Recent Western-European Historical Studies on ‘Pre-Modern’ Korea and the Issue of ‘Modernity’ Revisited*

Anders Karlsson**

Introduction

The notion of ‘modernity’ in Korean history is still a highly contested issue cutting at the core of both historical understanding and current politics, as can be seen in the controversy surrounding the understanding of this professed by the New Right Movement in South Korea. Although, of course, interrelated, there are two main aspects of the contested issues of modernity and Korean history: firstly, to what extent can socio-economic changes and intellectual and ideological developments in the late Chosón (Joseon) period be considered as carrying the quality of modernity, and secondly, is colonial modernity a proper concept to understand social and economic change in Korea under Japanese occupation.

Given the prominence of this issue, it has been either the subject of, or played a pivotal role, in a number of review articles related to historical scholarship on Korea. In 2003, for example, Kim Keong-il (Kŏngil) dealt

---

* This work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST).
** Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Korean Studies, the School of Oriental and African Studies
in some detail with the differing views between South Korean and American scholars on the nature of late Chosŏn society and colonial modernity in his article, “Over Contested Terrain: Current and Issues of Korean Studies,” and in the same year, “How Early is Korean Modernity? The ‘Early Modern’ in Korean Historiography” by Michael J. Allen was published. Furthermore, in the last issue of this journal, Mitsui Takashi focused on colonial modernity and discussed scholarly works in Japan advocating such a colonial modernity in relation to views put forward by South Korean scholars and within the context of a diversifying field of Korean history studies in Japan.

It is as well-known fact that the academic field of Korean studies has grown considerably recently also in the West, and even if much of this growth has been in the social sciences and focused more on contemporary issues, the study of the history of Korea has experienced growth and diversification. The purpose of this paper is therefore to introduce some recent Western European research on pre-modern Korea, but also, more importantly, to revisit the issue of modernity and look at contemporary scholarship in Europe and its treatment of not colonial modernity but rather “modernity” in “pre-modern” Korea.

This will not be a comprehensive survey of scholarship on Korean history in Europe; the main focus will be on works dealing with the late Chosŏn period (political, social, and economic), it will only look at English-language material, and it will rather try in the end to grasp the larger trends. It will furthermore try to understand recent European scholarship in comparison with earlier Western works on Korean history and within the context of Western scholarship, in particular Western scholarship on East Asia. European scholarship does, of course, engage with Korean scholarship and this is not to disregard the influence of important historical works and recent trends in South Korea, but rather to highlight an aspect that is often not considered when the focus too frequently has been on the differences between Western and Korean scholarship, and also to address the alleged “ghettoization” of Korean historical studies outside of Korea by showing how it relates to larger
academic trends in the West.³

Some Theoretical and Comparative Considerations

Given the experience of Japanese occupation and the concept of ‘colonial modernity,’ taking a position in the debate on modernity in Korean history is unfortunately often understood as taking a position on the role of the colonial experience in the modernization of Korea, as an indication of whether the scholar has a ‘positive’ or a ‘negative’ understanding of the late Chosŏn period on the one hand and on the colonial period on the other. In an attempt to facilitate a move away from such a judgmental approach this review will initially introduce some crucial theoretical and methodological considerations in relation to the role of ‘modernity’ in world history.

Ever since the marriage of history and sociology, be that either historians using sociological theory or in the form of historical sociology, the problem of the “modern” and “modernity” has played a central role in the historical narratives of regions and countries. Like the two sides of a coin, then, modernity is both a historical and a sociological term. For a long time the historical term described the European historical experience from the latter half of the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment and the later Industrial Revolution. The founders of sociology, like Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, lived in these times of transformation understood as “modernization” and tried to develop a scholarly understanding of what this was, leading to the development of ‘modernity’ as a sociological term.⁴

Although the two modernity concepts are inextricably intertwined in historical narration by social historians or historical sociologists, there is an important difference in emphasis. Whereas the historical understanding mainly regards it as an actual historical process, in the sociological context modernity represents certain qualities and is in a sense an analytical tool rather than a representation of a social reality.
With certain markers of modernity identified in social theory and used as analytical tools that could be applied to different time periods, it became obvious that the shift from the traditional to the modern was not an abrupt development, which in turn led to the development of the notion of the ‘early modern’.\(^5\) Furthermore, these social theories could also be applied to other parts of the world, and the concept of ‘early modern’ describing societies displaying certain qualities of modernity but still not on the path of a process of modernization started to be used in the context of, for instance, Chinese and Japanese history.

This notion of the early modern has been criticized, though. The concern is that it is easy to understand the ‘early modern’ to necessarily lead to the ‘modern,’ that is, applying an evolutionary view without sufficiently considering the empirical facts of the actual historical process, or “the ‘early modern’ model [being] used simply to get aboard a (historical) train bound for modernity.”\(^6\) As Jack Goldstone rightly has pointed out, qualities of modernity as defined by the social sciences can be found throughout human history and it would be a fallacy to regard all periods when such qualities emerge as precursors to modernity.\(^7\)

Still, scholars do apply the qualities of modernity to East Asian history in the sociological sense, either in the form of the ‘early modern’ or arguing for possible multiple paths of modernity. As Benjamin Elman has stated in relation to Chinese histories: “the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries can be considered not only as a ‘late imperial’ prelude to the end of traditional China, but as an ‘early modern’ harbinger of things to come.”\(^8\)

A representative scholar arguing for multiple paths of modernity is Alexander Woodside, who in his *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea and the Hazards of World History* highlights a number of modern qualities in the East Asian bureaucratic tradition and civil service examinations. Although the book describes qualities rather than historical processes, it opens up for the possibility of these modern qualities to influence later modernization processes, which in the end they did not and thus the title, *Lost Modernities*.\(^9\)

Two other scholars who engage in a revaluation of East Asian history
with reference to Western historical experience are Kenneth Pomeranz and R. Bin Wong. In his book, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, Kenneth Pomeranz emphasises the similarities in the economic development of Europe and the Yangzi delta in China, claiming that ‘the great divergence’ did not occur until the nineteenth century.10 R. Bin Wong, in his highly stimulating *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*, attempts to develop a model of historical change for China that is not based on the European experience and thus dislocates the global significance of the Western experience of modernity.11

**Earlier Western Scholarship on Korean History**

The above brief survey of the development of the concept of modernity in historical and sociological scholarship helps shed light on the treatment of this notion in historical scholarship on Korea. Also in the study of the history of Korea has the notion of ‘modernity’ been both central and controversial. The occupation of Korea by Japan in the early twentieth century and the colonial verdict on the ‘backwardness’ of Korea has led to this issue being inextricably embroiled in nationalist discourses. Furthermore, the issue of “modernity” in relation to social and economic changes in the late Chosôn period has also been as issue that for a long time have divided Korean and Western scholarship.12

Refuting the early twentieth-century verdict that late Chosôn society was characterised by stagnation (*Chosôn sahoe chôngch’erón*; *Joseon sohoe jeongcheron*) and that the colonisation of Japan ushered the modernization of Korea (*singminji kûndaehwaron*; *geundaehwaron*), post-liberation South Korean historians focused on describing the dynamic development in late Chosôn, most famously in the form of the theory of the sprouts of capitalism (*chabon chuûi maengaron*; *jabon juui maengaron*) and the theory of internal development (*naejaejôk palchônnon*; *naejaejeok baljeoonnon*), arguing for an indigenous modernisation process
preceding the colonial experience.

These South Korean scholars thus applied the analytical tools of sociology to look for qualities of modernity in late Chosŏn Korea. Regardless of whether they were Marxist or not, they were predominantly influenced by the evolutionary Marxist view of history and understood these qualities as representations of ‘contradictions’ in society—although non-Marxist scholars would prefer the notions of ‘seeds’—that inevitably would lead to the breakdown of the old system.

So whereas post-liberation South Korean scholars applied the analytical tools from sociology within the framework of an evolutionary understanding of history to argue for the internal roots of modernity, early Western scholar on Chosŏn history mainly understood modernity as a strictly historical term describing the European historical experience since the late eighteenth century, and consequently considered Korean modernity to have started when the country came into contact with Western civilization. Modern Korea history was usually regarded to have started in the late nineteenth century with the so-called “opening” of Korea.13

It is interesting to notice that whereas later on a more nuanced understanding, bringing in elements of modernity as a sociological term, developed in the understanding of the histories of China and Japan, and the notion of the ‘early modern’ started to be applied, this was never extended to Korea, and when the term ‘early modern’ was used for Korea it was mainly to designate the late nineteenth century and did not relate to socio-economic developments in late Chosŏn.

Western historians of Korea who do not include or criticize the notion of modernity in their discussions of late Chosŏn have been labelled “orientalistst.” 14 Depending on how this term is understood, such criticism might be justified in relation to some scholars, but we must take into consideration theoretical and methodological differences between early Western scholarship on Korean history and academic trends in South Korea. That is, it is important not only to pay attention to whether scholars in a larger sense understand modernity as a mainly or initially
European historical process or as qualities, but also, in relation to social historians, to which larger schools of sociology—mainly the Marxist or the Weberian—their work might be understood to belong.

As discussed above, in an effort to refute the colonial verdict of late Chosŏn society as stagnated, the scholars of the school of internal development adopted an evolutionary understanding of history that borrowed from Marxist historiography. Whereas in South Korea, therefore, many scholars, even though some of them were not Marxist, had a Marxist-influenced evolutionary understanding of history, early Western scholars were rather guided by a Weberian understanding. Although admittedly “modernity” plays a crucial part in Weberian theory, the approach is rather configurational, paying attention to the characteristics of the types of “traditional” and “modern” rather than the transition period between the two. It has been pointed out that such an approach in fact has difficulties in explaining the development from one type to the other.15

So whereas South Korean scholarship with their evolutionary Marxist-influenced approach could see the germination of modernity in late Chosŏn society in the “contradictions” the society displayed, Western scholars armed with Weberian theories rather focused on describing the type of traditional Korean society. It may be argued, as has been done, that such an approach is influenced by Parsonian modernization theory and even if not explicitly aimed at highlighting differences between the West and Korea, implicitly having such a result. However, such criticism should not levied based on circumstantial evidence, and we should recognise the validity of approaching history from a Weberian point of view.16

**Recent Western European Scholarship**

The above section has tried to show the theoretical and methodological approach of earlier Western scholarship on Korean history to facilitate a
comparison with more recent works in Europe. But before we start the
main discussion of this section, let us first briefly survey the field of
English-language scholarship on Chosŏn-period history in Europe.

Although there were other scholars working on Chosŏn Korea, in terms
of political, social, and economic history that is relevant for the topic
under discussion in this article, for a long time European scholarship was
the work of Martina Deuchler, first at Zurich University and later at the
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), on Confucian ideology
and the yangban social status group and its relationship with the state.
Professor Deuchler is still active although she has retired from SOAS, but
today the field has grown, in particular in the United Kingdom. James B.
Lewis at Oxford is working on relations between Chosŏn Korea and
Tokugawa Japan and also recently the economic history of late Chosŏn.
The author of this review article is also mainly working on the Chosŏn
period, in particular rural unrest and statecraft at SOAS. Younger scholars
who have recently joined the field are Owen Miller and Andrew Jackson,
the former working on commercial history of the period and latter on
rebellion and factionalism.17

Although the number of scholars still is limited, we can observe certain
trends. Scholars today address issues in Korean history that are not core in
the Weberian tradition that dominated earlier Western scholarship on
Korea, most predominantly the characteristics of the social elites and their
relationship with the state. It is also interesting to note that there are
scholars active in the United Kingdom that are willing to embrace the
internal development theory. Although more of an expert of Korea under
Japanese occupation, Michael Shin at Cambridge University has
translated and co-edited a volume presenting some of the main figures in
this school in South Korea.18

General histories are a good starting point to see how historical change
and development is understood and, in relation to the issues under
consideration in this article, how the issue of modernity is dealt with.
English-language general histories of Korea are rare, and even if recent
years have seen more works being published it is mainly either translated
Korean works, or histories written by scholars active in the United States. One European English-language exception, though, is Keith Pratt’s *Everlasting Flower: A History of Korea*. This work, however, although aiming to “offer snapshots of what seems to me to be important elements in the formation and development of the modern Korean state,” focuses much on cultural history and does not engage with sociological theory to any larger extent. Instead we have to turn to monographs and articles to see discussions relevant to the concept of modernity.

The scholar who most explicitly advocate the use of ‘modernity’ in ‘pre-modern’ Korea, and who pushes the applicability of this notion back in time most boldly, is Remco Breuker, at Leiden University, whose research mainly deals with the Koryŏ period. Through explorations of identity in Koryŏ, Breuker has challenged many notions held about pre-modern Korea by arguing for a Korean nation in the period—nations and nationalism often seen as a result of modernization—and arguing for a pluralist identity.

In a study that discusses the Yuan Empire and Koryŏ and argues for the applicability of the term ‘modern’ to earlier East Asian history, Breuker, clearly influenced by the work of Alexander Woodside, positions himself as follows:

*I will not argue that the late 13th century Yuan Empire was equivalent to what we believe modernity to believe. The difference in the advances in technology and its widespread application in the form of industrialization is too great to allow any meaningful comparison here. I will argue, however, that many of the characteristics now exclusively defined as modern have in fact been around for a long time and that if such characteristics are found in clusters, the significance in this clustering must not be overlooked. Industrialization may be our modernity’s most visible ingredient, but it is not an essential one. Only at the peril of misunderstanding how the past becomes the present, do we ignore the substance of pre-modern clusters of ‘modernity’s’ characteristics. Modernity may be part of industrialization, but the*
opposition is not necessarily true. Hence, this paper will also argue that ‘modernity’ per se is not a modern phenomenon, but that history has shown it before; that it can be found, lost and, presumably, regained.  

With this emphasis on ‘clusters’ Breuker places his argument at the center of the ongoing discussion on the usefulness of the term ‘early modern.’ Scholars who argue for the usefulness of this term tend to put forward sets of such markers. Evelyn S. Rawski, for instance, arguing for an early modern Qing China emphasizes the “interrelatedness of economic, political and social change,” and builds up her argument with references to economic growth, increased revenues, territorial consolidation, administrative centralization, and cultural convergence.  

We saw above how scholars like Jack Goldstone questions the usefulness of identifying certain marker of modernity in earlier history, but in the approaches of both Evelyn S. Rawski and Remco Breuker we can see attempts to overcome such concerns by arguing for the existence of clusters of qualities of modernity. This is an interesting approach, and in fact it brings to mind another argument of the same Jack Goldstone.  

In “Neither Late Imperial nor Early Modern: Efflorescences and the Qing Formation in World History,” Goldstone also discusses such clusters of qualities, or rather convergences of trends and labels them efflorescences.

An efflorescence is a relatively sharp, often unexpected upturn in significant demographic and economic indices, usually accompanied by political expansion, institution-building, cultural synthesis, and consolidation [...] They are often seen by contemporaries and successors as “golden ages” of creativity and accomplishment. Moreover, they often set new patterns for thought, political organization and economic life that last for many generations. The role of efflorescences in understanding world history is to replace the dichotomy between stagnation (seen as typically premodern) and
growth (seen as typically modern,) I [...] argue that the content of efflorescences, as well as their overall form, matters in setting a path-dependent future.  

Although Goldstone proposes efflorescences instead of ‘early modernity,’ these two notions share the ambition of looking at the dynamic aspect of ‘premodern’ societies, and his ideas are relevant also for Breuker’s work on Koryo-period Korea.

Remco Breuker situates his discussion even more firmly at the center of the Korean controversy by describing the 14th century situation as ‘colonial modernity,’ focusing on the role played by the Yuan Empire. The purpose might partly have been to provoke, but this approach indicates another important element in the notion of ‘early modernity’—that this was not an isolated national development but part of larger global trends. Although not explicitly putting this forward as a strong argument for the early modern world, Sheldon Pollock has stated:

Few deny that that over the three centuries up to 1800 Eurasia as a whole witnessed unprecedented developments: the opening of sea passages that were global for the first time in history, and of networks of trade and commodity-production for newly global markets; spectacular demographic growth (the world’s population doubled); the rise of large stable states; the diffusion of new technologies (gunpowder, printing) and crops from the Americas.

Moving early modernity out of national histories and into a broader, even global, perspective in this manner is another way of stretching the notion back in time while avoiding a strong evolutionary or teleological approach.

Although not explicitly discussing the term modernity in the same way as Remco Breuker, other scholars do also engage with a more comparative approach influenced by a reevaluation of Chinese history by scholars like Woodside, Pomeranz, and Wong. One example is James B.
Lewis and his work on late Chosŏn economy. Influenced in particular by the work of Pomeranz and the notion of a relatively late divergence of the economies of Europe and East Asia, Lewis has in a series of co-authored articles explored quantitative aspects of Chosŏn economy to facilitate such a comparison. Through mainly statistical analyses of economic indices and indicators of living standards, such as rice prices, wages, rents, interest rates, and physical features, this research team describes economic expansion and decline in the late Chosŏn period.25

Positioning themselves against existing scholarship and trying to move away from the contentious dichotomy of the internal development theory versus the model of colonial modernization, James Lewis and his co-authors in one article summarize previous scholarship as follows:

*Until the late 1990s, two Marxist models dominated Korean economic history. One model argued that land ownership was a monopoly of the king; commoners had no property rights, and land tax was a form of rent. This model argues that capitalism did not really appear until Japanese colonialism arrived in the twentieth century. Another model found “sprouts of capitalism” in the “capitalistic relations” of food production and proto-industrial manufacturers before the twentieth century. Both models were keen to place Korea somewhere along a developmental curve from feudalism to capitalism.*26

Instead James Lewis and his co-authors suggest a model based on the physiocratic ideas of Adam Smith. Furthermore, just like Remco Breuker, they want to dislocate the importance of industrialization and argue, like Wong and Pomeranz has done for China, that comparison should be with the “Smithian dynamics of growth found in the “industrious revolution” Jan de Vries describes for the economies of eighteenth-century agricultural Europe, not to the economies of nineteenth-century industrial Europe.”27

In relation to the issue of modernity they conclude:
Finally, in answer to an old question—why did Korea fail to modernize?—we would argue that this has been, for too long, the wrong question. We reject the implicit teleology of agriculture to industrialization and would rather examine the nature of change from the past forward, not from the present backwards. In this connection, Adam Smith helps greatly in understanding a pre-industrial agricultural economy. A more apt question is—from when and how did the Korean (and Chinese?) agricultural model diverge from the European case and why?28

The significance of this work in relation to the topic of this article is the attempt to move away from the dichotomy between pre-modern stagnation (or moderate growth or stability at the best) and modern growth, and instead to try to provide a dynamic understanding of economic fluctuations.

Another work that has challenged some notions held about the ‘pre-modern’ economy of Chosŏn Korea is Owen Miller’s study on the silk merchants of the Myŏnjujeong (Myeongjujeon). This is an in-depth study of guild documents, the majority of them in the Kawai collection in the library of Kyoto University, and one of the findings is that the guild system in the late nineteenth-century shifted towards a more market-oriented system, not due to the changes brought by the opening of Korea, but rather through internal mechanisms.29

The author of this review article is another scholar who has made a humble attempt to revaluate the late Chosŏn period partly in light of the larger revaluation of the historical experience of East Asia in comparison with the West. In particular influenced by R. Bin Wong, my work has focused on eighteenth and nineteenth century statecraft and the relationship between state and society, trying to offer a less judgemental and more dynamic understanding of late Chosŏn state performance.

To begin with, in studies of nineteenth-century rural unrest I have tried to challenge the notion that this was an indication that the traditional system was crumbling due to corruption and stagnation, and have instead
put forward the argument that this was a conflict between central power and local society caused by political centralisation and a more active and intrusive state. Although arguing against seeing this unrest as a social movement, I still situate it in the context of not only a centralizing state, but also of social and economic changes in local society.

The influence of R. Bin Wong can be seen in a series of articles that deal more specifically with Confucian statecraft, covering agricultural conditions and taxation, famine, disaster and poor relief, orphan care, and judicial processes and punishment. Despite the fact that the focus is on Confucian ideology and statecraft, the aim has not so much been to describe their characteristics as to show the interaction with changing demographics, society, and economy in late Chosŏn. Challenging notions of administrative decay in the nineteenth century, a study on famine relief states:

This study will look at famine relief administration in the first half on the nineteenth century and will argue that, when it came to this task, the state was not out of touch with the actual situation in rural areas. In his commendable effort to transcend Eurocentric views on historical change in China, R. Bin Wong has suggested that state performance should be measured against the specific tasks that the state confronted, and not by any “universal,” that is, Eurocentric standard of development. In late Chosŏn, the Korean state faced the two difficult tasks of helping a countryside increasingly afflicted by crop failure and famine, and at the same time reproducing the existing social order in order to secure the state’s stability.

Concluding that the Chosŏn state successfully addressed those two tasks while facing serious fiscal restraints, the article attempts to show the dynamic interaction between Confucian ideology and statecraft and the social conditions of nineteenth-century Korea.
Concluding remarks

Given the limited number of scholars in Europe working on the political, social, and economic history of late Chosŏn Korea, it is difficult to discuss trends. But overall, if the current research trends are broadly compared with earlier Western scholar as discussed in this article, a shift can be discerned from viewing modernity as a historical term describing a historical process that started in late eighteenth century Europe to later spread to other parts of the world as they came in contact with Western civilization to an approach in which it is rather the sociological term that is utilized to shed light on late Chosŏn society, economy, and statecraft. Even if some scholars still are reluctant to introduce the term ‘modernity’ into their arguments, their works are often based on a comparison of European history in its early modernity or discuss qualities that in the European experience has been defined as markers of modernity, and have in that sense extended the questions that can be found in the discourse of the ‘early modern world’ to Korean history.

As stated in the introduction, this article does not discuss the way in which this recent European research relates to current trends in South Korean historiography, but it might be proper to conclude with once again stating that these works, of course, are not only influenced by Western scholarship on East Asian history, but also very much positively engage with and to a certain extent mirror developments in Korean scholarship, and that a good topic for another review article would be to discuss convergences in recent scholarship on Korean history to supplement previous articles that mainly have highlighted the differences and lack of communication between Korean and Western scholarship.

Notes:

1 Kim Keong-il, “Over Contested Terrain: Currents and Issues of Korean
Recent Western-European Historical Studies on ‘Pre-Modern’ Korea and ~


3 The notion of the “ghettoization” of Korean historical studies outside of Korea has been put forward by Vladimir Tichonov in “Doing Korean History Research Outside of Korea: An Advantage of Looking from Outside?” *The Review of Korean Studies* 15:1 (2012).


5 This term was coined in the 1940s and became widely accepted by the 1970s. Peter Burke, “Can we speak of an ‘early modern’ world?” *IAS Newsletter* 43 (Spring 2007).


7 Goldstone, “The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World.”

8 Benjamin A. Elman, “Early Modern Classicism and Late Imperial China,” *IAS Newsletter* 43 (Spring 2007).


12 Kim Keong-il, 156-62.

13 ‘Early Western scholarship on Chosŏn history’ is in this article referring to pivotal early scholars such as Edward Wagner, Martina Deuchler, and James Palais.


22 Rawski, “The Qing Formation and the Early-Modern Period.”


24 Sheldon Pollock, “We need to find what we are not looking for,” *IIAS Newsletter* 42 (Spring 2007).

25 See for example, James B. Lewis and SH Jun, “Wages, Rents, and Interest Rates in Southern Korea, 1700 to 1900,” *Research in Economic History*, University of California, No. 24 (2006); James B. Lewis, SH Jun and HR Kang, “Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century: A View Suggested by Adam Smith,” *Journal of Economic History*
Recent Western-European Historical Studies on ‘Pre-Modern’ Korea and ~


26 James B. Lewis, SH Jun and HR Kang, “Korean Expansion and Decline from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century,” 244-5.

27 Ibid, 246.

28 Ibid, 274.


