

## **Political Trends of Hong Bog Won Clan in the Period of Mongol Domination**

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### **Introduction**

The Mongol invasion, which occurred in the period of the military regime in Koryo, as well as the period of Yuan domination and interference that followed the Koryo-Mongol wars and reconciliation, constitute one of the most important stages in the history of Korea. The ordeals cost a terrible loss of human lives and brought a gigantic damage to Koryo's economy, but at the same time the military regime was overthrown, significant changes in socio-economic structure were brought about and new social forces came to the Koryo's political scene, adopting the new ideology of Neo-Confucianism which itself came to Korea through the Yuan empire.

That was also the time when one of the powerful landlords of the North-Western Region, Hong Bog Won, betrayed Koryo and joined the Mongols during their invasion, later fleeing to Shenyang region. The descendants of Hong Bog Won kept playing an important role in Koryo-Yuan relations. There is but one study on Hong Bog Won in Korea's historical literature, as for the clan itself – it was out of Korean scholars' observation. In this work I inquire into the clan's political trends and their role in Koryo-Yuan bilateral relations through the period that covers most

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of those relations' history.

I find the issue important also in connection with the so-called North-Eastern Project, recently being put in progress in China, as after Hong Bog Won fled to Shenyang the region became a base for his operations, as well as it was at the time a shelter for many Koryo people. So the investigation of the Hong clan's activity may also help us understand the role of the Koryo factor in the region at the time.

In the article I take into consideration the period of almost a hundred years between the first known contact between Koryo and the Mongols, which is dated 1218, and 1312, the year of last significant reference in historical records connected with the clan. It is interesting that trends in political activities of the clan, and even the changing of major acting figures chronologically correspond to major transformations of Koryo-Mongol relations. Thus, the period of Koryo-Mongol wars, usually dated by major Korean specialists 1231-1258, was also a period of mainly Hong Bog Won's activity. After that came the time of reconciliation and cooperation between the Koryo court and the newly established Yuan Empire, since 1259 and till 1275, which was the time of Hong's son, Hong Da Gu's rise and active service to the Yuan dynasty. As king Chungson came to power in 1275, the period of the so-called son-in-law system started, when Hong Da Gu's sons represented the major trend of the clan's political activity.

### **Submission of Hong Dae Sun and Hong Bog Won to the Mongols and their Activity during the Koryo-Mongol Wars Period**

According to both Korean and Chinese chronicles, Hong Bog Won and his father, Hong Dae Sun had first contact with Mongols in 1218, when the Kitan hordes, being pursued by the Mongols, invaded Koryo and Hong Dae Sun took his son and his subordinates and joined the Mongols for the operation against the Kitan.<sup>1</sup> We don't know much of Hong Bog

Won's father. He was a *toryon* in the region of Inju, an important post of a military commander in *Chujingun* system, with about 3000 armed men in command<sup>2</sup>. The *toryons* were often called *t'oho*, (powerful families) as they acted like autonomous warlords in subordinate regions<sup>3</sup>. Important in this regard is the fact that there is no information in the chronicles about Hong Dae Sun taking any orders from the central government concerning the joint military operation with the Mongols.

It is obvious that an attack against the Kitan was in the interest of the Northwestern Koryo population, but, keeping in mind future actions taken by Hong Bog Won, we can also consider it as an autonomous move in his father's advantage. The *t'ohos* of the North Western region were in rather tense relations with the central government of the military, due to its policy aimed at putting their activity under control, including the border trade with the nomads, which brought local warlords considerable income. It is also necessary to mention some ethnical and cultural differences between the North West, which was in active interaction with the nomads of Manchuria, and the rest of the country. Due to those reasons rebellions against the central power were not uncommon for the region, and during some revolts the local warlords looked for support of the nomads across the border. We have no information about Hong Dae Sun's original intentions, but it is obvious that coming in contact with the rising force of the Mongols was in his best interest. We should also mark the fact that he met them accompanied by his son, which shows to some extent that he had no fear or suspicions about their intentions, thus proving the fact that there was no such cultural barrier between the people of the Koryo North-West and the nomads as there could be in the case of the rest of the Koryo population.

Hong Bog Won was 12 years old when his first contact with the Mongols occurred.<sup>4</sup> It is likely that the way of life and superiority of military technique of nomadic warriors made an impression on the young boy. We have already mentioned some factors of antagonism between the Northwestern *t'ohos* and the central government. After all, Hong Bog Won could have striven for personal social advancement, which could be

hard for him as a provincial officer in the contemporary Koryo bureaucratic system. However that may be, it looks like he had made a decision even before the Mongol invasion, as in 1231, when the Mongols attacked Koryo for the first time, he met them on the way and took their side with his subordinates numbering about 1500 families.<sup>5</sup> After that he was appointed the *Koryo kunmin manho* ('the commander of ten thousand families of Koryo warriors'),<sup>6</sup> and, using his personal influence to persuade 40 Koryo fortresses in the region to capitulate to the Mongols, played an important role in the Mongol invasion and following peace treaty negotiations.<sup>7</sup> It is worth mentioning that after the Mongols had to leave Koryo due to their commander Sallitai's death, the king of Koryo appointed Hong Bog Won the *rangjang* of Seogyong, thus indirectly acknowledging that the center had no actual control over the territory at the time and had to seek compromise with the warlord, who could exercise his influence in the region.

The move by the central government was a temporary one, as it did strive to restore its influence in the North-West sending an envoy to the Jing. Hong Bog Won, obviously worried by these developments, raised a revolt in Sogyong in 1233, killing Chong Ui, the general who was appointed to Sogyong to defend the central elite interests. It is remarkable that Chong Ui, who was born in the southern province of Chungchon, made his career by putting down another rebellion in the region in 1217, personally killing its leader Choe Gwang Su.<sup>8</sup> Thus he had acquired the post of *changgun* by keeping the Northwest under the central government control, but in 15 years died in another separatist rebellion. The reaction of Kaegyong, which had obviously recovered from the first Mongol invasion by the time, was both quick and fierce. The revolt was crushed and Sogyong was "turned into desert, while its people were moved to sea islands"<sup>9</sup>. While Hong Bog Won managed to escape to the lands under Mongol control, his father and brother Hong Baek Su were captured and taken to Kaegyong.

The damage sustained by Hong's clan after the suppression of the uprising was devastating. According to *Yuanshi*, after entering the

Shenyang region he begged the Mongols to permit his “staying in the land where he could save his life”.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, it seems that his popularity among the people of the Northwest Koryo and Manchuria was quite considerable at the time, as he was appointed *kwanryong kuibu koryo kunmin changgwan*, ‘the Commander of Submitted Koryo Warriors’, thus becoming a ruler of Koryo people who fled to Manchuria territory and took the Mongol side in the long Koryo-Mongol war to come, and by that acquiring a dominating position in the Shenyang region.

The table below shows the trends of Hong Bog Won’s activity in his new position.

<Table 1> Hong Bog Won’s Activity after the 1233 Revolt

Year	Contents	Sources
1234	Hong receives an order to attack Koryo as a Commander of Koryo Warriors.	<i>Yuanshi</i> , juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won; <i>Wonkoryogisa</i> , 5 <sup>th</sup> year of King T’aejong
1238	About 2000 Koryo men under command Cho Hyon Seup and Lee Won Ja submit to Mongols and are placed under Hong’s command.	<i>Yuanshi</i> , juan 95, Wai-yi, Gaolizhuan.
1250	Prince Wang Chun of Koryo stays in Hong’s house while being sent to Mongols as a hostage, the two men have a quarrel.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
1252	Hong gathers his men and receives a permission of Mongol emperor for an attack against Koryo.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 129, Yolchon 42, Choe Chung Hon.
1253	Hong provokes a new Mongol invasion of Koryo by saying that the king of Koryo has no intention of moving the capital back to Kaegyong and leads Koryo troops within the Mongol invasion force.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 24, Sega 24, 40 <sup>th</sup> year of King Kojong.
	Hong demands bribes from Koryo court.	Ibid.
1254	Large amounts of gold, silver and leather are given to Hong by the Koryo court.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 24, Sega 24, 41 <sup>st</sup> year of King Kojong.
1256	Hong takes part in the Mongol invasion of Koryo as a commander of Koryo troops.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 24, Sega 24, 43 <sup>rd</sup> year of King Kojong.
1258	Hong is killed in a conflict with Wang Chun.	<i>Yuanshi</i> , juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.

As we can see from the table, Hong Bog Won took active part in Mongol invasions of Koryo; he acted not only as one of the commanders in the Mongol army, but did his best to provoke new invasions. We should keep in mind his previous history, which along with traditional complications between the central government of the military and the Koryo Northwest had to form an extremely negative attitude towards the ruling elite of the country. One should also remember that military loot was one of the main sources of wealth at the time for the Mongol warlords, one of which Hong Bog Won eventually had become. But the main factor, as it seems, was the peculiarity of his position in the new environment. As any traitor he had to exert himself to prove his loyalty, which he certainly did. On the other hand, the only time he could be of special value to the Mongols was the time of Koryo active resistance; it was the war between his country and the Mongols that he could capitalize on thus improving his economic and political position inside the emerging Mongol Empire.

The death of Hong Bog Won in 1258 can also be understood in this context. Prince Wang Chun, who married a Mongolian princess and was gaining influence with the Mongol elite, started playing an active role in Koryo-Mongol reconciliation process which king Wonjong successfully used to overthrow the power of the military, thus threatening Hong Bog Won's position of main expert on military operations in Koryo. On the other hand, the Mongols, being worried by the growing number and power of Koryo element in Shenyang and Liaoyang regions and using the "divide and conquer" stratagem evidently strove to balance Hong's influence by the Wang Chun factor. While *Koryosa* gives us a quite convincing story of personal conflict between Hong Bog Won, Wang Chun and his Mongol wife, which ended by the princess using her influence to provoke the killing of Hong Bog Won by Mongolian strongmen,<sup>11</sup> the *Yuanshi* has a laconic remark on Hong Bog Won and Wang Chun struggling for influence over the Koryo warriors in Manchuria and Hong Bog Won dying after he lost the struggle.<sup>12</sup>

It is remarkable that after the death of Hong Bog Won the Koryo

population of Manchuria was divided in two groups: the people of Lyaoyang were left under control of the Hong clan, while Wang Chun gained control over the population of about 2000 Koryo families living in Shenyang.<sup>13</sup> The fact does support the assumption that control over Koryo warriors was the main reason for the Hong-Wang Chun feud. On the other hand, except for one case, which I intend to mention below, none of Hong Bog Won's family became subject of repression after his death. This can lead to a conclusion that while Mongols did look for some force to balance the Hong influence over a considerable military power of the Koryo element in Manchuria and so provoked his conflict with Wang Chun, they still had no intention of ousting the Hong clan as such, and, more to that, the killing itself might have been an accident.

### **The rise of Hong Da Gu during the Koryo-Yuan reconciliation period**

Hong Bog Won had seven sons and one daughter, and his second son, Hong Da Gu, can be considered the most remarkable figure in the clan's history. It may be supposed that he was born in 1244, as, according to the *Yuanshi* records, he died in 1291 at the age of 48. He entered military service at a rather young age and managed to impress Hubilay, the future founder of the Yuan Empire, with his courage and military talent. The two were close enough for Hubilay to give Da Gu, whose original name was Chun Gi, the name which he is known under in the records as a sign of their personal friendship.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless he was arrested soon after his father's death in 1260 as he tried to provoke another conflict between Koryo and the Mongols by saying that the king of Koryo lied about his intentions to submit to Hubilay and move the capital back to Kaegyong.<sup>15</sup> Let alone the clan's conflict with Wang Chun, the timing the young heir of Hong Bog Won picked for the provocation was wrong. While king Wonjong tried to establish friendly relations with the Mongols as he needed support after

overthrowing the Choe regime, Hubilay had newly proclaimed himself a founder of the Yuan dynasty and needed all the support he could receive. In 1260 the two met in person, thus beginning a period of the Koryo-Yuan reconciliation.

On the other hand, in 1261 Hubilay called the 17-year old Hong Da Gu and said to him that his father was unjustly punished and that he, as the emperor, wished to rectify the mistake by appointing Da Gu the *chongwan* of the Koryo warriors.<sup>16</sup> Although personal sympathy for Hong could affect the emperor's decision, we should keep in mind that the political struggle in Koryo was far from being over, and Hubilay still needed the clan that could exercise influence over rather numerous and experienced force of Koryo people defected to Manchuria. The number of Koryo warriors in Lyaoyang and Shenyang at the time came up to a few tens of thousand,<sup>17</sup> and they evidently became a quite important factor both for Koryo and Yuan politics, as there is a record in *Yuanshi* of Hubilay personally demanding their loyalty and threatening repression against their families should they give support to his enemies in Koryo,<sup>18</sup> thus demonstrating that the Koryo element in Manchuria was at least strong enough for the Yuan emperor to pay his personal attention to it. These factors probably influenced Hubilay's settlement of the Hong-Wang Chun struggle issue, as in 1263, after Hong Da Gu reported Wang Chun boasting about his high position and saying that his rank was no less than the emperor's heir, Hubilay took all Koryo families in Manchuria out of Wang Chun's command and returned them under Hong's control.<sup>19</sup>

It is quite understandable that in the situation when Hubilay had to wage a war against his relatives fighting for control over China and Mongolia itself he needed a force that could defend his interests in Koryo, and Hong Da Gu, who, according to Koryo sources "hated his motherland"<sup>20</sup> and was personally connected with Hubilay, was far better person for the job than Wang Chun, who still had rather close ties with the Koryo court. So when in 1269 the Lim clique made an attempt to dethrone Wonjong it was Hong Da Gu who got the order to invade Koryo in support of the king with 3300 of his men.<sup>21</sup>



This expedition opened a period of direct Yuan interference into Koryo domestic affairs, and Hong Da Gu and his Koryo warriors became one of the main instruments for such policy for about 10 years since 1269. He was one of the Yuan troops' commanders during the suppression of the Sambyolcho uprising, showing a severity that could astonish the Mongols themselves. It is worth mentioning that during the Sambyolcho rebellion Hong Da Gu was accompanied by sons of Wang Chun. Before sending them to battle Wang Chun told them to save their relative Wang On, a crown prince of Koryo, whom the rebels named their king. But Hong Da Gu was one of the first to land in Chindo Island and attack the rebel base, where he personally killed Wang On, thus indirectly avenging his father's death. Two years after he also carried out mass executions of the rebel prisoners when the Yuan and Koryo troops jointly stormed the Thamna Island - the last base of the Sambyolcho.

Hong Da Gu showed same harshness and cruelty during the preparation of military expeditions against Japan, which was the most important task and the biggest failure of his life. According to *Koryosa*, in 1274 Hong Da Gu was appointed 'commander of the shipbuilding' for the Japan expedition, and the Koryo people went through a lot of suffering because of economic exploitation connected with the project. As both attempts to conquer Japan failed, Hong Da Gu's position in Koryo faded, and after 1281 there are no records in Koryo sources about this man. It is obvious that as the atmosphere in Koryo-Yuan relations changed from confrontation to cooperation between the two elites resulting in establishment of the son-in-law vassalage system, when Koryo kings married Yuan princesses and Koryo, due to its geopolitical position and comparatively highly developed culture, had taken a rather high place among the vassals of the Yuan empire, Hong Da Gu could no longer be as useful to Yuan court as he was before. He actually could be rather an uncomfortable subordinate due to his constant atrocities, misconduct of his men and attempts to provoke new complications in the Koryo-Yuan relations.

The last such attempt was his attack against Kim Ban Gyong, a popular

Koryo general, who after fighting the Mongols in the period of Koryo resistance came to leading the moderate party in Koryo elite, striving for establishment of friendly ties with Beijing. Kim Ban Gyong led Koryo troops in suppression of the Sambyolcho and in Japan expedition, and his activity aimed at reconciliation with the Yuan naturally threatened Hong's interests. When the scandal connected with alleged plot by Kim Ban Gyong to kill the king occurred, Hong actively participated in the event. Although it was rather quickly proved that the 'plot' was nothing but false accusations made by Kim's personal enemies, Hong came to Kaegyong, arrested Kim and tortured him, at the same time asking Yuan court for permission for another military expedition against Koryo. The result was quite different from what Hong Da Gu expected. He and the king Chungryol were ordered to come to the Yuan capital, where after some discussion the emperor took the Koryo king's side. The Mongol troops were called off and, as the king returned to Koryo, Hong's supporters were sent into exile.<sup>22</sup>

The event can be called a turning point in the clan's history. As after a period of reconciliation the vassalage son-in-law system was established in Koryo-Yuan relations, the Yuan did no longer need subordinates for hostile activities and suppression of the Koryo court. Thus Hong Da Gu's influence, as well as the influence of the clan as a whole, decreased dramatically. After the last attempt to conquer Japan failed, Hong Da Gu had to return to Manchuria where he continued his military service, but could no longer affect the situation in Koryo.

<Table 2> Hong Da Gu's activity in 1269-1281

Year	Contents	Sources
1269	Hong leads the expedition against the Lim clique.	<i>Yuanshi</i> , juan 95, Wai-yi, Gaolizhuan.
1270	Hong takes part in negotiations connected with a project of the Koryo king's marriage with the Yuan princess.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 26, Sega 26, 11 <sup>th</sup> year of King Wonjong, 2 <sup>nd</sup> month.
	A group of Koryo officers defected to Manchuria and was placed under Hong's command.	Ibid, 4 <sup>th</sup> month.

	Hong is sent to three southern provinces to suppress the resistance.	Ibid, 7 <sup>th</sup> month.
1271	Hong requests another military expedition against Koryo, but the Mongol commanders refuse the request.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
	Hong is ordered to prepare provisions for the Japan invasion.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 27, Sega 27, 12 <sup>th</sup> year of King Wonjong.
	Hong takes part in the suppression of the Sambyolcho uprising.	Ibid, 5 <sup>th</sup> month.
	Hong insulted the Koryo king while visiting the court by refusing to make a bow.	Ibid.
1273	Hong takes part in discussion of the Japan invasion.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 27, Sega 27, 11 <sup>th</sup> year of King Wonjong, 2 <sup>nd</sup> month.
	Koryo court is ordered to provide 500 sets of clothing for Hong's subordinates.	Ibid.
	Hong takes part in expedition against the Sambyulcho to Thamna, carries out mass executions of prisoners.	Ibid, 4 <sup>th</sup> month.
1274	Hong's people loot Koryo homes while preparing for the invasion of Japan.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 28, Sega 28, 1 <sup>st</sup> year of King Chungryol, 8 <sup>th</sup> month.
	Hong commands the building of the 300 ships for invasion of Japan.	Ibid, 10 <sup>th</sup> month.
	Hong and Kim Ban Gyong have a conflict over Hong's harsh atrocities during the preparation of invasion to Japan.	<i>Koryosa</i> , Yolchon 17, Kim Bang Gyong.
1275	Hong returns to Shen-yang after the failure of invasion to Japan.	<i>Koryos</i> , kwon 28, Sega 28, 1 <sup>st</sup> year of King Wonjong.
	Hong takes part in the Kim Ban Gyong issue.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 104, Yolchon, 17, Kim Bang Gyong.
1277	Hong prepares his troops for an invasion of Koryo, but the Yuan emperor forbids the expedition.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
	The Koryo officials report that the food prices in Koryo rose due to Hong's expropriations and looting.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 79, Sikhwa 2, Hwap'ae.
1278	Hong orders expropriations of rice and beans in western provinces of Koryo.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 82, Pyong 2, Tunjon.
1279	Hong requests the Yuan emperor to order the king of Koryo to grant permission to wives of his soldiers of Koryo origin to leave the country as the troops pull out.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 29, Sega 29, 5 <sup>th</sup> year of King Chungryol.
	The Koryo envoy at the Yuan court reports that the population of Koryo is distracted by Hong's atrocities and expropriations.	Ibid, 7 <sup>th</sup> month.
1280	Hong renews the preparations for another invasion of Japan and promises the emperor to succeed.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 29, Sega 29, 6 <sup>th</sup> year of King Chungryol.
1281	The invasion of Japan fails, Hong is recalled from Koryo.	<i>Koryosa</i> , kwon 29, Sega 29, 7 <sup>th</sup> year of King Chungryol.

### The Hong Clan's Activity during the Son-in-law Vassalage System

The historical sources give us information about two sons of Hong Da Gu: Hong Jung Hee and Hong Jung Gyong. *Yuanshi* tells us that Hong Jung Hee served in the Emperor's guard in 1276, and in 1279 he "inherited" his father's title of the Commander of Koryo Warriors.<sup>23</sup> He went to Koryo as a Yuan envoy once in 1284 and brought horses as a present to the king. But the son of Hong Da Gu, he was a warrior and not a diplomat. When the younger brother of Hubilay, Naehan, raised a rebellion in 1287, he distinguished himself while putting it down and in 1306 was appointed *Pyongjang chongsa* of the Lyaoyang province instead of his uncle, Hong Gun Sang. Until he and his brother chose to raise the Province establishment issue, his activity was concentrated in Manchuria.

The son-in-law vassalage system, which had been formed in the Koryo-Yuan relations by the time, dramatically complicated the situation influencing the interests of different Koryo and Mongol clans. The political elite ruled the country while the king of Koryo could participate in the Yuan politics, as did king Chungson who played an important role in Wu-Tsun's enthronement. There were also plenty of Koryo people who lived and worked in the Yuan Empire, and every group of Koryo nationals inside Yuan had their own interests and their own diplomacy.<sup>24</sup>

The sons of Hong Da Gu inherited both their father's hate for their historical homeland and his position inside Yuan, which made the stabilization on Korean peninsula the worst scenario for their family. Thus, as their grandfather and father, they worked diligently to provoke a new crisis in the Koryo-Yuan relations.

It is known from the sources that in 1302 emerged the idea of unification of Lyaoyang province and the "Province of the Eastern Conquest", the Mongol administrative body inside Koryo. It is known that Koryo clans of the Lyaoyang province brought up the project.<sup>25</sup> As we know, the Hong clan was the most influential in the region: the brother

of Hong Da Gu, Hong Gun Sang was the *Pyongjang chongsa* of the Lyaoyang province at the time, succeeded then by Hong Jung Hee in 1306, who was promoted to the Chwasung of the Lyaoyang province in 1307.<sup>26</sup> By the time he already was the Commander of Koryo Warriors so it is reasonable to agree with the assumption that it were the Hongs who had raised the issue of curbing the Koryo's independence even further.<sup>27</sup>

In 1309, as king Chungson came to power, brothers Hong Jung Hee and Hong Jung Gyong criticized the new ruler for his administrative reforms which he later had to abolish and at the same time proposed to send 2000 warriors of the Shenyang army to cut lumber in the region of the Paektu mountain with the use of Koryo fleet, thus also trying to provoke some complications in the two royal homes' relations.<sup>28</sup>

About the same time the brothers proposed establishing a province of the Yuan Empire in the Korean peninsula instead of the separate Koryo kingdom. According to *Koryosa*, the emperor rejected the idea in 1312,<sup>29</sup> so it will be reasonable to assume that it was brought up between 1309 and 1312. Hong Jung Hee, who was the author of the project, tried to justify it saying that it is unreasonable for one person to occupy two thrones at the same time, meaning king Chungson's accession to the throne of Wang of Shenyang, the position established in 1260 by the Mongols for ruling the Koryo people living in Shenyang. While the real power in the region belonged to the Hongs and other *t'oho* clans, the merely symbolic post of Shenyang-wang was usually occupied by a member of the Koryo royal family, thus establishing an alternative center of political influence causing discord in Koryo elite. In 1308 the new emperor, Wu-Tsun, granted the post to his personal friend king Chungson, who could now occupy both thrones ruling Koryo people in and outside the peninsula. No wonder that the issue raised by the Hongs enraged the emperor and Hong Jung Hee was sent into exile.<sup>30</sup>

The origin of the conflict was the right of control over the Koryo population of Lyaoyang and Shenyang, the economic and political base of the Hong clan. It was mentioned before that the Hongs proposed sending 2000 men of the Shenyang army to cut lumber in the Paektu mountain

region, so we can assume that they still had a rather considerable human and economic resources under their control and enjoyed respectable autonomy. As positions of the clan in Koryo itself came almost to nothing, the Shenyang region was the last place where they could exercise political power.

But at the time due to personal friendship of the emperor and the Koryo king the Koryo court's influence in the region increased dramatically. The Lyaoyang province was on the way from Koryo to the Yuan capital, so all envoys from Koryo and to Koryo had to go through it. In 1279 Hubilay ordered establishing of one village of 200 families and two of 100 families each on the way under Koryo king's jurisdiction to provide for envoys' comfortable trips.<sup>31</sup> The villages became Chungson's base for expansion into Manchuria. After being appointed Wang of Shenyang, he was granted lands on the Amnokkang Northern bank and as a result gained considerable influence over the region.

The process naturally irritated the Hongs who tried to check the king's expansion in the manner their family was used to the most: by a direct attack against Koryo. But being warriors, not politicians, the Hongs obviously failed to adapt to the new situation, understand the peculiarity of the relations between the Yuan and Koryo rulers. Their fiasco brought an end to the era when the Koryo warriors of Shenyang headed by *t'oho* defectors from the Northwest of Koryo could play a separate role in the region. Their activities, hostile to the central power of Koryo, were useful to the Mongols in the period of Koryo-Mongol wars, but at the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century such provocations were not only of no practical use, but could also bring distortion into the Empire's regional policy. As a result the Hong clan lost most of its power, and there are no references about Hong Da Gu's sons after 1312.

Some of their relatives, such as Hong Da Gu's younger brother, Hong Gun Sang (?-1309), who played an important role as a diplomat in Koryo-Yuan relations, or Hong Bog Won's brother Hong Baek Su and his family (son Hong Son (?-1318), grandsons Hong Tak, Hong Ik, Hong Su, Hong Myoungleehwasang), who stayed in Koryo and gained rather high

positions there, but were eliminated during 1356 purges by king Kongmin, still were rather active politically, but they, of course, had no power or resources to play any significant role in Koryo-Yuan relations.

## Conclusion

I have investigated political trends of the Namyang Hong clan during the periods of Koryo-Mongol wars, the period of Koryo-Yuan reconciliation, and, at last, the period of the son-in-law vassalage system, when respectively Hong Bog Won, Hong Da Gu, and Hong Jung Hee played or at least tried to play an important and to some extent autonomous role in the relations of the two countries. The clan representing a stratum of North-West *t'ohos* was originally hostile to the Koryo central government, and after Hong Bog Won raised a rebellion and fled to Manchuria the Koryo-Yuan hostilities became a major source of influence for the family. As the son-in-law vassalage system came to existence, the Hongs could no longer play a role of any significance in the two countries' relations and the impudence of Hong Jung Hee put an end to the Hongs' ruling of the region.

It is necessary to point out that the Hong Bog Won and Hong Da Gu had played rather important roles in the Mongol's invasion in Koryo and strengthening of their domination over the peninsula being important sources of information on Koryo politics, geography and military system, and securing the communications of the invasion force by bringing the Northwest of Koryo under the Mongol's control. The Hong's, on the other hand, managed to become autonomous rulers of rather significant region with a considerable military force under their control, the position they could never achieve under the rule of the military elite in Koryo. But the treason they had to commit to reach their goals made their position vulnerable as well. They depended on the conflict between the two countries, and, while the relations between Kaegyung and Beijing developed their influence had to decline dramatically.

It is important also in the context of the present discussion of the region's history that the Lyaoyang and Shenyang provinces of the Yuan Empire were inhabited by significant numbers of Koryo people and were controlled by the people of Koryo origin. Furthermore, the struggle for influence over the region in the period was also between the Koryo people only, whether these were Wang Chun and Hong Da Gu or Hong Jung Hee and king Chungson. And even project of establishing a Koryo province and depriving Koryo of its independence was also brought up by people of Koryo origin and aimed at winning struggle for control of Shenyang between the two groups of Koryo elite. So we have to point out rather close ties between the region and Koryo at the time, leaving investigation of factors, which led to such connection, for more detailed and separate research.

**Key Word** : Koryo, Yuan, Hong Bog Won, Lyaoyang and Shenyang provinces, king Kongmin

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#### Notes,

- 1 *Koryosa*, kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
- 2 Lee Gi Baek, 'A Study on Koryo Chujin Army', in *Studies of Koryo Military System (Koryo pyongje-sa yongu)*, Ilchogak, 1968, pp. 246-247.
- 3 Kim Nam Gyu, *A Study on Koryo Yanggye Region (Koryo yanggye chibang-sa yongu)*, Saemunsa, 1989, p. 146.
- 4 According to *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won died in 1258 at the age of 52, so we can guess that he was about 12 when he first met the Mongols in 1218.
- 5 *Koryosa*, kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
- 6 Chu Chae Hyok, op.cit., pp. 25-26.
- 7 Ibid., p. 14.
- 8 *Koryosa*, kwon 121, Yolchon 34, Chong Ui.
- 9 *Koryosa*, kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
- 10 *Wonkoryogisa*, 6<sup>th</sup> year of King T'aejong; cited in Chu Chae Hyok, op.cit., p. 13.
- 11 *Koryosa*, kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
- 12 *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.



- 13 Kim Gu Jin, 'Koryo Military of the Liaodong region in the Yuan Times', in *History Theories, Commemorating the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Lee Won Sun (Li Wonsun hoegap kinyom sahang-non)*, 1986, p. 472.
- 14 *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.
- 15 *Koryosa*, kwon 25, Sega 25, 1<sup>st</sup> year of King Wonjong.
- 16 *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.
- 17 Kim Gu Jin, op.cit., p. 469.
- 18 *Yuanshi*, juan 95, Wai-yi, Gaolizhuan.
- 19 *Koryosa Choryo*, kwon 25, 4<sup>th</sup> year of King Wonjong.
- 20 *Koryosa*, kwon 130, Yolchon 43, Hong Bog Won.
- 21 *Yuanshi*, juan 95, Wai-yi, Gaolizhuan.
- 22 *Koryosa*, kwon 28, Sega 28, 4<sup>th</sup> year of King Chungryol.
- 23 *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.
- 24 Min Hyong Gu, *Theories on Political History of Koryo. The Establishment of a Unified State and a Trial of an Independent Kingdom (Koryo chongch'isaron. T'ongil kukka-ui hwangnip-kwa tongnip wanggug-ui siryon)*, Korea University Press, 2004., p. 173.
- 25 Ko Byong Ik, *A Study on History of Negotiations in East Asia (Tong-a kyosopsa-ui yongu)*, Seoul National University Press, 1970, p. 227.
- 26 *Yuanshi*, juan 154, Liezhuan 41, Hong Bog Won.
- 27 Paek In Ho, *A Study on Pro-Yuan Forces in Late Koryo (Koryo hugi puwon seryok yongu)*, Sejong Press, 2003, p. 89.
- 28 *Koryosa*, kwon 33, Sega 33, 1<sup>st</sup> year of King Chungson, 8<sup>th</sup> month.
- 29 *Koryosa*, kwon 34, Sega 34, 4<sup>th</sup> year of King Chungson, 8<sup>th</sup> month.
- 30 *Koryosa*, kwon 36, Sega 36, 1<sup>st</sup> year of King Chunghae.
- 31 *Koryosa*, kwon 29, Sega 29, 5<sup>th</sup> year of King Chungryol.

〈국문초록〉

## 원간섭기 홍복원 일가의 정치적 동향

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13세기 초엽 고려 북계의 토호인 洪福源은 아버지 洪大純의 정치적 성향을 이어받아, 고려를 배반하고 몽고의 고려 침략에 중요한 역할을 했다. 그 후, 그는 몽고에 투항한 고려인들의 지도자가 되어, 그것을 기반으로 遼瀋지방에서 튼튼한 정치적, 사회경제적 발판을 마련하게 되었다. 홍복원이 정치적 영향력을 행사할 수 있었던 배경은 高麗·元 간의 갈등 관계에 기인한 것이었기 때문에, 그는 평생토록 이런 갈등상황을 유지시키려 했다.

사료에서 가장 많이 다루어지는 것은 홍복원의 자손 가운데 그의 둘째 아들 洪茶丘와 그 아들인 洪重喜, 洪重慶으로 구성된 분파에 대해서이다. 그들은 고려와 모든 관계를 단절시킨 채 고려에 압박을 가하였다. 그리고 그들은 홍복원의 정치적 성향을 계승하였으며, 고려에 대한 침략과 수탈을 통해 자신들의 영향력을 강화하여 했다. 그러한 가운데 高麗·元 관계 성립기, 즉 충렬왕 즉위까지는 洪茶丘의 정치적 영향력이 컸지만, 양국관계가 안정됨에 따라 그 영향력은 쇠퇴하였다. 그것을 회복하기 위해 홍다구는 김방경 사건을 비롯하여 도발적인 책동을 벌였지만, 끝내 그 영향력을 회복하지 못하였다.

13세기말~14세기 초에는 홍다구의 아들인 홍중희, 홍중경의 활동이 遼瀋지역에 집중되었으며, 따라서 이 지역은 그들의 정치적, 경제력의 유일한 근거지가 되었다. 그러므로 요심지방에 대한 충선왕의 영향력의 확대는 바로 홍중희, 홍중경으로 하여금 立省論을 제기하게 만들었다. 즉, 홍중희, 홍중경은 충선왕의 심양진출로 위기감을 느끼게 되었으며, 자기 세력의 기반을 지키기 위해 충선왕과 대립하지 않을 수 없었다. 고려에 지지할 세력이 없는 그들은 충선왕 지지세력과

협상을 할 수 있는 처지도 아니었고, 元 조정을 통해서 충선왕 세력 제거를 시도할 수밖에 없었다. 그리하여 그들은 입성책동을 시도하였던 것인데, 그것이 실패하자 그들의 영향력은 더욱 약화되었으며, 그 이후 그 一派는 적극적 정치 활동을 할 수 없었던 것 같다.

홍복원 일가 가운데 그의 또 다른 아들인 洪熊三, 洪君祥과 그들의 후손이 따로이 일파를 구성했는데, 그들은 홍씨 국내파와 밀접한 관계를 유지하면서 원에서 활동하였다. 이들은 駙馬國體制에 적응하여 고려와 원의 교류에 있어서 상당한 역할을 하였다. 특히 주로 충렬왕 때에 활동하였던 홍군상은 그의 정치적, 경제적 위치가 두드러졌는데, 高麗·元 간의 평화적 교류와 우호관계 유지에 크게 기여하였다.

홍복원의 동생인 洪百壽는 고려에 남아 활동했는데, 그의 후손이 홍씨일가의 국내파를 형성하였다. 자신들의 사회경제적 기반과 이해관계가 고려와 관련되었던 만큼, 그들 홍씨 국내파는 高麗·元 간의 관계를 깨뜨리는 일보다는 고려와 원 사이의 중재인 역할을 원했고, 실제로 그러한 역할을 수행했으므로, 이 시기의 다른 부원배 세력과 대조를 이룬다고 하겠다. 물론 그들의 정치적인 성향도 고려의 내정 상황에 따라 좌우되었다. 즉, 洪誥를 비롯한 홍백수의 아들로 구성된 일파는 충선왕 측근세력과 긴밀한 관계를 유지했기 때문에, 자연스럽게 제1차 立省論을 반대하였던 것이라고 생각된다.

마지막으로 지적할 만한 것은 홍복원 일가의 정치적 동향을 통해서 드러나는 바 요심 지역에서 고려인이 정치적, 군사적 측면에서 차지하는 비중에 대해서이다. 당시 元都에서는 요심 지역을 중국 영토의 일부로서보다는 별도의 지역으로 인식하였으며, 요심 지역 고려인 토호세력의 존재와 요심 지역에 대한 고려 왕조의 영향을 인정하였다. 그리하여 당시 이 지역에 있어서 고려의 영향은 상당히 강했으며, 요심 지역에서의 통치권 분쟁은 대부분 고려인 간에 일어난 것이었다.

홍복원 일가는 요심 지역에서 계속적으로 관직을 차지하면서 이 지역의 고려군민을 통제하였다. 한편, 원은 以夷制夷 政策의 일환으로 瀋王을 임명하여 요심 지역에 대한 통치권을 둘러싸고 고려 지배층의 분열을 조장하였는데, 여기서

주목할 만한 것은 심왕은 물론 형식적이라도 요심 지역과 관련하여 관직을 받는 사람들이 모두 고려인으로서, 고려 왕조와 관련되어 있었다는 점이다. 또한, 심왕이 요심 지역에 대해 실제 통치권을 갖지 못하도록 심왕을 견제한 인물들이 바로 고려출신 홍복원 일가였다. 이러한 사실들로 미루어보아, 당시 요심 지역에 있는 고려군민의 큰 비중과 이 지역에 있어서의 고려의 강한 영향력을 인정할 수밖에 없는 것이다.

원의 붕괴에 뒤이어 명이 성립되어 고려 및 조선과 외교 관계를 전개시켜 나갔고, 그 결과 遼瀋 지역에 대한 漢族제국인 명의 통제가 확립되었던 것이지만, 13세기 이 지역에서 고려군민 세력이 절대적 위치를 차지했었다는 사실을 잊어서는 안된다고 본다. 이러한 맥락에서, 홍복원 일가의 정치적인 활동을 통해 드러나는 요심 지역에 대한 고려의 강한 영향력과 그 지역과 고려와의 긴밀한 관계는 재인식될 필요가 있으며, 이것은 바로 동북공정과 관련된 역사적 문제를 해결하는 데 도움이 될 수도 있으리라 생각한다.

**주제어:** 고려, 원, 홍복원, 입성론, 요심지방, 공민왕