1946: The Transition of the Kuomintang Government’s Policies towards Korean Immigrants in Northeast China*

Zhang Muyun**

Introduction

Currently, the research on the Kuomintang Government’s policies towards Korean immigrants has gradually increased. Scholars have attached great importance to the use of archival resources in Shanghai, Tianjin, Peking, Wuhan and Liaoning. Yang Xiaowen1 (2008) made use of the original records to discuss post-war China’s policies towards the repatriation of Korean immigrants in the Wuhan area. Ma Jun, Shan Guanchu2 (2006) adequately utilized Zhongguo diyu hanren tuanti guanxi shiliao

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1 Yang Xiaowen. “Zhanhou zhongguo guannei hanren de jizhong qianfan zhengce ji qi shijian yanjiu: yi wuhan wei gean fenxi” (the post-war Chinese’s policies towards repatriation of Korean immigrants in Wuhan area) (Master diss., Fudan University, 2008).

2 Ma Jun, Shan Guanchu. “Zhanhou guomin zhengfu qianfan hanren zhengce de yanbian ji zai shanghai diqu de shijian” (the development of the Kuomintang government’s policies towards repatriation of Korean immigrants in Shanghai area), Shilin, 2006(2).
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huibian³ (the Comprehensive Collection of Archival Papers on Korean immigrants’ organizations in China) to investigate the development of the Kuomintang government’s policies towards the repatriation of Korean immigrants in the Shanghai area. In Zhongguo chaoxianzu yiminshi⁴ (Korean People Migration History), Sun Chunri presents a general description of the economic, political and cultural reasons why Korean people migrated in China from the Qing dynasty to the Chinese second civil war. This book was based on historical data from the archives of the three northeastern provinces, but I think many important topics were not discussed in adequate depth and detail due to space limitations. By using historical data from the Yanbian University collections, Lyu Jiaji⁵ (2009) thoroughly reviewed the KMT’s policy towards Korean immigrants’ estates in Northeast China between 1945-1949. However I believe that some viewpoints in this dissertation are still open to question. In Lyu Jiaji’s view, the U.S. resisted the repatriation of Korean immigrants in Northeast China because it might give rise to chaos in the U.S. zones of occupation. By viewing the historical data, I think Lu Jiaji’s view turned out to be the very reverse of the truth. Instead of obstructing the repatriation of Korean immigrants, the U.S. provided a lot of help that included transportation support, financial aid and requested that the KMT should improve the living conditions of Korean immigrants.

Between 2007 and 2008, Shi Yuanhua⁶ at Fudan University examined

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³ Shanghai Archives, Shanghai Zhongguo diyu hanren tuanti guanxi shiliao huibian (the Comprehensive Collection of Archival Papers on Korean immigrants’ organizations in China) Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe (1999)

⁴ Sun Chunri, Zhongguo chaoxianzu yiminshi (Korean People Migration History). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju (2009)

⁵ Lyu Jiaji, “Lun jiefang zhanzheng shiqi guomimndang dui dongbei chaoxianren de zichan zhengce” (the KMT’s policy towards Korean immigrants’ estate in Northeast China between 1945-1949) (Master diss., Yanbian University, 2009)

⁶ Shi Yuanhua, “Zhanhou zhonghan guannei diqu hanqiao wenti jiaoshe shukao” (the negotiating process between the KMT government and the South Korea’s delegation on Korean immigrants issues in the customs area), Hanguo yanjiu
the negotiation process between the KMT government and the South Korea's delegation on Korean immigrants' issues in the customs area and Northeast China. Until now, Shi was the only scholar to make use of the historical files in the National History Institute of Taiwan. He thought that although South Korea's delegation was dissatisfied with the KMT’s policies, they stuck to an anti-Communist stand and bound the Kuomintang Government, which led to their failure. Nevertheless, other historical data which he did not mention in the paper indicated that there had been a transition in Kuomintang policies towards Korean immigrants in 1946 owing to many complicated reasons. This transition was related not only to the South Korea's delegation’s powerful appeal but also to the mediation among South Korea, KMT and the U.S. Shi Yuanhua highlighted the negotiation process between South Korea's delegation and KMT, but he ignored the intervention and influence of the U.S.

At present, The KMT government’s records about Korean immigrants’ issues are held in archives in Liaoning (Northeast Xing Yuan\(^7\) records, JE1 Files) and Taiwan (Files of the Nanking Executive Yuan\(^8\), the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs). By contrast, the size of the archives held in Taiwan is bigger than that on the Mainland.\(^9\) Xie Peiping, a Taiwanese scholar, has completed a

\(\text{luncong}(\text{South Korea studies}), December\text{ of }2007;\) Shi Yuanhua, “Zhanhou zhonghan dongbei diqu hanqiao wenti jiaoshe shukao” (the negotiating process between the KMT government and the South Korea's delegation on Korean immigrants issues in Northeast China), \(\text{Hanguo yanjiu luncong}(\text{South Korea studies}), September\text{ of }2008.\)

\(^7\) Xing Yuan (Mobile Barracks of High Command, Chinese: 行轅) is a Chinese term primarily referring to a ROC government regional special office opened on behalf of the military supreme commander in a particular region.

\(^8\) The Nanking Executive Yuan, set up in 1928, was the supreme executive organ of the Nanking Kuomintang Government. It was organized into a number of departments such as the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, etc.

\(^9\) Liaoning archives. \(\text{Liaoningsheng danganguan zhinan}(\text{Guide of Liaoning archives}), Beijing: Zhongguo dangang chubanshe (1994).\)
significant task where he compiled scattered documents and materials related to Korean immigrants issues in Taiwanese archives and published a book titled, *The Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part* in 2008\(^{10}\). This book directly supplements the historical study with abundant new data in 1945-1949 and it is of great importance to analyze the KMT’s thought process on the Korean immigrant problem. However it attracted little attention on the mainland. In addition, there is no Chinese research based on the “*Hanqiao shiwu*”\(^{11}\)(Korean Immigrants Affairs), which is a fundamental historical text about the KMT’s policies towards Korean immigrants. Based on these two important materials, Jilin Daily, Chinese Central Daily (Shenyang edition)\(^{12}\) and so on, this paper first reviews how the policies for Korean immigrants in China were developed between 1945 and 1946. Then it points out the historical background as well as the complicated reasons of policy changes in Northeast China. Finally, the paper attempts to analyze the content of the KMT Northeast Xing Yuan’s policies after 1946.

**1945-1946 : Outline of the KMT’s management of the Korean immigrant issue**

After Japan surrendered in 1945, the KMT government was confronted with a severe challenge of large-scale reconstruction. At that time, Korean immigrants were widespread in China and were mostly concentrated in Northeast China, Northern China, Central China, South China and rare in

\(^{10}\) Xie Peiping. *Zhanhou qiansong waiqiao fanguo shiliao huibian hanqiaopian* (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part), Taiwan: Taiwan Guoshiguan (Taiwan archives) (2008).

\(^{11}\) It was the Journal of the Northeast Xing Yuan Korean Immigrants Department

\(^{12}\) *Chinese Central Daily (Shenyang edition)* and *Jilin Daily* were two popular Kuomintang’s newspaper in Northeast China.
Taiwan area. The governance and repatriation of the Korean immigrants were yet to be dealt with in these areas. However the central government sent mixed signals on the Korean immigrant issue, leading to a confused implementation of the policy in the local government. From the dreadful living conditions of postwar Korean immigrants in China, we can see it was a blunder of the KMT’s policies towards Korean immigrants in the early period after the war. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (KPG) set up a delegation in China after 1945. This delegation in fact became a liaison with the Hankuk Independence Party and Kuomintang. Following KMT troops, the KPG’s delegation in China moved towards the Northeast to pacify Korean immigrants and cooperate with KMT local governments in 1946. Although this delegation repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction to the KMT concerning the Korean immigrant issue, the delegation was on the KMT’s side during the Chinese civil war. The KMT’s policies in 1945-1946 demonstrated an interactive model: “Korea’s repeated protests and China’s passive response.” This model was broken since the KMT began to examine its previous policies and due to U.S. intervention. The KMT’s policies have run a transformable course from implicitness to explicitness from 1945 to 1947.

In November of 1945, the KMT government promulgated the Interim Regulation on Korean immigrants. Even though the regulation was weak, its content maintained a moderate stance. According to this regulation, Korean immigrants living in China, who proved their innocence of crimes and were willing to go back to their homeland, can be rendered all the facilities necessary by the local government; Koreans who were dubious and restless would be punished or deported. As a condition of approval,

Koreans who intended to stay in China needed to display proper behavior and have decent employment. In December of the same year, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed the Nanking Executive Yuan that the Japanese prisoners and Korean soldiers should be managed separately. Furthermore, the administrative institution of the Korean soldiers should be set up to take the Korean soldiers. Although this policy aimed at distinguishing Japanese prisoners and Korean prisoners, the implementation in the locales differed greatly with the original policy. According to the appeal document of South Korea’s delegation, the Korean soldiers were treated badly since the separation of Japanese prisoners and Korean soldiers. What’s more, thousands of Korean soldiers were marshaled in deserted temples and put to hard labor. They didn't have enough food and clothing. Thus the deaths of soldiers increased every day.

What’s worse, the Kuomintang government put forward an unfavorable


policy called the Regulations on Korean immigrants in March of 1946, which worsened the Korean immigrants’ living condition. By this regulation, all Korean immigrants in the Kuomintang-held areas except the Korean soldiers in the KMT Military, the officers of the Korean interim government and the businessmen who had two Chinese businessmen as sponsors, should be concentrated in special areas set by the local government for administration. Additionally, the Korean immigrants who were concentrated in the areas could only take up to 10000yuan (National currency) and daily necessities. Other property must be deposited in Chinese government banks. This regulation gave rise to Koreans’ strong irritation. Some local governments mistakenly granted same treatment to Korean and Japanese prisoners. As a result, some Koreans hid property or requested familiar Chinese to take charge of the money. Some Koreans tried to gain the identity of Chinese officials (public servants). And some poor Koreans intended to join the CPC’s or the KMT’s troops.

Upon this unreasonable regulation, the head of South Korea’s delegation Pu Chun telegraphed the Foreign Minister Wang Shijie in protest. Firstly, he emphasized that Kim Gu and Chiang Kai-shek reached an agreement which included: seriously dealing with the pro-Japanese Koreans, repatriation of the Koreans who wanted to go home, protection of kind Koreans,


and the transfer of Korean soldiers to the Korean Independence Army. Secondly, Pu Chun pointed out that instead of placing the Korean prisoners under arrest, the local governments of Peiping, Shanghai, Tianjin, Wuhan, Qingdao, and Jinan took the prisoners’ bribes and let them go unpunished. However, the KMT’s local government confiscated kind Koreans’ properties and forced them to gather without daily necessities. Thirdly, Pu Chun was furious that the police, gendarme and ruffians took turns to loot the belongings of innocent Koreans, which reduced many Koreans to poverty. Pu Chun declared that if the conditions did not improve, the South Korea's delegation would leave China.20

Under the all-out effort of South Korea’s delegation, an official of Foreign Affairs named Li Jiecai provided a proposal on the Korean immigrant issue to the Nanking Executive Yuan. This proposal is of great value to analyzing the transition of the KMT’s policies towards the Korean immigrant problem. Firstly, Li Jiecai said: it is understandable that the Korean immigrants’ matters existed as a result of the postwar resettlement and confusing policy in the past. But now even thought the regulations having been set, some local governments still took the regulations into their own hands and they failed to realize the critical importance of the China and Korea relationship in the future. Secondly, Li Jiecai severely criticized some local governments who viewed the Koreans equally without distinction and caused social turmoil. These local governments violated the central government’s policy that China had always pursued a friendly policy towards the Koreans. More importantly, Li Jiecai pointed out a principal concern of the KMT which was China's international image issue. He said that if the Chinese government could not fix these problems, it would be

20 Pu Chun. “Hanguo zhuhua daibiaotuan tuanzhang puchun han waijiaobuzhang wangshijie wei lvhua hanqiao ji hanji shibing chuzhi wenti” (the head of the South Korea's delegation Pu Chun telegraphed the Foreign Minister Wang Shijie about Korean immigrants issue (4.10.1946)) ed. Xie Peiping, Zhannhou qiansong waiqiao fanguo shiliao huibian hanqiaopian (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part), Taiwan: Taiwan Guoshiguan (Taiwan archives) (2008). 14-16.
impossible to estimate the toll these mistakes took on the image of China’s leadership in East Asia. Lastly, Li Jiecai indicated that the KMT’s policies towards Korean immigrants also affected the living conditions of Chinese people in Korea and would bring out the vengeance of the Koreans.  

Nevertheless, before the proposal of Li Jiecai had been fully discussed, the Chinese Foreign Minister suddenly signed a document about the Korean immigrants’ repatriation, which suggested all Koreans living in China should be sent back to South Korea. The U.S. War Department promised to provide the boats for the Koreans’ repatriation only by April of 1946. Thus, the KMT Army Headquarter made the deadline for repatriation April of 1946. This policy about repatriation was not feasible due to the large numbers of Korean immigrants and it caused a firestorm of protests.


In this situation, the Foreign Affairs Ministry invited nine government departments such as the Nanking Executive Yuan, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Central Secretariat to attend a meeting about the Korean immigrant issue on April 24, 1946.\textsuperscript{24} There was agreement at the meeting that the previous views of the responsible departments were often in conflict and these departments all shirked responsibility. Therefore, the meeting attendees believed that a separate department for Korea Affairs should be set up since Korea was going to gain independence in the future. The meeting's resolution stressed that: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be in charge of the matters of Korean immigrants and the Korean delegation to China; the Ministry of War took the charge of Korean soldiers and the local governments assisted in handling local affairs. Additionally, the meeting attendees kept the basic policy of repatriation but they considered that the Korean immigrants should not be repatriated without distinction and the Korean immigrant issue in Northeast China would be discussed separately due to its own particular characteristics.\textsuperscript{25}

In June of 1946, the South Korean delegation expressed their strong dissatisfaction about the repatriation within the specified time limit and proposed ten improved measures about the Korean immigrants.\textsuperscript{26} With the

\textsuperscript{24} The Foreign Affairs Ministry. “Waijiaobu hanqing xingzhengyuan mishuchu deng xiangguan jigou paiyuan huishang hanqiao shiwu”(The Foreign Affairs Ministry invited relative government departments to discuss the Korean immigrants issue(4.11.1946))ed. Xie Peiping,\textit{Zhanhou qiansong waqiao fanguo shiliao huiqiao hanqiaopian} (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part),Taiwan: Taiwan Guoshiguan(Taiwan archives)(2008). 19-20.


\textsuperscript{26} The South Korea's delegation. “Hanguo zhuhua daibiaotuan suoti gaishan banfa zhi yijian”(The advice of improving measures on the Korean immigrants) ed. Xie
South Korean delegation's endeavor, on June 10th of 1946, Chiang Kai-shek finally telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie to approve the Outline of Measures towards Korean immigrants, which no longer required all Korean immigrants to return to Korea, but allowed law-abiding and employed Koreans stay in China and obtain the necessary residence permit. Further, the property of kind Korean immigrants should be put under sufficient protection.27

It is worth noting that this outline became the transition point of the KMT government’s policies. Through the comparative analysis of the KMT’s major policies before June of 1946, we can find out the content in this outline had changed greatly and added many new positive policies. In 1947, the KMT government carried out the regulation on Korean immigrants in Northeast China, which was a more detailed version of the outline in 1946.

Furthermore, in 1946, there was also a positive change in American policy towards Korean immigrants, and hence the U.S. continued helping the KMT government to repatriate Koreans after April of 1946. A telegram which Army Advisory Group of the U.S. sent to the G-2 Ministry of Chinese National Defense described this transformation process: “At the time Peiping Headquarters Group assumed the repatriation mission from U.S. Army Forces in China in July of 1946, the U.S. War Department

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1945</td>
<td>Hanqiao chuli zanxing banfa (the Interim Regulation on Korean immigrants)²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1945</td>
<td>Guanyu hanqiao hanfu chuli banfa (Measures for the settlement of Korean immigrants and prisoners)²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1946</td>
<td>Hanqiao guanli banfa (Regulation on Korean immigrants)³⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1946</td>
<td>**Hanqiao guanli banfa dagang (Outline of Measures towards Korean immigrants)**³¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1946</td>
<td>Shoufuqu hanqiao chanye chuli banfa (Measures for the settlement of Korean immigrants’ assets)³²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1947</td>
<td>Dongbei hanqiao chanye chuli banfa (Measures for the settlement of Korean immigrants’ assets in Northeast China)³³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1947</td>
<td>Dongbei hanqiao jyuliu zheng banfa (Measures for issuing residence permit to Korean immigrants in Northeast China)³⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July. 1947</td>
<td>Dongbei hanqiao guanli banfa (Regulation on Korean immigrants in Northeast China)³⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

approved the discontinuance of assistance to the Chinese National Government in repatriation of Koreans. However, in December 1946 further assistance was extended in the repatriation of a group of 2524 Koreans from Manchuria to U.S.-occupied territory in Korea. This decision was based on the U.S. policy that Koreans residing in China were considered as displaced persons from an allied occupied country, and as such, should be given assistance in returning to their homeland as displaced persons.”

During the KMT’s discussion process of the Korean immigrants, the Korean immigrant issue in Northeast China was put on one side for the time being before 1946. To find out its cause, we have to come to understand the complicated background. The following parts will make a thorough description about the propelling process of Korean immigrants’ policies in Northeast China.

**Propelling process of Korean immigrant Policies in Northeast China Specific background of Northeast China**

Northeast China, which included Rehe and east Inner Mongolia in 1945,

covered a land of 1.3 million square kilometers. The three northeastern provinces alone had an estimated population of 34 million. Northeast China is blessed with a superior geographical location and rich natural resources. As World War II ended, the crucial and pivotal status of Northeast China emerged. Both sides of CPC and KMT launched a series of measures to win for themselves favored positions in the Northeast. Under the “Sino-Soviet Friendly Treaty of Alliance” and US support, the KMT made preparations for taking all of Northeast China. On the other side, the CPC formulated the military strategy of “Develop Northward and Defense Southward”, and sent 100,000 troops including the Korean Army of Volunteers into Northeast China. As the international situation changed, negotiations between the KMT and Soviet Union broke down and the military conflicts between the KMT and CPC took place in Northeast China. And the full-scale war erupted in the first half of 1946. Until the 1946 Armistice Agreements, KMT’s troops stood on the other side of the Songhua River against the CPC’s.38

As the second Chinese civil war was launched in Northeast China, Korean youths had been the focus of confrontation between the CPC and the KMT. In 1947, the head of Northeast China Xing Yuan Korean immigrants Agency Zhang Jianfei said, “Currently, most Korean immigrants are living in the CPC- controlled areas. The Communists are willing to use any dirty trick to gain support of the Koreans and deceive the Koreans under the cloak of ethnic equality. What’s more, the Communist Bandits conspired with the North Korean armed forces and obliged the Korean immigrants to join the battle. We must strengthen the management of Korean immigrants against the Communists’ guile and seduction.”39 From the reports of Jilin Daily and Chinese Central Daily, we can tell that the Kuomintang forces were at a disadvantage over the People's Liberation Army in enlisting Korean Youths. On May 28, 1947, Jilin Daily published

an article on “the Korean communists in Northeast China joined the battle, and resident aliens were suffered by the communists in Changli”. This report said, “it is becoming increasingly clear that the Chinese Communists has conspired with the Korean Communists through this battle of Zhongchanglu. Although the Korean Communists has previously been involved in the war of Northeast China, the size of the troops was larger and the number of Korean soldiers was unprecedented this time. In Changchun, it was discovered that more than 12,000 soldiers joined the mixed column of China and Korea. In the Far East there were 7000-8000 soldiers in the mixed column which named detachment of Li Hongguang and Yang Jingyu. Besides, it is said that 50,000 Korean communists forcibly occupied Yanji and intended to run away in direction Yedian.\(^\text{40}\) On August 2, 1947, according to another report on ‘the Communist bandits recruited Korean immigrants from the Shenyang branch of Chinese Central Daily, it said ‘the Kuomintang military authorities arrested 40 Communist bandits. In the criminals’ confessions, the regiment which took the offensive has enlisted large numbers of Koreans among the Communist-controlled area. For example, in Hunchun, more than 500 Koreans join the Communist bandits.” As far as some aged Korean people whom I interviewed in Changchun recollect\(^\text{41}\), most Korean youths in the Chinese


\[^{40}\] “Dongbei hangong canjia zirao weihuo canlie changli gongjun xijie waiqiao an- yang xiangning woshoujun zhuanyi zhendi”(The Korean communists in Northeast China joined the battle, and resident aliens were suffered by the communists in Changli), \textit{Jilin Ribao}(Jilin Daily) May 28, 1947.

\[^{41}\] In the interview. Quan Qidu mentioned the Korean Youth's impression of the KMT and the CPC. He recalled, “In August of 1945, it was unexpectedly announced that we could not go to school. Planes were flying round and round. The Japanese were finished. As they left, our village was approaching a condition of anarchy. For a long time, no troops except the bandits had gone down to our village. At that time, neither KMT nor CPC publicly took charge of us. Later these two armies were fiercely engaged near the railway station and some wounded soldiers of KMT came to our village. We kids thought KMT soldiers were conceited and frightening.
village joined the forces of the CPC, even if the troops of the CPC had
yet come into these areas such as Panshi, Yushu and Jiutai. 42

Meanwhile, according to the statistics from the Northeast XingYuan,
there were at least 2,163,000 Korean immigrants in the three Northeast
provinces. With mass Koreans returning to their homeland, this number
declined to 1,310,000 in 1947. However, nearly five-sixths of Korean
immigrants lived in the CPC-controlled areas. 43(The following figures
show the population of Korean immigrants in the Kuomintang-held areas).

What’s more, there was a continued movement of the Korean immi-
grants from the KMT-controlled areas to the CPC-controlled areas, as a
result of the KMT’s previous inattention to the Korean immigrant issues.
For example, on August 16, 1946, Chiang Ching-Kuo, who was then the
commissioner of the Kuomintang's Headquarters in Northeast China, sent
a telegram to the Foreign Ministry and said: “there are 100,000 Korean
immigrants who have no clothing and food in the Panshi County due to
crop failures. Now they are moving to Huifa River’s southern shore be-
cause they have heard that they must be sent back to Korea after the re-
patriation of Japanese immigrants. If we don’t pay attention to this prob-

Once I was followed by some KMT soldiers who took guns on my way home.
They called to me and opened my schoolbag. Taking out one of my textbook, they
asked me what the book was about and whether there was revolutionary content in
it. We received enslaving education in the primary school, but we hate Japanese in
secret. The ordinary villagers all knew the Eighth Route Army struggled against
Japan, so we had deep feelings for CPC. After the liberation of Korea, more than
80 percent Koreans in our village joined the CPC troops. In my mind, few Koreans
except landlords and rich peasants would join KMT. Nearly every Korean was
poor in my village and we knew CPC fought for the rights of the poor.[Quan
Qidu(born in 1936).Interview by author. Tape recording. Changchun, Jilin. 18 of
January, 2015].”

42 “Gongfei zhengji hanren canzhan” (The Communist bandits recruited Korean
immigrants), Zhongyang Ribao (Shenyang) (Shenyang branch of Chinese Cen-
tral Daily), August 2, 1947.
43 Zhang Jianfei. “Dongbei Hanqiao wenti” (Korean immigrants Issue in Northeast
lem, these Korean immigrants are bound to be manipulated by the communists. However, if we forbid these Koreans’ movement, what should we do with the problem of relief?” Chiang Ching-Kuo suggested that the Foreign Ministry should immediately discuss the issue with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. Gradually, the KMT came to realize that the impolitic approach to the Korean immigrants issue had affected the tables of the battle in Northeast China. China, Korea and the U.S. started extensive discussions on the Korean immigrant issues in Northeast China since 1946, which advanced the transition of the KMT’s policies.

Table 2. The population of Korean immigrants in Northeast China (the Kuomintang-held areas), JUNE OF 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>8,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaobei</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>11,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>3,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andong</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>2,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>5,513</td>
<td>26,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Occupational Distribution (in households)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beishi</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huanggu</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>3398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuhong</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadong</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiexi</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hun River</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenhai</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daxi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaoxi</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanshi</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beiling</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongxin</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heping</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>3635</td>
<td>8120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appeals for clear Regulations

Compared with the other local governments, the KMT’s government in Northeast China paid more concern to the Korean immigrant issues since 1946. In addition, the government officials in Northeast China began to specify the measures for further implementation.

On July 16, 1946, the head of Northeast China Security Headquarters’ Korean Affairs Department Wang Yishu sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This telegram reads as follows, “Before 1945, there were more than 2,000,000 Korean immigrants in Northeast China, and there are still 1,500,000 Koreans in Northeast China now. During the take-over period, the Korean Affairs Department was set up under the Northeast China Security Headquarters and it dealt with the affairs based on the Interim Regulation on Korean immigrants. Soon after, The Commission of the take-over Enemy assets in Northeast China confiscated the Koreans’ property according to the Measure for the settlement of Taiwanese and Koreans’ property. It is noticeable that this measure was recently repealed by the Nanking Executive Yuan in March, but the commission still insists confiscating the Koreans’ property, which has struck terror into the Korean immigrants. Since millions of Korean immigrants are in the CPC-controlled areas, this will be to the advantage of the CPC. Therefore, please enact relative measures with dispatch to provide a criterion.”

45 Korean Immigrants Department. “Shoufuqu dongbei hanqiao renkou”(The population of Korean immigrants in Northeast China (the Kuomintang-held areas)), Han-qiao shiwu(Korean Immigrants Affairs), 1947[1] 27-29.
46 Capital of Liaoning Province.
47 Wang Yishu. “Dongbei baoan siling zhangguanbu hanqiao shiwu chuzhang wangyishu qing waijiaobu congsu zhiban chuli hanqiao banfa”(the head of Northeast China Security Headquarters’ Korean Affairs Department Wang Yishu asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for enacting a more clear Regulation about Korean immigrants’ issue(7.16.1946))ed. Xie Peiping,Zhanhou qiansong waiqiao fanguo shiliao huibian hanqiaopian (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part),Taiwan:Taiwan
Although the Outline of Measures towards Korean Immigrants came out in June of 1946, Wang Yishu’s message suggests there was a disparity between the central government’s policies and the local government’s implementation. The KMT government in Northeast China was still confused over the question of Korean immigrants. More importantly, in the second part Wang Yishu outlined three key questions: “Firstly, which reference standard, our friends’ or enemy’s, should be taken on the Korean immigrants’ treatment? Secondly, how to dispose of the Koreans’ immovable property such as housing, shops, schools, factories, hospitals and land? Should we pay for the loss incurred or confiscated the Koreans’ property directly? I think we should allow them farming as tenants after confiscating parts of their property. Thirdly, which department should be in charge of the affairs mentioned above? I recommend that an agency should be founded under the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Northeast China.” Finally, Wang Yishu gave warning that the Korean immigrants issue would be morphed into an international moral issue if the questions above remained unsolved.48

**Bringing Korean immigrants into the scope of relief**

In addition to appealing for more clear regulations, some officials within the Kuomintang proposed that the Korean immigrants could be brought into the scope of relief. At that time, Northeast China Relief

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Sub-Administration, which was under the Nanking Executive Yuan Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, took the charge of extending relieves to the refugees in Northeast China. On August 20, 1946, the head of Northeast China Security Headquarters Du Yuming signed a petition to the Army General Staff. Du Yuming said that it was difficult to repatriate the Korean immigrants due to the traffic problems for the time being. There was nothing to do except requesting traffic support from the U.S. or allowing the Koreans return to their homeland on foot. If the government made no effort to help them, these Korean immigrants would be in a tight corner in the winter of 1946. Du Yuming mentioned that Northeast China Relief Sub-Administration would not offer relief to the Korean immigrants, let alone other departments. Thus he hoped the Nanking Executive Yuan Relief and Rehabilitation Administration could allow the aid.

Two days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a request to the Nanking Executive Yuan as well. The message said, “In the light of South Korean Delegation’s information on August 5th, many Korean immigrants in Changchun suffered from poverty and illness. Although the Koreans asked the Changchun Relief Sub-Administration for help, this Sub-Administration rejected them as the Korean immigrants were not in the range of relief and some Koreans had joined the CPC army before. Please support aids for humanitarian reasons.”

49 People who took the overland route from Northeast China to Korea had to across the CCP-controlled areas.


51 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Waijiaobu dian xingzhengyuan shanhoujiujishu ju hanguo zhuhua daibiaoquan cheng dongbei hanqiao pinbingjiaojia qingyujijiji” (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a request to the Nanking Executive Yuan
Eventually, the requests of these two departments were answered on September 18th. The Nanking Executive Yuan Relief and Rehabilitation Administration telegraphed the Northeast Branch about the Koreans’ situation and approved relief for poor Koreans. The Nanking stressed that the Koreans who were verified to be in dire necessity could be granted equal relief with the Chinese refugees.  

The Mediation on the repatriation issues

In 1946, to send the Korean immigrants in Northeast China more swiftly, the South Korean delegation and the Kuomintang Peiping headquarters negotiated with the U.S. and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) separately about the repatriation issues. After much deliberation, the SCAP permitted transporting 15,000 Korean immigrants, who lived in the south of 38 degrees northern latitude before the war, back to South Korea. In December of 1946, as a result of the talks between China, Korea and the U.S., the U.S. took the charge of offering the ships and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Special Appointee Office in Northeast China was responsible for gathering Korean immigrants around the three north-
eastern provinces. Besides, the Northeast China Xing Yuan provided the supplies as well as the coals during the repatriation.\(^5^3\)

However, what was the amount of funds every time? Did the KMT government allocate these special funds? On December 9th, 1946, the commissioner in Northeast China Zhang Jianfei reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about repatriation matters. Zhang Jianfei mentioned the Korean Immigrants Department in Northeast China granted 100 yuan per person to the Koreans who lived in stark poverty, but the rate of this relief funds could not exceed 50%. What’s more, Zhang said the total repatriation budget this time was 7,600,000 yuan which had been appropriated by the Ministry of National Defense.\(^5^4\)

As regard to the repatriation of Korean immigrants in Northeast China, there is dispute in academic circles now. Scholars are in agreement with the situations of the first centralized repatriation in December of 1946. Owing to the extraordinarily cold weather in the Northeast China, the actual number of the repatriation, which was 2483, varied widely from the originally scheduled number 15,000. The American ships carrying the Koreans left the harbor on December 24th.\(^5^5\) However, scholars held different views on the second centralized repatriation. Ma Jun and Shan Guanchu believed that since late 1946, the U.S. no longer provided the


ships and the KMT government was responsible for the remaining repatriation. What’s more, Ma and Shan’s viewpoint was quoted in the Shi Yuanhua’s book *the Chronicle of the South Korean Independence Movement and the Relations between Korea and China.* Similarly, in the book *Korean People Migration History*, Sun Chunri only mentioned the repatriation of 1946. But I believe that Xie Peiping described a more comprehensive picture of the repatriation in *the Comprehensive Collection of archives on the Post-war alien’s repatriation issue: Korean immigrants Part* due to the rich historical materials at hand. According to the statistics of Xie, besides the repatriation in 1946, the U.S. dispatched the ships in the second repatriation from May 1948 to September 1948. The American landing crafts such as KBMQ 10 carried 1096 Koreans on May 6th, 1203 Koreans on May 20th, 441 Koreans on May 22th, 1090 Koreans on May 28th, 1090 Koreans on June 3rd, 1191 Koreans on June 27th, 1344 Koreans on July 27th, 1300 Koreans on September 1st.

In addition, we can find that the U.S. was involved in the Korean immigrant affairs through the repatriation, which objectively promoted the propelling process of Korean immigrant policies. On December 18th 1946, the Embassy of the United States of America sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said, “A repatriation team has been attached to

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56 Ma Jun, Shan Guanchu. “Zhanhou guomin zhengfu qianfan hanren zhengce de yanbian ji zai shanghai diqu de shijian”(the development of the Kuomintang government’s policies towards repatriation of Korean immigrants in Shanghai area), *Shilin*, 2006(2).


the United States Army unit in Hulutao in connection with the program which has been set up for repatriation of Koreans from the Manchurian area. The United States Political Adviser for Japan has informed the Embassy that he has received reports, some of which have also come to the Embassy, of widespread destitution among the Koreans in Manchuria. Apparently these Koreans have had few sources to which they could appeal for relief in the face of hunger and intense cold. It has been suggested that in view of this situation the Chinese Government might wish, for humanitarian reasons among other considerations, to undertake measures to care for these Koreans as a newly liberated people.\footnote{60}

The opinions of America immediately attracted the KMT’s attention. On January 7th, 1947, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed the message of the U.S. to the relative departments and stressed that the Northeast China Xing Yuan, the Northeast China Relief Sub-Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Special Appointee Office in Northeast China should report the details of the repatriation as well as the process of relief to the U.S. Additionally, on September 2, 1947, the officer of the Foreign Affairs’ East Asia Division Yu Langping submitted a report which mentioned the U.S. Army seemed to welcome the Korean immigrants in Northeast China back to build Korea. Yu Langping hoped it would bring this case to the attention of the KMT government.\footnote{61}

\footnote{60} The Embassy of the United States of America. “Meiguo dashiguan zhi waijiaobu jieluweidongbeidaiqianhanqiao jihanjiapoqingyushelfazhaofo”(the Embassy of the United States of America asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for undertaking measures to care the Korean immigrants (12.18.1946)) ed. Xie Peiping, Zhanhou qiansong waiqiao fanguo shiliao huibian hanqiaopian (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part), Taiwan: Taiwan Guoshiguan (Taiwan archives) (2008) 382-383.

\footnote{61} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Waijiaobudian dongbeixingyuan deng xiangguan jigou weizhuanameiguo zhuahdashiguan qingshelfazhaoliodongbeihanqiaodian” (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed the message of the U.S. to the relative departments (1.7.1937)), ed. Xie Peiping, Zhanhou qiansong
Specific policies towards Korean immigrants

When KMT forces entered Jinzhou in the autumn of 1945, the Northeast China Security Headquarters’ Korean Affairs Department was in charge of the Korean immigrants’ issue. Then in the autumn of 1946, this department renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Special Appointee Office in Northeast China. However, these two departments were confused over the duty and right of management. In April of 1947, the Northeast China Xing Yuan decided to set up a specific department to handle matters, which alleviated the problem of passing the buck among the departments to some extent. The KMT’s policy change on property and household registration during this period was reviewed by Sun Chunri and need not be repeated here. But the research on the aspects of propaganda and agricultural loans have lacked. The following paragraph will highlight these two cases.

The propaganda work

In the depths of the civil war, ideological politics and propaganda on the Korean immigrants was placed in an important position by the KMT government. As the repatriation report of the Foreign Ministry in December of 1946 described, the local governments were required to indoctrinate Korean immigrants on the Three Principles of the People and redouble the propaganda on China's friendly relations and cooperation with Korea.

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waiqiao fanguo shiliao huibian hanqiaopian (the Comprehensive Collection of Archives on the Post-war Alien’s Repatriation Issue: Korean immigrants Part), Taiwan: Taiwan Guoshiguan (Taiwan archives) (2008). 415.


According to the reports of Jilin Daily on November 7th 1947, the KMT government in Jilin organized a Korean propaganda team in order to prevent the Koreans in the CPC-controlled areas from turning bandits and prevent evil thoughts from poisoning the Koreans in the KMT-controlled areas. This Korean propaganda was set up under the commandoes’ press section and aimed to heighten the Korean’s political awareness.  

In addition, the KMT government in Northeast China strengthened its propaganda through the news. For instance, on October 14, 1947, the Jilin Daily reported on the Korean Youth, who were dissatisfied with the regression in the CPC-controlled areas, forsook darkness for light and hoped that the Korean immigrants could get some instructions from the government. The government established a typical example named Han Changhuan to educate and lead young Korean immigrants. Han was an interpreter in the CPC’s 1st Division and defected on October 13. This report said, “Han Changhuan was dissatisfied with the regression in which the CPC distrusted the educated youth, use the bandits to disturb the public order and demoralize the people. Han thought these helpless Koreans who lived in North Korea and Northeast China before were forcibly recruited as CPC troops. If the government could print leaflets and protect the safety of the lives of those who surrendered, tens of thousands of Korean youths will come to the government’s side. This report also mentioned the Korean youths accounted for about one-third of the CPC’s troops in Northeast China. More than half of the soldiers in the three divisions of Jidong mil-

65 “Jiaqiang hanqiao shiju yishi zhengfu zuzhi hanwen zhenggongdui” (Jilin government organized a Korean propaganda team) Jilin Ribao (Jilin Daily) (November 7, 1947).
itary region and 4th 5th 6th columns were Koreans.66

The policy of agricultural loans

Granting agricultural loans was a significant breakthrough in the KMT’s policy improvements towards Korean immigrants. After World War II, rather than improving the conditions, Korean immigrants experienced a decline in living standards. Most of the Korean merchants and peasants lost their jobs due to industrial and land disputes. These uprooted Korean immigrants accounted for a quarter of the total Koreans in Northeast China. According to statistics of the Korean immigrants department, in the beginning of 1947, there were 202,131 Koreans in the KMT-controlled areas. After the CPC quickly occupied Andong and other places, this number declined to 90,496 in the May of 1947. What’s more, there were 24,149 Koreans living in dire poverty in Northeast China, among which 8000 Koreans in Shenyang, 2034 in Anshan, 1242 in Tieling, 1821 in Panshan, 1482 in Fushun, 568 in Kaiyuan, 1002 in Changchun and 8000 in Jilin.67

Therefore, granting timely agricultural loans was crucially important for the relief of Korean immigrants. In 1947, the newly-formed Korean Immigrants Department gave careful attention to the agricultural loans issue. In spring 1947, the South Korean’s delegation submitted ‘the Specific plan on Korean farmers’ funds’ to ask for agricultural loans. The Korean Immigrants Department presented this plan to Northeast China XingYuan and the ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively. After much joint effort, the Agriculture Committee set aside 30,000,000 yuan for Korean farmers from the first agricultural loan in which was nine hundred millions. Nev-

66 “Buman feiqu tuihua xianxiang hanji qingnian toucheng yaowang zhengfu zhishi bideng tujing”(The Korean Youth, who were dissatisfied with the regression in the CPC-controlled areas, forsook darkness for light and hoped that the Korean immigrants could get some instructions from the government), Jilin Ribao(Jilin Daily) October 14, 1947.
ertheless, there still existed a gap between the original plan and actual grant. On this occasion, the Korean Immigrants Department applied for additional funds. According to the officer in this department, they secured additional loans from the emergency loan of Andong, Liaobei and Changtu. By the statistics of the agro-forestry agency, compared with 33yuan for each Chinese farmer, the average loans of Korean farmers reached 102yuan per person.67

On May 10th 1947, Jilin Daily reported on the details of the local government in Jiangbei district granting loans to Korean farmers. In this report, the South Korean delegation who represented the Korean farmers in Jiangbei district asked the Jilin government for aid due to the lack of rice seeds. After the discussion with the Jilin Farmer's Bank, the city government decided to raise the rice seed of 14400kg as the agricultural loans which made the mayor of Jilin as the Guarantor.69

Conclusion

It is worth noting that some scholars on the mainland still describe the KMT’s policies towards Korean immigrants as national oppression. However, I believe that the KMT’s limitation towards Korean immigrant issues lies not in ethnic discrimination but in the aborted measures and improper implementation. For instance, during the 1940s, the KMT and CPC both used agricultural loans as a means of increasing agricultural production. But the KMT’s policy often backfired at the basic level. As the rural economist Chen Han-seng said, the landlords, rich peasants and

69 “Benshi nongdai zhou’nei daifang ji angbei pinkun hanqiao nonghang daichou daozhong” (The local government in Jiangbei district granting loans to Korean farmers), Jilin Ribao (Jilin Daily), May 10, 1947.
businessmen dominated the KMT’s cooperatives and they had management power to dominate politics as well as the economy. When they got agricultural loans from the next higher level, they granted the loans to farmers at doubled the interest.⁷⁰ In contrast, the land reform of the CPC reset the rural class structure, which kept corruption with limits and supported the Chinese civil war.⁷¹

This paper holds that we should make a more objective assessment about the KMT’s policies towards Korean immigrants. On the one hand, it

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⁷¹ In the interview, Lin Guiren (born in 1938, Yanbian) believed the CPC’s land reform had a dominating influence on Korean immigrants’ life. And as the CPC occupied most of the Northeast, women’s liberation movement started developing. She said, “I was brought up by my mother. When my father died, my younger brother was only three months old and my mother was 23. My grandma suggested that my mother should remarry and come back to Korea. At that time, we didn’t have any friends or relatives to turn to. Yet my mother stayed in Yanbian for us two children. My mother sacrificed a great deal to raise us. One winter twilight, my mother chopped wood in the snow mountain, and she was too tired to carry the wood. She was worried we would suffer from cold that night, so she held the wood tightly and rolled down the snow mountain. In 1946 when the land began to be divided, the agricultural cooperative in my village sent people to help us with farming and harvest. My mother became head of the women's association in my village to fight landlords and Korean traitors. She advocated the emancipation of women and corrected the behavior of disrespecting women. In the past, Korean rich men were allowed to have several wives. After liberation, my mother did propaganda work of monogamous marriage among these landlords’ families. The big factory which five kilometers away from our village as well as the Korean school were the main meeting place my mother often went to. Especially the working women’s day, all the women in my village attended the celebration assembly. We stood in a line, waved the flags and sang Korean songs. One of the lyrics goes, “we raise the chest up, walk on the starlit road and stand on the wide stage. We fight for freedom and liberation. We will abolish all the feudal ethics.” Lin Guiren(born in 1938). Interview by author. Tape recording. Changchun, Jilin. February 9, 2015.
is necessary to expose the fact of the mixed and unwise policies after the war; on the other hand, scholars should not shy away from the KMT’s policy changes in 1946. During this period, the Korean Immigrants Department in Northeast China shifted from disorder to order. Thanks to the attention on the international image of China and the war situation, the KMT’s government formulated and began to implement new policies towards Korean immigrants such as welfare and repatriation. Nevertheless, these policies were short-lived because the CPC quickly occupied Northeast China in November of 1947. More remarkably, as the U.S. got involved in the Korean immigrant affairs through repatriation, we can find that the KMT’s policies were also affected by the foreign policy.

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1946: The Transition of the Kuomintang Government’s Policies towards Korean Immigrants in Northeast China

Northeast China, which witnessed many controversial incidents, was the arena of Korea, China and Japan in the modern history. Meanwhile, Korean immigrants in Northeast China were the target to be won over by various political powers during the twentieth century. When the World War II ended, nearly five-sixths of Korean immigrants lived in the liberated areas (the Communist Party of China-controlled areas). Some young Korean immigrants were mobilized by the CPC to join the Chinese civil war. To strengthen its reign and gain support, KMT government changed the policies of settling Korean on June 10th of 1946 and established the Northeast Korean Immigrants Department to address the problems in the fields of education, welfare and repatriation in 1947. This paper, with careful analysis of the historical documents, aims to build the ground for future research on the Korean immigrants in Northeast China.

Key words: Kuomintang government, Korean Immigrants, Policy Transition, Chinese civil war
논란이 되는 사건들을 목도하고 있는 동북중국은 근대사에서 한국, 중국, 일본의 영역이었다. 한편, 동북 중국의 한인 이민자들은 20세기 동안 다양한 정치권력들의 타겟이 되었다. 제2차세계대전이 종료되었을 때 거의 한인 이민자5세 혹은6세들이 해방된(중국 공산당이 점유하던 지역) 지역에 살고 있었다. 몇몇의 젊은한인 이민자들은 중국 내전에 참전하기 위해 중국 공산당에 동원되었다. 국민당 정부는 그들의 동지를 강화하고 지지를 얻기 위한 목적으로 1946년 6월 10일 한인 정착에 대한 정책을 바꾸었다. 또한 1947년 교육, 복지, 귀환 분야의 문제를 해결하기 위해 동북지방 한인 이민자국 (the Northeast Korean Immigrants Department)을 설치했다. 이 논문은 역사적 자료의 세밀한 분석과 함께 동북중국의 한인 이민자들에 대한 향후 연구의 기반을 다지는 것을 목적으로 한다.

주제어: 국민당 정부, 한국이민자, 정책전환, 중국 국공내전