후 원나라가 들어서고 충선왕이 심왕으로 임명되면서 요동을 회복하려는 움직임이 일어나기 시작했다. 고려왕조를 이어 들어선 조선의 태조 역시 요동확보 의지를 드러내었다.
조선은 여진을 제압하다면 명의 다음 단계는 바로 국경선을 접하게 될 조선임을 우려하지 않을 수 없었다. 이를 방지하기 위해서는 여진을 조선편으로 끌어들이고 선제공격하여 요동지역을 조선이 차지하는 것이었다. 만약 그렇게 된다면 서북쪽에는 몽골이 있고 그 아래 남쪽에는 명이, 그리고 조선이라는 삼각구도가 형성될 수 있을 것이다. 이같은 생각에서 정도전은 태조 이성계와 손을 잡고 요동정벌을 계획하였으나 이방원의 쿠데타로 실패하였다.
태종대에 이르러서 명은 여진세력을 통제하기 위해 건주위를 설치했다. 이에 세종은 여진족의 분란을 틈타 6진과 4군을 설치하여 압록강과 두만강 이남의 영역은 조선의 것으로 고착화 시켰다. 또한 이전 시대의 역사지리 기록을 모두 압록강 이남에 존재했던 것으로 기재하여 압록강 이남만은 명의 침략으로부터 지키고자 했다. 이같은 사실이 기록된 것이 『세종실록지리지』와 『동국여지승람』 그리고 『고려사』이다. 史書에서 우리 역사를 압록강 이내로 고착화시킴으로서 요동에 대한 조선인의 생각이나 정벌의지는 점점 약화될 수 밖에 없었다.


Abstract

Liaodong refers to the southeastern part of Liaoning Province today. During the Three Kingdoms Era, this area was part of Koguryŏ territory, and after the collapse of Koguryŏ, it belonged to Parhae. However, when Parhae fell at the hands of the Jurchens, the Koryŏ dynasty was unable to secure Liaodong. Afterwards, with the rise of the Chinese Yuan dynasty, King Ch’ungsŏn of Koryŏ was appointed by the Yuan emperor as the King of Shenyang, and the movement to reclaim Liaodong began to gain momentum in Korea.
Succeeding Koryŏ, the Chosŏn dynasty claimed to support Ming China under the principle of sadae, but this did not mean that relations between Chosŏn and Ming were stabilized. As a result, Chosŏn could not but worry about the fact that if the Ming were to suppress the Jurchens, Chosŏn would be Ming’s next target. To prevent a Ming invasion of Korea, Chosŏn had to make an ally of the Jurchens and launch a preemptive attack to annex Liaodong. With this in mind, Chŏng Tojŏn joined hands with T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye and planned to conquer Liaodong but failed due to Yi Pangwŏn’s coup.
During the reign of T’aejong, Ming established Jianzhou Guard in Liaodong to control the Jurchens. While the Jurchens were embroiled in a dispute, King Sejong also established four districts and six garrisons and, he changed the geographical records from the previous dynasties and kingdoms to appear as if they had existed in the land south of the Amnok River in an attempt to protect the regions south of Amnok from the Ming invasion. This was recorded in Sejong sillok chiriji, Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam, and Koryŏsa.


Introduction

Liaodong is a region located to the east of the Liao River in China, and it refers to the southeastern part of Liaoning Province today. During the Three Kingdoms Era, this area was part of Koguryŏ (Goguryeo) territory, and after the collapse of Koguryŏ, it was part of Parhae (Balhae) territory. However, when Parhae fell at the hands of the Jurchens, the Koryŏ Dynasty was unable to secure Liaodong. Afterwards, with the rise of the Yuan Dynasty, King Ch’ungsŏn of Koryŏ was appointed by the Yuan emperor as the King of Shenyang, and the movement to reclaim Liaodong began to gain momentum in Korea. King Kongmin and King Wu even dispatched Korean military forces to Liaodong during the Yuan-Ming transition period. After the fall of the Koryŏ Dynasty, King T’aejo of Chosŏn also showed his determination to reclaim Liaodong. However, the interest in Liaodong in the early Chosŏn dynasty was not based on the logic of reclaiming the territories that had once belonged to Koguryŏ and Parhae, but instead on Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses built during the Koryŏ dynasty after driving out the Jurchens.
In the second year in the reign of King Yejong of Koryŏ (1107), Yun Kwan built nine fortresses in the region that Koryŏ reclaimed from the Jurchens.1 However, due to the controversy that arose in Koryŏ surrounding the attack on the Jurchens, the Koryŏ government voluntarily returned the territory to the Jurchens in order to quell the opposition and appeals within Koryŏ. Afterwards, Koryŏ underwent a period of intervention from Yuan China, and only during the reign of Kongmin, Koryŏ was able to express its intention to reclaim the Liaodong area through the plan to conquer the Tongnyŏng Commandary. In 1356 (5th year of Kongmin’s reign), Kongmin recaptured the Yuan commandery of Ssangsŏng (C. Shuangcheng) and asserted sovereignty over the territory to the north of Samsal (Pukchŏng), Ssangsŏng. At the time, none of the families in the northeastern border region had vested rights or power as the Northern Yuan Dynasty was weakening. In addition, the fact that a large number of Koryŏ people had resided in this region for a century during Yuan intervention bolstered Kongmin’s attempt to recapture Liaodong.2 Kongmin ordered Yi Sŏnggye, Chi Yongsu, and An Ugyŏng to attack Tongnyŏng Commandary and Oro Mountain Fortress in Liaodong.3 At one point in time, Yi Sŏnggye had captured Liaoyang but retreated due to the difficulties in procuring military provisions. In the end, he was not able to secure Liaoyang as part of Koryŏ territory.4
Ming China attempted to capture Liaodong since 1371 (20th year in Kongmin’s reign). After years of struggle with the remaining Northern Yuan forces, Ming China only seized the chance for victory in 1385 (11th year in Wu’s reign) with the surrender of Naghachu of the Northern Yuan. From this point, Ming China declared to Koryŏ that the territory of the previous Yuan Dynasty belonged to the Ming and announced the construction of Chŏllyŏng Commandery. 5 In response, Koryŏ sent Pak Ŭijung to the Ming court and explained that the territory from Hamju to Konghŏm Garrison (Konghŏmjin) originally belonged to Koryŏ. Pak explained that the area north of Chŏllyŏng to Konghŏm Garrison originally belonged to Koryŏ, but it had been taken over by the Jurchens. Then Yun Kwan recaptured this region and built nine fortresses. Afterwards, Yuan built Ssangsŏng commandery in this region, but Koryŏ once again reclaimed it.6 However, Ch’oe Yŏng and King Wu’s plan to conquer Liaodong failed when Yi Sŏnggye withdrew his troops from Wihwa Island.
This study will examine how the Koryŏ kings’ attempts to incorporate Liaodong into Koryŏ territory changed with the dynastic change from Koryŏ to Chosŏn. There are a number of research papers on Korea’s relationship with the Jurchens and Korea’s territorial conflict with Yuan and Ming China in the late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn.7 This study will focus on the early Chosŏn period and analyze the Chosŏn society’s perspectives on Liaodong.
Even after the Chosŏn Dynasty was founded, Chosŏn Korea and Ming China continued to stand in conflict over Liaodong. This paper hopes to examine Chosŏn’s Northern Policy under such circumstances and investigate the ways in which Liaodong was described in Sejong sillok chiriji (Geographical Treatise in the Annals of King Sejong) and Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (Augmented survey of the geography of Korea) to trace the changes of Chosŏn government officials’ perceptions of the Liaodong region..

Koreans’ Perspectives on the Northern Territories in the Koryŏ and Chosŏn Dynasties

Territorial Awareness in Late Koryŏ

Before exploring the Korean perception of the northern regions in early Chosŏn, this paper will first examine the Liaodong region during the period of Yuan intervention in Koryŏ. After destroying the Jin and taking over Liaodong, Yuan China established Liaoyang Province in the Liaodong region. In addition, Yuan created the Tongnyŏng Commandary in northwest Koryŏ 8 and Ssangsŏng Commandery in the northeast and placed them under its domain. Yet in 1287, Yuan returned Tongnyŏng Commandary to Koryŏ after Nayan’s rebellion in 1287. At this time, Ch’oe T’an, the commander of Tongnyŏng Commandary, moved to Liaoyang and Shenyang with people under his jurisdiction.9 Therefore, even after the Northern Regions (Pukgye) were returned to Koryŏ in 1290 (16th year of Ch’ungnyŏl’s reign), Tongnyŏng Commandary (elevated from Tongnyŏng-bu to Tongnyŏng-ro at this time) still remained as one of the seven districts that belonged to Liaoyang Province and had control over the displaced people from Koryŏ. Many people from Koryŏ resided in the Liaodong region at the time that people from Koryŏ, such as Hong Pokwŏn and Wang Chun, became administrators of the region,10 and the Yuan emperor later appointed King Chungsŏn of Koryŏ as the King of Shenyang (later King of Shen) to engage in governing Liaodong.11
In May 1356 (5th year of Kongmin’s reign), King Kongmin had Ki Ch’ŏl killed, abolished the branch secretariat of Zhengdong Province, and ordered In Tang to attack the eight relay station (站) to the west of the Amnok River and Yu Inwu to recapture Ssangsŏng Commandery. In June of the same year, In Tang defeated three relay stations, including Pasa District near the Amnok River, and recaptured Ssangsŏng Commandery in July. However, when Yuan China threatened to send 800,000 troops to reprimand Koryŏ for invading the Yuan border, Kongmin became disconcerted and had In Tang killed under the false accusation that the invasion of Liaodong was an act of In Tang’s personal conviction. This shows that Koryŏ was not completely free of Yuan intervention even though it was no longer fully under Yuan rule. Later, the Yuan dynasty was ousted by the Ming dynasty and established the Northern Yuan in Liaodong (1368, 17th year of Kongmin’s reign), and Koryŏ began to attack Liaodong in the following year. Kongmin attacked Tongnyŏng Commandary under the pretext of suppressing the Ki family’s base of power, but his actual goal was to acquire Liaodong. A number of different forces invaded Liaodong with the decline of Yuan,12 leaving Liaodong available for any forces to take over. Koryŏ saw the opportunity and struck first. At this time, Kongmin asserted that the Liaoshen region was Princess Chegukdaejang’s t’angmokŭp (C. tangmuyi), arguing that Liaoshen was given to Princess Chegukdaejang as a fiefdom for accommodation and bathing.13 With Yuan’s installment of the King of Shen system in Koryŏ, Koryŏ believed that the Liaodong region, which was under the jurisdiction of the King of Shen, could be considered Koryŏ territory.14
Moreover, Ming China requested Koryŏ to undertake the defense of the Liaoshen region,15 aware of the fact that Northern Yuan was still standing strong. Encouraged by these circumstances, Kongmin sent Chi Yongsu and Yi Sŏnggye to capture Liaoyang and declared to the residents of Liaoyang that Liaoshen ws Koryŏ territory and the residents of Liaoshen were citizens of Koryŏ.16 At the time, there were about 6,000 to 7,000 Koryŏ households and 30,000 to 35,000 Koryŏ people residing in Liaoshen. Ming China seemed to acknowledge Koryŏ’s declaration implicitly. However, after completely suppressing the Yuan, Ming openly began to express its ambition to dominate Liaodong.
In 1387, (13th year of Wu’s reign), the Ming subdued Naghachu (納哈出), the head of the Yuan dynasty, with a large force of 200,000 troops. Afterwards, Ming China asserted that the land that had formerly been Yuan territory should be under the Ming’s rule and announced the establishment of Ch’ŏllyŏng Guard (C. Tielingwei). In sum, Ming China brought up the establishment of Ch’ŏllyŏng Guard to stop Koryŏ from expanding to the north and to secure its hold on Liaodong. Moreover, the fact that Koryŏ maintained a favorable relationship with Naghachu of Northern Yuan must have caused the Ming discontent,17 and Ming China also might have feared that Koryŏ would try to join forces with Naghachu and accede the territory under his control to Koryŏ.
In opposition to Ming’s establishment of Chŏllyŏng Guard, Ch’oe Yŏng set out to conquer Liaodong but failed when Yi Sŏnggye withdrew Koryŏ troops from Wihwa Island. The retreat from Wihwa Island was a declaration that Koryŏ was abandoning its expansion into Liaodong. However, after receiving the report that a garrison at Chŏllyŏng would be difficult to maintain because of Koryŏ’s opposition, Ming China altered its plan and established a garrison at Fengji (奉集), located about 80 li (25 miles) northeast of Liaoyang.18 And the issue of taking over Liaodong emerged as an important question in the Chosŏn dynasty.
Chosŏn expressed interest in the northern territories since the time of T’aejo. Yi Sŏnggye planned to conquer Liaodong with Chŏng Tojŏn, but the plan floundered when he lost the throne to his fifth son, Yi Pangwŏn, in a coup. During the reign of T’aejong, the Ming established Jianzhou Guard (K. Kŏnjuwi) in Liaodong to control the Jurchens.19 T’aejong endeavored to establish Chosŏn’s historical legitimacy over Liaodong by ordering Ha Ryun and Kwŏn Kŭn to investigate and report on the existence of a stele erected by Yun Kwan.20
King Sejong also established four districts and six garrisons, while the Jurchens were embroiled in a dispute, in an attempt to secure the areas south of the Amnok River and Tuman River as Chosŏn territory.21 This indicates that Korea’s ambition for the northern territories had been reduced to the region south of the Amnok and Tuman Rivers, unlike during the reigns of Kongmin and Wu of Koryŏ. It seems that Sejong recognized the difficulties involved in advancing to Liaodong and believed that the areas around the Amnok and Tuman Rivers were the northernmost frontier that needed to be secured.

Conflicts between Ming China and the Jurchens over Liaodong in the Chosŏn Dynasty

(A) The Publication of Sejong sillok chiriji: From T’aejo to Sejong
The Chosŏn dynasty supported Ming China under the diplomatic principle of (“serving the great”), but this did not mean the relations between Ming and Chosŏn had been stabilized. King Kongmin of Koryŏ continued to maintain friendly relations with Northern Yuan even after establishing a tributary relationship with the Ming dynasty. Moreover, the Ming envoy Cai Bin was murdered during the reign of King Wu of Koryŏ, and Koryŏ had even attempted to take over Liaodong, and as a result, Ming Taizu, the founder and the first emperor of the Ming dynasty harbored suspicions against Koryŏ. After the establishment of the Chosŏn dynasty, Ming recognized the new dynasty but continued to distrust and keep strict watch over Chosŏn.22
Chosŏn did not always have friendly relashions with the Ming. Historically, when China succeeded in establishing a unified country, it invaded Korea, as can be seen from the examples of the Han, Sui, Liao, and Yuan dynasties. Having unified China into a powerful nation, the Ming was attacking the Jurchens at times and appeasing them at others in an attempt to make them an ally. From Chosŏn’s position, it was difficult not to worry about Ming’s possible invasion of Korea after suppressing the Jurchens.23
To prevent a Ming invasion of Korea, Chosŏn had to make an ally of the Jurchens and launch a preemptive attack to annex Liaodong. Chosŏn’s government officials must have believed that if this plan worked, a power triangle of the Mongols to the northwest, the Ming to the south, and Chosŏn to the east could be created, and Chosŏn would be able to maintain stable diplomatic relations as Koryŏ had with the Liao and Song, and with the Jin and Southern Song.24 It can be assumed that this idea motivated Chŏng Tojŏn to join forces with T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye and plan the conquest of Liaodong.25 However, in the early years of the Chosŏn dynasty, T’aejo evaluated those who were to be rewarded in his retreat from Wihwa Island and declared that the conquest of Liaodong could not be justified.
(A-1) Imperial Commissioners Hwang Yŏnggi and Ch’oe Yŏn came with a Royal message from the emperor....1. You sent people to Liaodong under the pretext of performing a ritual and lured out border patrol officers (邊將) with hemp, silk, gold, and silver. This was the second conflict you caused. 1. Recently, you secretly sent an envoy to cajole the Jurchens and crossed the Amnok River in secret with over 500 people. No other sin is greater than this. This was the third conflict that you aroused.26
(A-2) At the end of the Koryŏ dynasty, Wiju (僞主) and Sinu (辛禑) were so heinous, wild, and violent that they plotted to conquer Liaodong with their subject Ch’oe Yŏng. They goaded on other commanders and planned to cross the Amnok River. At that time, I became the commander in chief of the Right Army, and I said to other commanders, “It is immoral for a small country to invade the boundary of the country of the Son of Heaven. On top of that, if we sin against the Celestial Dynasty, then the people of the East would not even be able to exist. Many commanders listened to me and turned their troops around according to our great cause, and brought peace in the East. That was how I came to be today.27
In (A-2), T’aejo assessed the meritorious retainers who turned their troops around from Wihwa Island, confirming the legitimacy of the Chosŏn dynasty. He explained that turning the Koryŏ troops around at Wihwa Island in the 14th year of the reign of Wu, had to be done for the people of Koryŏ, and praised himself for establishing the Chosŏn dynasty under these circumstances. In this process, T’aejo emphasized that no one can invade the boundary of the country of the Son of Heaven. This phrase appeared again in a letter he sent to Ming China through an envoy on July 18, the day after Yi Sŏnggye was crowned the king of Chosŏn, and several more times afterwards.28
“Yiso yŏkdae” (以小逆大), meaning a small nation should not attack a bigger nation, was the pretext Yi Sŏnggye used when he retreated from Wihwa Island, and as a result, Chosŏn could not but emphasize this principle after the founding of the dynasty. Although this might have been a strategy to justify retreating from Wihwa Island, it ended up confirming the fact that the regions north of the Amnok River belonged to the Ming. Yi had to keep this position in order to avoid the Ming’s suspicion, since Ming China had already noticed that Chosŏn was attempting to appease the Jurchens and to secure Liaodong, and dispatch an envoy with a strong warning to the king of Chosŏn, as illustrated in (A-1).
T’aejo’s declaration that the conquest of Liaodong was wrong deprived Chosŏn of the cause to make an assertion that Liaodong was Korean territory. This became a shackle for T’aejo, and he was unable to actively lead any conquest of Liaodong. However, when Ming Taizu threatened and killed an envoy from Chosŏn because of Chŏng Tojŏn’s letter to Ming Taizu, and oppressed Chosŏn, T’aejo became enraged. Taking advantage of this situation, Chŏng Tojŏn encouraged Yi Sŏnggye to plan for the conquest of Liaodong.29 The next record states:
(B) (During T’aejo’s reign, Chŏng Tojŏn) encouraged Nam Ŭn to write an appeal to the king as follows: “The troops have been trained, and we have enough provisions. When the time is right, we will be able to recapture the territory that had once belonged to King Tongmyŏng of Koguryŏ.” However, the king did not believe that was the case. Nam Ŭn repeated this idea several times, and the king asked about it to Chŏng Tojŏn. Explaining that the Jurchens had grown to rule China in the past, Chŏng said Nam was trustworthy and even used toch’am (a book of prophecy) to support his argument.30
Yi Sŏnggye put forth the principle of “yiso yŏkdae” as an argument against the conquest of Liaodong above all else. He also came up with other reasons, such as the Japanese invasion, emphasizing the fact that the timing was not right due to a number of factors. Yi explained that if a large number of expeditionary forces leave the country, Japanese invaders might take the opportunity to invade Korea, and also mobilizing troops in the summer would be inappropriate as weapons would be damaged and epidemics could occur during the rainy season.31 A similar reasoning followed the plan to conquer Liaodong even after the establishment of Chosŏn. Cho Chun, who opposed Chŏng Tojŏn’s plan to conquer Liaodong, did not object to the fact that the conquest of Liaodong would simply be an act of reclaiming the territory of Koguryŏ. Cho Chun proposed exercising discretion on the conquest of Liaodong as 1) military actions without cause in the early years of the founding of the dynasty when Ming’s weaknesses had not been revealed would be reckless, 2) the people of Chosŏn were suffering from a lean year and civil engineering projects, and 3) military provisions were insufficient.32
In response, Chŏng Tojŏn took a step further from the conquest of Liaodong and explained to T’aejo about how the barbarians from the border regions had hegemony in China. In other words, Chŏng stressed the fact that Yi Sŏnggye himself could become the emperor of China and raised T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye’s expectations. Besides, the conquest of Liaodong was a way to abolish private military forces without internal conflict, 33 and an opportunity to make an ally of the Jurchens in the border region.
As can be seen from the case of Cho Chun, we can glean that only a few government officials of the Chosŏn court agreed with Chŏng Tojŏn’s plan to conquer Liaodong.34 The meritorious retainers at the founding of the Chosŏn dynasty were concerned about losing their private military forces in the process of organizing troops for the conquest of Liaodong. Moreover, they feared that Ming China might invade Chosŏn, as the Mongols had in the past, if Chosŏn attacked the Ming without a clear cause since the Ming did not provide any reason for Chosŏn to start a war albeit maintaining a high-handed position toward Chosŏn. Since there were a number of precedents of Chinese dynasties that successfully unified the country and then invaded Korea, it seems that Korean officials must have believed that waging a war to conquer Liaodong would provide a reason for the Ming to attack Chosŏn. Therefore, the Prince’s Rebellion had been a coup that Yi Pangwŏn started when he was robbed of the crown prince title, but it was able to succeed thanks to the help of those government officials who wanted to prevent Chŏng Tojŏn and Yi Sŏnggye’s plan to abolish private military armies and to conquer Liaodong.
Around this time, the fourth son of Ming Taizu became crowned as Yongle Emperor after a successful coup in Ming China. Yongle actively pursued an expansionist policy, conquering Vietnam, crushing Mongolia himself, and appeasing the Jurchens. Among them, the establishment of Jianzhou Guard created tension in Chosŏn. Jianzhou Guard was established in the first year of Emperor Yongle’s reign (1403) to enlist the Jurchens in the southern Manchurian region around the Amnok and Tuman River basins by offering amnesty.
(C-1) The three government bodies discussed the issue of the Jurchens. The emperor sent an imperial message to the Jurchens, offering amnesty to Odoli Clan, Huligai Clan, Udige Clan, and others, and ordering them to pay tribute to the Ming. The Jurchens originally belong to us (Korea), which was the reason the three government bodies held a discussion.35
(C-2) I (T’aejong) ordered Ha Ryun, the director of the Bureau of State Records, and Kwŏn Kŭn, the second deputy director of the Bureau of State Records, to open the history archives and investigate Yun Kwan’s conquest of the eastern Jurchen tribes and establishment of a stele nearby in the Annals of King Yejong from the Koryŏ dynasty. This was to take action in response to the Ming emperor sending Wang Keren to the Jurchens and attempting to establish Jianzhou Guard.36
In the early Chosŏn dynasty, a considerable number of the Jurchen tribes in the Tuman River basin belonged to Chosŏn. As Ming China expanded its power over Liaodong, Chosŏn strove to keep the Jurchens from falling under the Ming’s control. However, when Ahacu of Huligai, who resided near Fengzhou, became the commander of the Jianzhou Guard and began to cooperate with Ming China in its attempt to control Liaodong, Dudu Mentemmu (K. Tongmaenggach’ŏpmoka, 동맹가첩목아) of Odoli, who had maintained friendly relations with Chosŏn, was incorporated into the Jinzhou Guard as well.37 When Dudu Mentemmu paid a visit to the Ming court, Yongle personally made him the regional commissioner of the Jianzhou Guard,38 and the struggle between Chosŏn and Ming surrounding the enlistment of the Jurchens began to turn in the Ming’s favor.
The Ming court’s enlistment of the Jurchens was focused less on territorial expansion and more on controlling the Jurchens. By separating and controlling the Jurchens residing in the Amnok and Tuman River basins in smaller sections, Ming China not only prevented the Jurchens from uniting to build power but also attempted to deter Chosŏn from advancing into Liaodong.39 Due to the Ming’s expansion of power and the Jurchens surrender to the Ming, Chosŏn was no longer able to advance into Liaodong. As a result, King Sejong focused on defending against the Jurchens with the Amnok and Tuman Rivers as boundaries. The Jinzhou Jurchens paid tribute to Ming and Chosŏn and proposed to enter into friendly relations, but continued to invade the Chosŏn border repeatedly.
In consequence, Sejong sent Ch’oe Yundŏk and Yi Ch’ŏn up the Amnok River to subdue the Jurchens, and established four districts—Yŏyŏn, Chasŏng, Much’ang, and Uye. He also sent Kim Chongsŏ to subjugate the Jurchens in the Tuman River basin and established six garrisons—Kyŏngwŏn, Chongsŏng, Hoeryŏng, Kyŏnghŭng, Onsŏng, and Puryŏng. After the six garrisons and four districts were established during Sejong’s reign, Chosŏn no longer attempted to advance into Liaodong. Asserting Chosŏn’s vested rights in a region where the Jurchens resided at a time when Ming China was strong contained the difficulty of waging an all-out war with the Jurchens.
As northward expansion became difficult with Chosŏn’s boundary fixed at the Amnok and Tuman Rivers, Sejong became interested in the region north of the Tuman River. He found justification for territorial expansion at Konghŏm Garrison and Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass, which was established by Yun Kwan.40 However, when Yongle relocated the capital city to Beijing and gradually became interested in the northeast, Chosŏn’s northern expansion policy became even more difficult to realize. The only action that Sejong could take was to leave a record in Sejong sillok chiriji for the future generations.

The Publication of Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam: From Sejo to Sŏngjong

After establishing diplomatic relations with the Yuan, the people of Koryŏ visited China via land routes by crossing the Amnok River and passing through the Tongp’alch’am region, where eight relay stations including Yunshan (K. Yŏnsan), Longfeng (K. Yongbong), Kaizhou (K. Kaeju), and Tangzhan (K. T’angch’am) were located on the road from Ŭiju to Liaoyang.41 During the Chosŏn dynasty, the Ming had control over Liaodong, yet the Ming’s power did not reach to the east of Yunshan’gwan of the Tongp’alch’am region. To utilize the area where the Jurchen resided as the rear base, Ming China established provincial headquarters in Nuergan (Heilongjiang and Vladivostok area, 奴兒干), where the Songhua and Amur Rivers met, in 1409 (9th year of T’aejong’s reign). However, this area was impossible to govern in practice.42 Consequently, Ming China notified Chosŏn about dispatching troops to the Tongp’alch’am region under the pretext of protecting Chosŏn’s envoys to China from the Jurchens who were threatening the road along the Tongp’alch’am region.43 This seems to have been a part of Ming’s policy to capture the northeastern territories by establishing garrisons.
Yang Sŏngji opposed the Ming’s policy, arguing that if Ming China were to establish a garrison around Kaizhou, the residents of Pyŏngan Province who had been suffering from forced labor might relocate to Kaizhou on the one hand, and on the other hand, Ming might discover Chosŏn’s weaknesses, ultimately posing a threat to Chosŏn.44 However, there was no legitimate reason to stop Ming China from establishing a garrison around Kaizhou.
During the reign of King Sŏngjong, Ming China notified Chosŏn of its intention to establish relay stations in Chindong (Zhendong), Chinyi (Zhenyi), and Ponghwang (Fenghuang) for the safety of the route Chosŏn envoys take to reach the Ming court.45 While Chosŏn hesitated in responding to the Ming’s notification, Ming China set up an outpost at Tangzhan, about 60 li (18 miles) from Ŭiju, bringing Ming’s military base close to the Amnok River basin. In this way, Ming China was able to turn the idle land of the Tongp’alch’am region into Ming territory.46 Although Chosŏn was unable to hide its anxiety internally, it could not openly express its grievances about the Ming. Rather, Chosŏn conveyed gratitude for protecting the Chosŏn envoys by establishing outposts and towns along the route in the Tongp’alch’am region.47
Chosŏn had no means to stop Ming’s advancement to the east. As a preventive measure, Chosŏn built fortresses and walls48 to stop Ming forces from crossing the Amnok River at worst. However, this was not undertaken due to complaints from the people regarding the procurement of food and manpower. Regarding these circumstances, Yang Sŏngji made the following appeal to the king:
(D-1) I heard that China is planning on building a garrison at Kaizhou in the near future. Upon repeatedly thinking on this issue, it worries me greatly. Kaizhou had been built around Mount Fenghuang, which stands erect with a large river that runs through the center. Three sides of the mountain are extremely rugged and dangerous terrain, and people and horses can access the mountain only on one side. It is a natural fortress where only one guard at a checkpoint can defeat even 10,000 troops, Tang Taizong had occupied Kaizhou and conquered Koguryŏ, and the displaced people of the Liao dynasty had resided in Kaizhou and planned to revive their nation. Therefore now as before, everyone knows that this region is related to our country. ··· Moreover, it only takes a day from Kaizhou to reach the Amnok River—it is as close as the front yard is from a house, and can even be likened to two corners of a chair. If Ming builds a fortress at Kaizhou, they will not stop at Kaizhou but will also build a fortress at Tangzhan. And if they build a fortress in Tangzhan, they will not stop and build fortresses everywhere.49
(D-2) Chŏng Ch’angson, Sim Hoe, and others discussed, “The diplomatic message from the Ming military bureau clearly stated reasons for setting up guard as follows: First, it is to stop the Jinzhou Jurchens from looking into this region; second, to provide an accommodation for Chosŏn envoys en route between Chosŏn and Ming. Their message was gentle and logical, so how can we ask them not to build a post?50
Yang Sŏngji opposed the establishment of Kaizhou Guard because it was only a day’s journey from the Amnok River, meaning it was close enough in distance for Ming China to attack Chosŏn if necessary. He also feared that once the Ming built a fortress in Kaizhou, they would build another fortress in Tangzhan and other surrounding places, which would put Chosŏn in grave danger. Moreover, Yang was concerned over the burden that might be put on the people of Chosŏn and Chosŏn’s treasury if the Ming were to request grain and equipment to build the fortress. However, he faced strong opposition from Chŏng Ch’angson and other government officials, who argued that they had no reason to stop the Ming from building the fortress, and was unable to protest against Ming’s construction of the fortress in Kaizhou.
Yang Sŏngji also pointed out that the place where Ming was planning to build a fortress was part of the territory that had been guarded by Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses that not even the Jin dynasty invaded.51 Yang’s emphasis on Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses rather than the former territory of Koguryŏ and Parhae seems to be related to the geographical treatises from early Chosŏn, which recorded that the capital of Koguryŏ was located to the south of the Amnok River, and also in line with the fact that people of early Chosŏn did not consider Parhae as part of the Korean history.

Liaodong in Sejong sillok chiriji and Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam

During the Chosŏn dynasty, a number of chiriji (geographical treatises) were published, including Kyŏngsangdo chiriji (Geographical treatise of Kyŏngsang Province) in 1425 and Sinch’an p’aldo chiriji (The Geography of the Eight Provinces) in 1432 (14th year in Sejong’s reign). Sejong sillok chiriji (Geographical treatise in the Annals of King Sejong) was based on the Sinch’an p’aldo chiriji and included information from between 1491 (1st year of King Sejong’s reign) to 1432 (14th year in King Sejong’s reign), which had not been included in Sinch’an p’aldo chiriji. Furthermore, the changes in the Amnok and Tuman River basins until the end of Sejong’s reign were reflected in the geographical treatise as well. Afterwards in 1479 (10th year in the reign of Sŏngjong), poetry and prose were added to P’aldo chiriji, and it was published as Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (Survey of the geography of Korea) in 1481. Then, in 1530 (25th year in Chungjong’s reign), a revised and augmented edition of the survey was published. Therefore, we can assume that Sejong sillok chiriji contains the territorial awareness of Koreans from early Chosŏn to the time of King Sejong, while Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam reflects a changed awareness of geography during the times of King Sejo and King Sŏngjong. First, this paper will examine the additional records on border regions in Sejong sillok chiriji and Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam.52
(E-1) “Kyŏngwŏn Metropolitan Prefecture (Kyŏngwŏn-dohobu),” Sejong sillok chiriji: Formerly Kongju and sometimes referred to as Kwangju. It had been occupied by the Manchus for a long time until Koryŏ general Yun Kwan expelled them from the region and placed Konghŏm Garrison defense commander in charge of this region.
Kŏyang Fortress (Kŏyangsŏng, 巨陽城)···Originally built by Koryŏ gen eral Yun Kwan. About 60 li (18 miles) to the west from Kŏyang is Sŏnch’un Prefecture, where Yun Kwan erected a stele. Engravings decorated all four sides of the stele, but the Manchus carved away the engravings. Later on, when people dug under the writing that had been carved away, there were four characters “Koryŏ chigyŏng (border of Koryo).” In the north of Sŏnch’un Prefecture, along Soha Rivere, there is Konghŏm Garrison, which had been set up by Yun Kwan.53
(E-2) “Kyŏngwŏn Metropolitan Prefecture,” Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam: Formerly, Kongju. (Sometimes referred to as Kwangju. Later on, a person found a copper seal while digging, and the seal was engraved with six characters, “Kwangju pangŏjiin.”) It had been occupied by the Jurchens for a long time, until Yun Kwan from Koryŏ chased them away. Afterwards, Yun Kwan built a fortress and built a defense post in Konghŏm Garrison.
【Historical site】 About Kŏyang Fortress, it is said, “This place was built by Yun Kwan of Koryŏ, and Sŏnch’ullyong Pass is located at about 60 li (18 miles) to the west.”
【Nature】 The following places are located on the other side of the Tuman River. The Hunchun River originates from the land of the Jurchens, passes through Tongnim Fortress, and flows into the Tuman River. This is the place where the Odoli tribe resides. Subin River originates from Mount Paekdu and flows north into Soha River while another branch becomes Sokp’yŏng River, passes through Konghŏm Garrison and Sŏnchullyŏng Pass to Kŏyang for about 120 li (39 miles), and finally reaches Amin and flows into the sea.54
(E-3) “Hoeryŏng Metropolitan Prefecture,” Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam: 【Historical site】 Konghŏm Garrison. From Goryŏng Garrison, when you cross the Tuman River, go over Gorai, pass through Odong Relay Station and Yŏngga Relay Station, you reach Soha River. At the riverside is the former site of Konghŏm Garriosn. In Koryŏsa chiriji (Geographical Treatise in the History of Koryŏ), it is stated, “Konghŏm Garrison was built in the third year of King Yejong’s reign, and a defense commander was stationed there. The fortress was built in the sixth year (of King Yejong’s reign).” In the annotation, it is referred to as Kongju or Kwangju. It is said to be located to the southeast of Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass and to the northeast of Mount Paekdu. If Kyŏngwŏn had been Kongju in the past, it seems that Konghŏm Garrison would be located to the southeast of Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass, northeast of Mount Paekdu, and along the Soha River. However, it cannot be found.55
In Sejong and Sŭngnam, Kyŏngwŏn Metropolitan Prefecture was referred to as Kongju or Kwangju, while Konghŏm Garrison was noted to have been referred to as Kongju or Kwangju in Koryŏsa. The locations of these two places are noted differently.
However, considering the fact that records in Sejong and Sŭngnam both indicated that the defense post of Konghŏm Garrison had been established in Kyŏngwŏn Metropolitan Prefecture, it seems that the record in Koryŏsa might have been made in error.
The information about Konghŏm Garrison built by Yun Kwŏn and Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass in Sejong was listed under Hoeryŏng Metropolitan Prefecture in Sŭngnam. Both records indicated that Konghŏm Garrison and Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass are located at about 700 li (218 miles) to the north of Tuman River, but the record from Sŭngnam cited Koryŏsa regarding the location of the two sites and noted that it cannot be investigated because they were located in foreign territory. In addition, the record from Sŭngnam stated that the location of Konghŏm Garrison could not be confirmed, admitting to the fact that the listed information was not based on thorough historical research. Instead, it explained that if Kyŏngwŏn could be assumed to be Kongju, the place along Soha River to the southeast of Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass and northeast of Mount Paekdu could be seen as the site of Konghŏm Garrison. It seems the editor of Sŭngnam did not find the records in Sejong or Koryŏsa completely trustworthy.
There wasn’t a huge difference between Sejong and Sŭngnam. Both geographic treatises pointed to 700 li (218 miles) north of Tuman River as the place where Yun Kwan’s stele had been erected. However, while Sejong asserted that the regions north of Tuman River were also part of the Koryŏ territory, Sŭngnam specified that it was located on the other side of Tuman River, clarifying that it was no longer part of the Korean territory although it had been part of Koryŏ’s territory in the past. However, the fact that the editors of this geographic treatise included information on the area north of the Tuman River, albeit stating that it was not part of Chosŏn’s territory, seems to suggest that the editors of Sŭngnam believed it was Korean territory that needed to be reclaimed in the future.56
It is also likely that the record in Sejong could have been created based on Koryŏ wangjo sillok (Annals of the Koryŏ Dynasty), which is believed to have existed during that time. In Koryŏsa, which began to be compiled in 1449 (3rd year in Sejong’s reign) and was completed in 1451 (1st year in Munjong’s reign), after the completion of Sejong, the northwestern border was recorded as the Amnok River since the Tang dynasty, and the northeastern border was Sonch’ullyŏng Pass. It stated that the northwestern border did not reach the boundary of the former Koguryŏ territory, but the northeastern border had been located beyond Sŏnch’ullyŏng,57 specifying that the area north of the Tuman River had been Koryŏ territory. Yet the compilers of geographical treatises in the early Chosŏn dynasty believed that the northeastern area was not part of Koguryŏ’s territory, and therefore seems to have emphasized Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses.
Although Sejong established four districts and six garrisons to designate the Amnok River and Tuman River as the Chosŏn border, it is possible that he left records about the locations of Sŏnch’ullyŏng Pass and Konghŏm Garrison with the intention to create favorable position for Chosŏn if territorial disputes were to occur in the future.

Liaodong and t Historical Awareness in Early Chosŏn

Not only Koryŏsa chiriji but also Sejong and Sŭngnam mention “former Koguryŏ territoriy” and “Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses.” However, none of the three documents mention Parhae. Also, all of the three documents also estimate the location of the capital cities and territories of of Kojosŏn and Koguryŏ to the south of the Korean peninsula. Let us examine the following records:
(F-1) Sejong sillok chiriji “P’yŏngan-do Anju-mok Sŏngch’ŏn Metropolitan Prefecture”: Originally the former capital of Biryu, governed by King Songyang.
(F-2) Sejong sillok chiriji “P’yŏngan Province P’yŏngyang District”: Originally the ancient capital of the Three Chosŏn (Tan’gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn, and Wiman Chosŏn).
(F-3) Sejong sillok chiriji “Hamgil Province”: Southern boundary begins at Ch’ŏllyŏng and the northern boundary ends at Konghŏm Garrison. The area spans over 1,700 li (528 miles)
(F-4) Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 53 “P’yŏngan Province Yonggang Prefecture”: 【Fortress】 Ansi Fortress. Located on Mount Osŏk at a distance of 5 li (1.5 miles) from the magistracy of the prefecture. It is a firm stronghold located on rugged terrain. The people say, “Tang Taizong personally came to conquer this fortress, but failed.” ○ In Da Ming yitongzhi (Comprehensive gazetteer of the Great Ming), Ansi Fortress was located to the northeast of Kaejuwi (C. Gaizhouwei). It was built by the Han, and Tang Taizong launched an attack on this fortress but failed, upon which Xue Rengui climbed this fortress in white armor. Parhae established Ch’ŏlju at this fortress; the Jin dynasty renamed it T’angji Prefecture and incorporated it into Kaeju. Wŏnsŏng mentioned Ansi Fortress, thinking this was Ansi Fortress, but it is not the same one.
(F-5) Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 53 “Ŭiju District, P’yŏngan Province”: 【Historical site】 Kungnae Fortress (Kungnaesŏng). Sometimes referred to as “Pulnae Fortress.” I now inform you that in Chŏng Inji’s Koryŏsa pyŏngji (History of Koryŏ, Book on Military System), it is recorded, “Since the former border of Kungnae Fortress began in the west where the Amnok River flowed into the sea, Kungnae Fortress must be located within the boundaries of former Inju.” In Koguryŏji (Records of Koguryŏ), Kim Pusik wrote, “I do not know the exact location of Kungnae Forgress, but it must have been located within the boundaries of the Han dynasty’s Hyŏnt’ogun to the north of the Amnok River, and to the east of Liaoyang, a prominent city of Liao.”58 It is not clear which is the correct location of Kungnae Fortress, but temporarily, I will follow Chŏng Inji’s theory and add it here.
(F-6) Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 54 “Yŏngbyŏn Greater Metroplitan Prefecture, P’yŏngan Province: 【Historical site】 Mount T’aebaek
According to the “Sŏngch’ŏn Metropolitan Prefecture” section in Sejong, the ancient capital of Piryu, governed by King Songyang, had been located in P’yŏngan Province region. The records specified that this was the Cholbon area, where Chumong first founded his country after defeating Songyang. The same information can be found in Koryŏsa59 and Sŭngnam as well.60 Currently, Cholbon is considered to have been located at the site of Wunu Mountain Fortress in Liaodong.
Both Sejong and Sŭngnam indicated that P’yŏngyang District was the ancient capital of the Three Chosŏn—Tan’gun Chosŏn, Kija Chosŏn, and Wiman Chosŏn. In the “P’yŏngyang District” section of Sŭngnam, P’yŏngyang was noted as the ancient capital of Koguryŏ.61 In Sejong, only Cholbon and P’yŏngyang were recorded as the capital of Koguryŏ, but in Sŭngnam, the compiler added that Kungnae Fortress was located at Ŭiju District. Currently, a majority of scholars believe that Koguryŏ’s Kungnae Fortress was located at the site of Ji’an, China. As for Kojosŏn, most people believe that Tan’gun founded a nation in the Liaodong region, and he moved down from Liaodong to the Korean peninsula later on.
According to the Samguk sagi (Historical record of the Three Kingdoms of Korea), Cholbon and Hongsŭnggol, where Chumong decided to found the capital city of his country, were located within the boundaries of Hyŏnt’o District and to the west of Liaoyang of the Liao dynasty. Then why was it reduced to the south of the Amnok River in Sejong? Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) also recorded that “Koguryŏ is Cholbon puyŏ. Some people claim that it is the present day Hezhou or Chengzhou, but they are all wrong. Cholbon is located near the border of Liaodong.” 62 In this way, Samkuk yusa once again confirmed that Koryugyŏ’s capital lay in Liaodong. Yet, certain records stated, “Some people claim that Cholbon is present day Hezhou or Chengzhou, but they are wrong.” These records seem to hint at the fact that there were people who believed Koguryo’s capital was located in the south of the Amnok River in late Koryŏ.63 It is difficult to discern the information that was used to support such an argument, but it can be assumed that compilers of geographical treatises chose to record certain perspectives depending on their own understanding.
In the Chosŏn dynasty, King T’aejong made official the ancestral rituals to Tan’gun, Kija, the progenitor of the Three Kingdoms, and King T’aejo of Koryŏ on the national level, claiming that Chosŏn was the rightful heir to all of the nations that had previously existed on the land.64 Consequently, Chosŏn attempted to incorporate the territories of the previous dynasties into Chosŏn’s own territory. If Chosŏn were to fail in reclaiming all the regions that had once belonged to one of the former dynasties or kingdoms of Korea, it meant that Chosŏn’s territory itself would not be complete, and this was a factor that could damage the legitimacy of the Chosŏn dynasty as a successor to the previous dynasties.65 However, this situation seems to have arisen as a result of Chosŏn’s weakened desire for expansion and its intention to maintain a stable relationship with Ming China.66 As a result, Chosŏn recorded the territories of Kojosŏn and Koguryŏ to the south of the Amnok River when compiling geographical treatises.
In these historical documents, it was possible to hypothesize the territory of Koguryŏ in the area south of the Amnok River, centering on its capital city of P’yŏngyang, as a city named P’yŏngyang was located on the Korean peninsula. Yet, if Chosŏn were to consider Parhae as one of its preceding dynasties, it meant that Chosŏn was an incomplete successor, as most of Parhae’s territories were located in Manchuria.67 As a result, Chosŏn opted to disregard Parhae. However, the following information brings to question whether the people of Chosŏn ever even thought about considering Parhae as a part of Korean ancestry.
(G-1) Yang Sŏngji, the director of the Office of Astronomy and Geomancy, addressed a memorial to the king. “I have looked through Tangshi (History of the Tang Dynasty). Taejoyŏng from Parhae was a general from Koguryŏ who suddenly rose to power and fell, and therefore there is nothing to praise about him. However, in the prosperous arts and culture of the Eastern nation, Tangshi only praises Parhae and does not mention Samhan. I find this shameful.68
(G-2) [I have looked into this matter, and] How is the Khitans’ conquest of Parhae related to us that T’aejo of Koryŏ not only refused a gift from the Khitans but also made an enemy out of them in retribution for Parhae? He refused the camel from the Khitans and let it starve to death, and also exiled the Khitan envoy to an island.69
(G-1) is about an appeal that Yang Sŏngji made to the king, asserting that the King’s birthday should be referred to as “chŏril (節日)” as people had in Koguryŏ. Even Yang, who is considered one of the most independent and reform-minded politician, did not seem to consider Parhae as ancestors of Koreans, the same way he did not consider Koguryŏ as ancestors. Yang Sŏngji saw Parhae and Silla as opposing nations, and as a result, he complained that Tang did not mention Silla at all while praising Parhae as haedongsŏngguk, or a powerful country in the East.
Also, Tongguk t’onggam (Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom [Korea]), which began to be compiled during the reign of Sejo and was completed in the reign of Sŏngjong, criticized the fact that T’aejo of Koryŏ let the camel that the Khitan envoy brought as a present starve to death and sent the envoy on an exile in retribution of the Khitans’ conquest of Parhae. The compiler of Tongguk t’onggam berated T’aejo Wang Kŏn of Koryŏ, asserting that the Khitans losing faith in Parhae had nothing to do with Chosŏn, and that T’aejo’s diplomatic blunder brought about the invasion of the Khitans later on.70 This illustrates that the people of Chosŏn lacked the awareness that the people of Parhae were also their ancestors, let alone the territorial issues.
It is possible that this perception became predominant during the reign of Ta’ejong, after T’aejo was dethroned and Chŏng Tojŏn was killed. T’aejong seized power with the support of Ha Ryun and Kwŏn Kŭn by eliminating Chŏng Tojŏn and his faction, who aggravated Chosŏn’s diplomatic relations with Ming China by attempting to conquer Liaodong and chose Pangsŏk as the Crown prince. Since he succeeded, his next task was to justify the coup. In this context, T’aejong gave up on the conquest of Liaodong using neo-Confucian justification.71 Afterwards, Sejong established six garrisons and four districts to designate the Amnok River and Tuman River regions as the natural border of Korea. Yu Hyŏngwŏn, a sirhak (practical learning) scholar from late Chosŏn expressed his criticism of the geographical awareness that appears in Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam, which designated Chosŏn’s borders as the Tuman and Amnok Rivers in Tongguk yŏjiji, and brought limitations of realistic abandonment of the Manchurian region.72
It seems that T’aejong and Sejong had no choice but to give up on Liaodong because of the Jurchens to the north and pressure from the Ming dynasty, but also because they could not criticize T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye’s retreat from Wihwa Island, as it became an important event in T’aejo’s founding of the Chosŏn Dynasty.73 Since both T’aejong and Sejong had to look on their father Yi Sŏnggye’s withdrawal of troops in a positive light, it became difficult for them to actively make arguments for the conquest of Liaodong. This could very well be related to the ingrained limitations of the Chosŏn dynasty at the time of its founding. Afterwards, the Chosŏn government not only returned the territory but also repatriated the people who left Liaodong on their own during the Ming period, in attempt to avoid any conflict with the Ming.74

Conclusion

Korea’s direct interest in the Liaodong region in the early Chosŏn dynasty can be traced through Parhae and Koguryŏ, back to Yun Kwan, who built nine fortresses after defeating the Jurchens. In the second year of Yejong’s reign (1107), Yun Kwan wiped out the Jurchens and built nine fortresses in the region he captured from the Jurchens, but the Koryŏ court returned this region to the Jurchens voluntarily. After a period of Yuan intervention, Koryŏ once again expressed its intention to recapture the northern region through King Kongmin’s policy to conquer Tongnyŏng Commandery. His objective at the time was to conquer Tongnyŏng Commandery and reclaim the land that had once belonged to Koguryŏ. Yi Sŏnggye had captured the regions up to Liaoyang, but did not succeed in reclaiming the territory due to the difficulties in procuring military provisions and other reasons.
In 1385 (11th year of Wu’s reign), the Ming conquered Liaodong after defeating Naghachu of Northern Yuan. Afterwards, the Ming notified Chosŏn of the establishment of Tieling Guard, emphasizing that all the territories of Yuan now belonged to Ming China. In opposition, Ch’oe Yŏng and King Wu attempted a conquest of Liaodong but failed when Yi Sŏnggye withdrew his troops from Wihwa Island.
Succeeding the Koryŏ dynasty, the Chosŏn dynasty claimed to engage in sadae, but this did not mean that Chosŏn’s relationship with Ming China had stabilized. Ming Taizu recognized Chosŏn as a legitimate dynasty of Korea, but continued to harbor suspicion against Chosŏn. Chosŏn also could not simply maintain friendly relations with the Ming, as previous Chinese dynasties had invaded Korea upon unifying the country, as can be seen in the case of the Han, Sui, Tang, Liao, and Yuan. Therefore Chosŏn feared that the Ming would subdue the Jurchens and turn its eyes on Chosŏn, which would then border Ming China.
To prevent a Ming invasion of Korea, Chosŏn had to make an ally of the Jurchens and launch a preemptive attack to annex Liaodong. Chosŏn’s government officials must have believed that if this plan worked, a power triangle of the Mongols to the northwest, the Ming to the south, and Chosŏn to the east can be created, and Chosŏn would be able to maintain stable diplomatic relations. With this in mind, Chŏng Tojŏn joined forces with T’aejo Yi Sŏnggye and planned to conquer Liaodong but failed due to Yi Pangwŏn’s coup.
During the reign of T’aejong in Chosŏn, the Ming established Jinzhou Guard to control the Jurchens. In response, King Sejong established six garrisons and four districts while the Jurchen tribes were in disorder, making the regions south of the Amnok and Tuman Rivers permanent Korean territory. Moreover, all the geographical records from the previous dynasties and kingdoms had been fixed to indicate that Korea existed to the south of the Amnok River in an attempt to protect Korean territory south of the Amnok River from a Ming invasion. These facts were recorded in Sejong sillok chiriji, Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam, and Koryŏsa.
As the history of Korea was fixed within the region to the south of the Amnok River in history books, the Chosŏn people’s interest in and volition to conquer Liaodong could not but weaken. The record that Liaodong had once belonged to Korea could only be proven in part from the nine fortresses Yun Kwan built in the region.
T’aejong and Sejong had to abandon their conquest of Liaodong due to the Jurchens in the north and intense pressure from the Ming, but it was also because they were unable to criticize Yi Sŏnggye’s retreat from Wihwa Island, which served as a chance for Yi to come into power. Since both T’aejong and Sejong had to look on their father Yi Sŏnggye’s withdrawal of troops in a positive light, it became difficult to actively assert the conquest of Liaodong. This could also be related to the ingrained limitations of the Chosŏn dynasty at the time it was founded. Criticisms and reflections on this point began to surface through Han Paekgyŏm, who published Tongguk chiriji (Treatise on Korean Geography), and Yu Hyŏngwŏn, the author of Tongguk yŏjiji (The Topography of Korea), in the seventeenth century.

Notes

1  Regarding the location of Yun Kwan’s nine fortresses, there are a few different scholarly theories: first is the Hamhŭng Plain area (from Chŏngju Fortress to Hamgwallyŏng Pass), second is the Chŏngju-Ŭlligollyŏng Pass area (Ulligollyŏng Pass located in Kilju), and the third is the Hamhŭng Plain-area north of the Tuman River (Kŏnghŏm Garrison located 700 li to the north of the Tuman River). (Kim, Sunja, “Koryŏ-Chosŏnch’o Han-Chung-gan yŏngt’o-e taehan Chungguk hakgye-ŭi sigak” (The Chinese academic perspective on the territorial issues between Korea and China between the tenth and fifteenth century). Yŏksa-wa hyŏnsil (History and Reality) 76 (2010): 303.

2  Kim, Sunja, “Koryŏ Wŏn-ŭi yŏngt’o chŏngch’aek in’gu chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu” (A study on the territorial disputes and population control issues between Koryŏ and Yuan). Yŏksa-wa hyŏnsil (History and Reality) 60 (2006): 257–258.

Kim Sunja explained that this was an expansion of the awareness of sovereignty grounded on the nationality principle.

Koryŏsa (The history of Koryŏ), December, 18th year in Kongmin’s reign

4  The first conquest involved Koryŏ conquering Ura Mountain Fortress, where Tongnyŏng Commandery was located and Kisaintemur was defending. The second conquest involved an attack on Liaocheng between August and December of the 19th year in Komgin’s reign. The third attack was launched on Tongnyŏng Commandery in the 20th year of Kongmin’s reign. But the Koryŏ army withdrew due to the difficulties in procuring provisions. Kim Sunja argued that Koryŏ was focused on seeking out and bringing back the people of Koryŏ rather than securing territory. (Kim, Sunja, Ibid., 57–59.)

Koryŏsa Vol. 137, Yŏljŏn, February of the 14th year in Sinu’s reign, Kyŏngsin; Yangch’on sŏngsaeng munjip (Collection of Writings by Yangch’on Kwŏn Kŭn) Vol. 24, “Sadaep’yojŏllyu (事大表箋類).”

6  Ibid., February of the 14th year in Sinu’s reign, Kyŏngsin.

7  Sŏ, Inwŏn. Chosŏn ch’ogi chiriji yŏn’gu (A study of geographical treatises from early Chosŏn), (Hyean, 2002); Pak, Inho, Chosŏn sigi yŏksaga-wa yŏksa chiri insik (Joseon dynasties, the history and historical geographical awareness), (Ihoe, 2003); O, Jongrok, Chosŏn ch’ogi yanggye-ŭi kunsa chedo-wa kukbang (Military institutions and dynastic defense on the northern and eastern borders in early Chosŏn), (Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2014); Pak, Wŏnho, “Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu” (A study on Chosŏn’s relations with China in early Ming), (Iljogak, 2002); Nam, Ŭihyŏn, Myŏngdae yodong chibae chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu (A study on Ming policy on governing Liaodong), (Kangwŏn Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2008), et al.

8  In 1269, (10th year of Wŏnjong’s reign), Ch’oe T’an, a clerk for the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwestern Frontier-District, and others started a revolt under the pretext of suppressing Im Yŏn, to dethrone Wŏnjong and enthrone Angyŏnggong Ch’ang as the new king. At the time, he surrended to Yuan with 54 fortresses in the Northern Regions including Sŏgyŏng and six fortresses in Sohae Island to the north of Chabiryŏng Pass. King Shizu of Yuan established Tongnyŏng commandery in Sŏgyŏng and appointed Ch’oe T’an as the commander of Tongnyŏng commandery.

Koryŏsa Vol. 30, 16th year of Ch’ungnyŏl’s reign, March, Chŏngmyo

10  Yi, Chŏngsin, “Yŏngny^onggong Chun yŏn’gu” (A study on Yŏngnyŏnggong Chun), Koryŏ sidae-ŭi chŏngch’i pyŏndong-gwa taeoe chŏngch’aek (Political transformations and diplomatic policies in Koryŏ), (Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2004).

11  Kim, Hyewŏn. “Koryŏ hugi Simwang yŏn’gu” (A study on the King of Shen in late Koryŏ), (PhD diss., Ewha Womens University, 1999).

12  Kim, Han’gyu, Yodongsa (The history of Liaodong), (Munhak-gwa Jisŏngsa, 2004), 531. In the Liaodong region at the time, Naghachu was in Jinshan; Kisaintemur in Tongnyŏng Commandery; Hong Pobo and Ko Kano in Liaoyang; and Yu Ik, the governor of Liaoyang in the Haeju and Gaeju area. Yu Ik surrendered to Ming in 1371 (20th year in Kongmin’s reign).

13  Koryŏsa Vol. 114, Yŏlchŏn. Chi Yongsu <The Yuan unified China and married the princess off, granting her the Liaoshen region as t’angmokŭp, divided into several villages.>

14  Kim, Hyewŏn, “Koryŏ hugi,” 181.

15  Koryŏsa Vol. 42, May of the 19th year in Kongmin’s reign, Kapin <My [the Ming emperor’s] troops have not yet left for Liaodong and Shenyang, and I expect violent and wild forces may appear there. They will not be of a great worry for China, but I fear that they may create an upheaval in Koryŏ. ```I grant the king the power to undertake this matter and make the necessary decisions.>

Kim, Sunja. “Koryŏmal taejungguk kwan’gye-ŭi pyŏnhwa-wa sinhŭng yusin-ŭi sadaeron” (The changes in Koryŏ-China relations in late Koryŏ and the theory of serving the great by the Neo-Confucians), Yŏksa-wa hyŏnsil (History and Reality) 15 (1995): 116.

16  Koryŏsa Vol. 42, December of the 19th year in Kongmin’s reign, Chŏngsa

17  Pak, Wŏnho, “Myŏng-gwaŭi kwan’gye” (Relations with the Ming). Han’guksa (The history of Korea) 22, (1995): 286.

18  Pak, Wŏnho, “Koryŏmal Chosŏnch’o taemyŏng oegyo-ŭi uyŏgokjŏl” (Vicissitudes of Korea’s diplomatic relations with Ming in late Koryŏ and early Chosŏn), Han’guksa simin kangjwa (Lectures on Korean history) 36. (2005): 83.

19  T’aejong sillok (The Annals of King T’aejong) Vol. 11, March 6 of the 6th year in T’aejong’s reign (Pyŏngsin)

20  T’aejong sillok Vol. 7, April 27 of the 4th year in T’aejong’s reign (1404, Chŏngyu). [T’aejong] ordered Ha Ryun, the director of the Bureau of State Records, and Kwŏn Kŭn, the second deputy director of the Bureau of State Records, to open the history archives and find information on the stele Yun Kwan erected after conquering the Jurchens in the east in the Annals of King Yejong from the previous dynasty. This was to prepare for responding to the news that the emperor sent Wang Keren to the Jurchens to establish Jianzhou Guard.

21  O, Jongrok, Chosŏn ch’ogi yanggye-ŭi kunsa chedo-wa kukbang (Military institutions and dynastic defense in northern and eastern borders in early Chosŏn), (Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2014), 225.

22  Pak, Wŏnho, “Myŏngch’o Chosŏn-ŭi Yodong kongbŏl kyehoek-gwa p’yojŏn munje” (Chosŏn’s plan to conquer Liaodong and the royal message incident during the early Ming dynasty), Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu (A study on Chosŏn’s relations with China in early Ming), (Iljogak, 2002).

23  T’aejo sillok (The Annals of King T’aejo) Vol. 14, May 15 of the 7th year of T’aejo’s reign (Kyŏngsin). <Han, Sui, Tang, Liao, Jin, Yuan, and other Chinese dynasties invaded Korea with their troops at the slightest discord with the rulers of the Korean peninsula, causing great harm to the Korean people. ····Envoys No Indo, Chŏng Ch’ong, and O Segyŏm went to the Yuan capital, but they have not returned. I fear that the Yuan may be plotting to conquer our land by detaining the envoys and turning them into guides for the Yuan.>

24  Kang, Sinhang, Han’guk-ŭi yŏkhak (Korea’s Dynamics), (Sŏul Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2000), 20–21. In early Chosŏn, the government trained interpreters for Chinese, Jurchen, Japanese, as well as Mongolian. It seems that Chosŏn continued to train Monoglian interpreters in the belief that they may be able to hold Ming in check by maintaining diplomatic relations with the Mongols, who were still strong.

25  Pak, Wŏnho, “Chosŏn ch’oji-ŭi Yodong kongbŏl nonjaeng” (The debate on conquering Liaodong in early Chosŏn), Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu (A study on Chosŏn’s relations with China in early Ming), (Iljogak, 2002), 81.

26  T’aejo sillok Vol. 3, May 23 of the 2nd year of T’aejo’s reign (Chŏngmyo). 欽差內 史黃永奇、崔淵等, 奉帝手詔來 一, 遣人至遼, 將布帛金銀之類, 假以行禮爲由, 意在 誘我邊將, 此生釁二也。一, 近者, 暗遣人說誘女眞, 帶家小五百餘名, 潛渡鴨江, 罪莫 大焉。 此生釁三也。

27  T’aejo sillok Vol. 4, July 22 of the 2nd year of T’aejo’s reign (Ŭlch’uk). 敎曰 “前朝 之季 僞主辛禑 頑凶狂悖 乃與其臣崔瑩 謀犯遼陽 督責諸將 將渡鴨綠江。時予爲右 軍都統使, 諭諸將以爲 “以小國犯天子之境 於義不順 況得罪天朝 則東方之民 殆無 類矣。··· 惟爾諸將 聽寡人之言 仗義還師 以安東方 肆予寡躬 得有今日.

28  T’aejo sillok Vol. 1, July 18 of the 1st year of T’aejo’s reign (Chŏngyu); T’aejo sillok Vol. 2, October 25 of the 1st year of T’aejo’s reign (Kyeyu); T’aejo sillok Vol. 3, June 1 of the 2nd year of T’aejo’s reign (Urhae).

29  Pak, Wŏnho, “Myŏngch’o Chosŏn-ŭi Yodong kongbŏl kyehoek-gwa p’yojŏn munje” (Chosŏn’s plan to conquer Liaodong and the royal message incident during the early Ming dynasty), Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa yŏn’gu (A study on Chosŏn’s relations with China in early Ming), (Iljogak, 2002).

30  T’aejong sillok Vol. 9, June 27 of the 5th year of T’aejong’s reign (1405, Sinmyo) “Yŏngŭijŏngbusa P’yŏngyangbuwŏn’gun Cho Chun-ŭi cholgi” (The death of Cho Chun, the deputy state councillor and Great Lord of P’yŏngyang). 使誾上書曰 “士 卒已鍊 糧餉已備 可以乘時復東明之舊壤” 太上殊不以爲然。誾屢言之 大上問道 傳。道傳歷論往古外夷得王中原者 深以誾言爲可信 且援引圖讖 傅會其說。

31  Koryŏsa Vol. 137, April in the 14th year of Wu’s reign.

32  T’aejong sillok Vol. 9, June of the 5th year in T’aejong’s reign (Sinmyo); Pak, Wonho, “Chosŏn ch’ogi,” Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa, 82.

33  Pak, Wonho, “Chosŏn ch’ogi,” Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa, 103.

34  Pak, Wŏnho, “Myŏngch’o Chosŏn,” Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa, 54.

35  T’aejong sillok Vol. 5, June 25 of the 3rd year of T’aejong’s reign (1403, Sinmi) 三 府會議女眞事。皇帝勑諭女眞 吾都里、兀良哈、兀狄哈等招撫之 使獻貢。女眞等本屬于我, 故三府會議。

36  T’aejong sillok Vol. 7, April 27 of the 4th year of T’aejong’s reign (1404, Chŏngyu).

37  Pak, Wŏnho, “15 segi tongasia-ŭi chŏngse” (The political situation of East Asia in the fifteenth century), Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa, 273.

38  『 T’aejong sillok Vol. 11, March 6 of the 6rd year of T’aejong’s reign (Pyŏngsin).

39  Pak, Wŏnho, “Yŏngnak yŏn’gan Myŏng-gwa Chosŏn-gwaŭi Yŏjin munje” (The Jurchen problem between Ming and Chosŏn during the reign of Yongle Emperor), Myŏngch’o Chosŏn kwan’gyesa, 200.

40  Sŏ, Inwŏn, Chosŏn ch’ogi chiriji yŏn’gu (A study of geographical treatises from early Chosŏn), (Hyean, 2002), 65.

41  Cong, Peiyuan, Zhongguo dongbeishi (The history of Northeast China), (Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1998); Yu, Chaech’un. “15 segi Myŏng-ŭi Tongp’alch’am chiyŏk chŏmgŏ-wa Chosŏn-ŭi taeŭng” (Ming’s occupation of the Tongp’alch’am region in the fifteenth century and Chosŏn’s reaction). Chosŏn sidaesa hakbo (The Journal of Chosŏn Dynasty History) 18, (2001): 7.

42  Nam, Ŭihyŏn, Myŏngdae yodong chibae chŏngch’aek yŏn’gu (A study on the Ming policy on governing Liaodong), (Kangwŏn Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 2008): 151–158.

43  Sejo sillok (The Annals of King Sejo) Vol. 21, August 26 of the 6th year of Sejo’s reign (1460, Kisa).

The fact that the Ming explained the deployment of their military forces to Chosŏn and asked for Chosŏn’s understanding shows that they were constantly mindful of Chosŏn as well.

44  Sejo sillok Vol. 40, November 2 of the 12th year of Sejo’s reign (Kyŏngo)

45  Sŏngjong sillok (The Annals of King Sŏngjong) Vol. 129, May 22 of the 12th year of Sŏngjong’s reign (1481, Pyŏngsin); Sŏngjong sillok Vol. 132, August 26 of the 12th year of Sŏngjong’s reign (1481, Mujin).

46  Yu, Chaech’un, “15 segi Myŏng-ŭi Tongp’alch’am chiyŏk,” Chosŏn sidaesa hakbo 18, (2001): 17–19.

47  Sŏngjong sillok Vol. 134, October 20 of the 12th year of Sŏngjong’s reign (1481, Sinyu).

48  Yu, Chaech’un, “15 segi Myŏng-ŭi Tongp’alch’am chiyŏk,” Chosŏn sidaesa hakbo 18, (2001): 26–32; Nam, Ŭihyŏn, Myŏngdae yodong chibae, 307.

49  Sŏngjong sillok Vol. 134, October 17 of the 12th year of Sŏngjong’s reign (1481, Muo).

50  Ibid.

51  Ibid.

52  Currently, only Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam survives today, but it contains notes marked “added and revised” to Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam that it is not difficult to figure out the contents of Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam. Hereafter, Sejong sillok chiriji will be referred to as Sejong and Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam as Sŭngnam.

53  Sejong sillok chiriji (Geographical Treatise in the Annals of King Sejong), Hamgil-do, Kilju-mok, Kyŏngwŏn-dohobu.

54  Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (Augmented survey of the geography of Korea) Vol. 50, Hamgyŏng-do Kyŏngwŏn-dohobu.

55  The same information can be found in “Hoeryŏng Metropolitan Prefecture, Hamgyŏng Province,” in Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 50, and “Konghŏmjin” under Tonggye, Geography in Koryŏsa

< 睿宗三年, 築城置鎭, 爲防禦使. 六年, 築山城. 【一云孔州, 一云匡州. 一云, 在 先春嶺東南, 白頭山東北. 一云, 在蘇下江邊.】 >

56  “Koryŏ-Chosŏnch’o Han-Chung-gan yŏngt’o-e taehan Chungguk hakgye-ŭi sigak” (The Chinese academic perspective on the territorial issues between Korea and China between the tenth and fifteenth century). Yŏksa-wa hyŏnsil (History and Reality) 76, (2010): 315.

Although there are a number of studies that recognize the “700 li” theory as true in Korean academia, a lot of problems and issues arise in proving the theory when considering related records in the history of Koryŏ and military aspects. Historians in early Chosŏn explained that they were aware of these problems, yet they could not completely disregard the records that had been passed down. As a result, all contradictory theories have been documented.

57  Koryŏsa Vol. 56, Chiri, “Sŏmun” (Preface).

58  Samguk sagi (Historical record of the Three Kingdoms of Korea) Vol. 37, Chiri 4, Koguryŏ.

則所謂朱蒙所都紇升骨城ㆍ卒本者 蓋漢玄菟郡之界 大遼國東京之西『漢志』所謂玄菟 屬縣, 高句麗是歟.

59  Koryŏsa Vol. 58, Chiri, Anbuk-daedohobu, Ch’ŏngju <本沸流王松讓之故都>

60  Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 54, P’yŏngan-do, Ch’ŏngju-dohobu.

61  Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam Vol. 51, P’yŏngan-do, P’yŏngyang-bu.

62  Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) Vol. 1, Kiyi, 高句麗 卽卒本扶 餘也 或云今和州 又成州等 皆誤矣 卒本州在遼東界

63  Hŏ, T’aeyong, “Chosŏn hugi nambukguknon hyŏngsŏng-ŭi nollijŏk kwajŏng” (The logical process of the formation of the Northern and Southern Kingdoms theory in late Chosŏn), Tongbang hakji (The Journal of Korean Studies) 152, (2010). The author asserted that the records have been changed in the Chosŏn dynasty because the compilers cited Samguk yusa and Chewang un’gi (Epic of Emperors and Kings) while excluding Samguk sagi. However, this writer believes that there is more to explore in Samguk yusa, albeit there are problems in terms of the location of Tan’gun Chosŏn.

64  Han, Hyŏngju, Chosŏn ch’ogi kukga cherye yŏn’gu (A study on national rituals in early Chosŏn), (Iljogak, 2002), 136.

65  Hŏ, T’aeyong. “Chosŏnhugi nambukguknon,” 133–134.

66  Pak, Inho, Chosŏn sigi yŏksaga-wa yŏksa chiri insik (Joseon dynasties, the history and historical reography awareness), (Ihoe, 2003), 137.

67  Hŏ, T’aeyong. “Chosŏnhugi nambukguknon,” 135.

68  Sejo sillok, March 15 of the 3rd year of Sejo’s reign (1457, Muin). 臣觀唐史 渤海大 祚榮 前麗舊將也, 暴起而亡, 無足可稱, 而東國禮樂文物之盛, 只稱渤海, 而三韓不 與焉, 臣竊恥之。

69  Tongguk t’onggam (Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom [Korea]) Vol. 13, 942nd year of Koryŏ (October of the 25th year in T’aejo’s reign).

70  Hŏ, T’aeyong, “Chŏngŭndae tonggukŭisik-ŭi yŏksajŏk sŏnggyŏk chaegŏmt’o” (Re-examiniation of the historic character of the Notion of Tongguk in the premodern period), Yŏksa pip’yŏng (Critical Review of History) 111 (2015): 454.

Hŏ explained that this was to establish the position of T’aejo of Koryŏ as inferior to that of Yi Sŏnggye.

71  Chŏng, Kubok. “Tongguk saryak-ŭi p’yŏnch’an-gwa kŭ sŏnggyŏk” (A short history of the eastern nation). Han’guk chungsesahaksa II (History of the medieval Korean historiography II), (Kyŏngin munhwasa, 2002), 27–29. Tongguk saryak, compiled by Kwŏn Kŭn in 1403 (3rd year of T’aejong’s reign), is an important history book. The historical awareness in this book reflects the political circumstances during the reign of T’aejong. T’aejong and those who supported him such as Kwŏn Kŭn and Ha Ryun strongly advocated the neo-Confucian justification to establish a philosophical foundation that can stabilize and strengthen the royal authority.

72  In 1656 (7th year in Hyojong’s reign), Yu Hyŏngwŏn proactively contemplated on the northern region and Manchuria in Tongguk yŏjiji, as he valued the importance of territories, locations, place names, and other aspects of historical geography.

Sŏ, Inwŏn, Chosŏn ch’ogi chiriji yŏn’gu (A study of geographical treatises from early Chosŏn), (Hyean, 2002), 279; Pak, Inho, “Yu Hyŏngwŏn-ŭi Tongguk yŏjiji-e taehan ilgoch’al – yŏksa insik-gwa kwallyŏnhayŏ-” (A study on Yu Hyŏngwŏn’s Tongguk yŏjiji: focusing on historical awareness), Ch’ŏnggye sahak (Cheonggye history) 6 (1989); Yang, Pogyŏng. “Pan’gye Yu Hyŏngwŏn-ŭi chiri sasang” (Pan’gye Yu Hyŏngwŏn’s thoughts on geography), Munhwa yŏksa chiri (Culture, History, and Geography) 4 (1992). 39.

73  Chŏng, Kubok. “Tongguk saryak-ŭi p’yŏnch’an,” 128.

74  Sŏngjong sillok Vol. 55, May 15 of the 6th year of Sŏngjong’s reign (Kyehae); Sŏ, Inbŏm, “Myŏngdae-ŭi Yodong tosa-wa Tongnyŏngwi” (The military commander of Liaodong and Tongnyŏng commandery during the Ming dynasty), Myŏngch’ŏngsa yŏn’gu (The journal of Ming-Qing historical studies) 23, (2005): 119. The author stated, “The residents of Tongnyŏng commandery were fully aware of the fact that they were from Chosŏn and that they would fight for Chosŏn if a war were to break out between Chosŏn and Ming. However, Chosŏn upheld the principle of sadae to Ming and attempted to resolve the issue quietly by repatriating the people of Tongnyŏng commandery to Liaodong and tryig to not to cause additional problems.

Yi, Chŏngsin, “Koryŏ, Chosŏn sidae Yun Kwan 9 sŏng insik-ŭi pyŏnhwa” (Changes in the historical evaluation of Yun Kwan and nine fortresses during Koryŏ and Chosŏn dynasties). Han’guk chungsesa yŏn’gu (The Journal of Korean Medieval History) 32, (2012): 121.

References

Primary Sources

1. Samguk sagi. Historical record of the Three Kingdoms of Korea.

2. Samguk yusa. Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms.

3. Koryŏsa. The history of Koryŏ.

4. Sejong sillok chiriji. Geographical Treatise in the Annals of King Sejong.

5. Sinjŭng tongguk yŏji sŭngnam. Augmented survey of the geography of Korea.

6. T’aejo sillok. The Annals of King T’aejo.

7. T’aejong sillok. The Annals of King T’aejong.

8. Sejo sillok. The Annals of King Sejo.

9. Sŏngjong sillok. The Annals of King Sŏngjong.

10. Yangch’on sŏngsaeng munjip. Collection of Writings by Yangch’on Kwŏn Kŭn.

11. Tongguk t’onggam. Comprehensive Mirror of the Eastern Kingdom [Korea].

Secondary Sources

12. Chŏng Kubok, Tongguk saryak-ŭi p’yŏnch’an-gwa kŭ sŏnggyŏk. A short history of the eastern nation. Han’guk chungsesahaksa II History of the medieval Korean historiography II. Kyŏngin Munhwasa, 2002.

13. Cong Peiyuan, Zhongguo dongbeishi. The history of Northeast China. Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1998.

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