

## **The Russo-Japanese War and the Root-Takahira Agreement**

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### **Introduction**

On November 30, 1908 American Secretary of State Eliuh Root and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington Takahira Kogoro initialed an agreement which has now come to be known as the Root-Takahira Agreement. In this agreement, both governments agreed to: 1) maintain the status quo in the Pacific; 2) assure equal opportunity to develop trade and industry in China; 3) recognize the territories possessed by each country in the Pacific region; 4) respect China's territorial integrity and independence.<sup>1</sup> In other words, this agreement contained two overarching themes, namely, the open door policy and respect for each other's territorial possessions.

Although the Root-Takahira Agreement was concluded during a period which has come to be known as that of the era of the revolution in diplomacy, very little attention has to date been paid to it. This agreement came to light during a period in which two camps were competing to have the U.S. join their proposed tripartite alliances (with one consisting of China and Germany and the other of Japan and England). In other words, the U.S. possessed the casting vote needed to maintain the balance of power between these two military governments. It is a well-known fact

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that the imperial powers were divided into two military camps during this period and that the isolation of Germany was one of the main causes of the outbreak of WWI. In other words, prior to the outbreak of WWI, the U.S. did not pursue a policy based on isolation from the international community. Moreover, the fact that Japan was able to speed up the process of formally annexing Korea following the signing of this agreement should also be kept in mind. While prior to this agreement Japan had hesitated between keeping Korea as a protectorate and annexing it outright, its decision to annex the country was made shortly after this agreement was reached. This can be perceived as having been no coincidence. More to the point, the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 can be regarded as having been a landmark event even when viewed solely from the standpoint of its influence on the international situation at that time.

This being the case, let us now look at the reasons why the U.S. chose to sign this agreement. A closer look at the contents of this agreement reveals two overarching U.S. motivations. While the first can be identified as the desire to assure the continuation of the open door policy in China, the second revolved around the protection of its territorial possessions in the Pacific. Moreover, these twin objectives represented a constant in the U.S.' East Asian policy. Nevertheless, most studies on this agreement have tended to focus almost exclusively on its relation to the open door policy in China. The majority of scholars, including A. Whitney Griswold, have claimed that this agreement involved the U.S. silently acquiescing to Japan's preponderant position in East Asia in return for securing concessions from Japan on the immigration issue.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, Thomas A. Baily has argued that because of this agreement, the U.S. position in Manchuria was greatly enhanced. Thus, this agreement did not give Japan a free hand in Manchuria, but rather resulted in strengthening the open door policy in Manchuria, which in turn removed the largest source of complaint for American entrepreneurs.<sup>3</sup> Others have claimed that this agreement allowed the U.S. to avoid being completely excluded in Manchuria.<sup>4</sup>

However, it is hard to envisage that the main purpose for the U.S. with regards to this agreement was to secure the continuation of the open door policy. This is because this objective runs contrary to some of the other provisions contained in this agreement; for example, the recognition of its territorial possessions in the Pacific and the maintenance of the status quo. First, this agreement contained a clause which called for the mutual recognition of the territories in the Pacific region possessed by each country. The recognition of its overseas territories had been an overarching concern for the U.S. since 1898 when its expansion into Asia began in earnest following its victory over Spain. These concerns became even more widespread following the performance of the Japanese military in the Russo-Japanese War. From that point on, American strategists became preoccupied with one issue: should a crisis break out, could the U.S. protect its overseas territories in the Pacific, including the Philippines, from the Japanese?

Second, the U.S. position during this period did not allow it to simultaneously pursue the continuation of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories in the Pacific. Originally, the U.S. had attempted to play Russia off against Japan in order to facilitate its own ability to catch two birds with one stone. However, this strategy was no longer feasible in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, as Russian military power was greatly curtailed as a result of its defeat at the hands of Japan. Furthermore, as part of its pursuit of a tripartite entente structure with Japan and France, Russia made it clear after 1907 that it had no intention of attempting to restrain Japan in the military and diplomatic spheres. What's more, the signing of a military alliance between Japan's ally England and Russia and France in effect resulted in creating a four-nation security arrangement consisting of England, France, Russia, and Japan. In other words, the only country capable of restraining Japan in the Pacific was the U.S. As such, as the strategy of playing Russia off against Japan was no longer feasible, the only means of preserving the open door policy in China was to defeat Japan in a military conflict. However, the U.S. government deemed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War that

should the U.S. and Japan come to blows, there was no way for Washington to protect its overseas possessions in the Pacific.

Third, the clause pertaining to the open door policy also does not mesh with the provision regarding the maintenance of the status quo. From the U.S. standpoint, the continuation of the status quo was necessary in order to assure the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific. However, from the Japanese standpoint, the status quo meant that its preponderant position in Manchuria, which it had acquired in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, was recognized by the U.S. Therefore, when viewed from the standpoint of logic, these two provisions are inherently contradictory. In other words, if the U.S. had intended to include Manchuria as falling within the sphere of its open door policy in China, Japan would never had agreed to sign this agreement.

As pointed out above, given the international situation at that time, could the U.S. really have simultaneously dealt with the issues of the open door policy and the securing of its overseas territories? Thus, this is why these two provisions found in the agreement were of a contradictory nature. Thus, could it not be asserted that the main objective of the U.S. in pursuing such an agreement was in fact the acquirement of a Japanese guarantee of the security of its overseas territories in the Pacific rather than the continuation of the open door policy in China?

This paper is intended to prove that the real reason why the U.S. signed the Root-Takahira Agreement was in fact what has been postulated above: to secure a promise from the Japanese to keep their hands off the U.S.' overseas possessions in the Pacific. In order to achieve this objective, this paper is focused on analyzing the international situation which prevailed at the time of the agreement, rather than the actual contents of this agreement as has been the case in previous studies. This is because the circumstances surrounding this agreement allow us to read between the lines and to properly comprehend what the contents of this agreement really pertained to. Special attention has been paid to the U.S. perception of the Russo-Japanese War, its decision to build its main Pacific naval base in Hawaii (1908), and its attitude towards the 2<sup>nd</sup> Hague Peace

Conference (1907). These events provide us with a window through which to perceive the main American concerns during the period leading up to the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement.

The first part of this paper will deal with the U.S. decision to alter its plans to build its main Pacific naval base in the Philippines in favor of constructing it in Hawaii. An attempt will be made herein to prove that this decision was an important factor which led to the conclusion of a U.S.-Japan agreement. Moreover, this paper will prove that the potent Japanese naval power put on display during the Russo-Japanese War forced the U.S. to move its main naval base in the Pacific to Hawaii, and that the U.S. had no choice but to rely on diplomacy in order to protect its territories in the Pacific until this naval base, which would provide the U.S. with the retaliatory force it would need in case of a Japanese attack, was completed. The result of this reliance on diplomacy was the Root-Takahira Agreement. In the second half of this paper, it will be proven that the failure of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Hague Peace Conference was another factor which prompted the U.S. to sign this agreement. As the U.S. proposal for the placing of limits on naval power was rejected during this conference, the U.S. found itself with no other option but to concentrate its naval forces in the Atlantic. Thus, the issue of how to fill the power vacuum created in the Pacific by the absence of U.S. naval power emerged as a crucial matter for U.S. policymakers. In the end, the U.S. had no other choice but to play for time and use diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan until an independent naval fleet could be amassed in the Pacific. The result was the Root-Takahira Agreement.

### **The Russo-Japanese War and the Decision to Establish a Naval Base in Hawaii**

The seeds of the Root-Takahira Agreement were first sown during the Russo-Japanese War. By February 1905, the U.S. had already reached the conclusion that war with Japan over the Japanese labor immigration

problem was a definite possibility. Moreover, given the potent Japanese naval power made evident during the Russo-Japanese War, the U.S. would be unable to assure the security of the Philippines and Hawaii.<sup>5</sup>

This kind of concern became a permanent one for Roosevelt in the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima. The security of the Philippines was widely regarded as the most pressing concern. A report submitted by General Wood, the American Commander in the Philippines, clearly makes this fact evident. In this report Wood claimed that as Japanese naval power was greatly superior to the U.S. it could seize the Philippines anytime it wanted to.<sup>6</sup> Roosevelt agreed with the contents of this report. Roosevelt's own perception was based on the fact that it was impossible for the U.S. to assure the three conditions needed to ensure the security of the Philippines. These three conditions were the following: First, the U.S. should have a more potent navy at its disposal than Japan; second, Japan should be made to focus solely on Korea and southern Manchuria; third, the international conditions needed to restrain Japan should be in place.<sup>7</sup> However, the U.S. was only able at that time to meet the second condition as the increase of U.S. naval power was opposed by the U.S. Congress. Moreover, the establishment of an anti-Japan alliance became impossible in the aftermath of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Japanese military alliance. In the end, who would go along with the U.S. and oppose Japan, which by then possessed the world's strongest navy.

Roosevelt undertook a review of the U.S. ability to single-handedly repel a Japanese attack. The Orange War Plan established from February-June 1907 dealt with such a war between the U.S. and Japan. This plan was premised on the U.S. dispatching its fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific in order to safeguard the Philippines in the case of a conflagration with Japan. However, even if such a step could in fact be carried out, there was no way of assuring the protection of the Philippines. This prompted Roosevelt to comment that the Philippines were the 'U.S. Achilles Heel.'<sup>8</sup> Roosevelt's comment, which emerged on August 21, 1907, or one month after the finalization of the Orange War Plan, makes it clear that the U.S. remained convinced that the Philippines could not be

protected from Japanese aggression. The possibility of relocating the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific in order to protect the Philippines was also reviewed by the U.S. military from July-October 1906, with the same conclusion reached. As such, the U.S. military reached the conclusion that the U.S. lack of naval power, and the great distance that would have to be traveled, made it impossible for the U.S. to divide its fleet into two smaller ones; and that as such, U.S. naval power should be concentrated in the Atlantic.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, the U.S. government refused to abandon its policy of pursuing the armed defense of the Philippines. Thus, they adopted a policy of constructing the proposed Pacific naval base in Hawaii, rather than in the Philippines as had originally been projected. The U.S. position up to that point had been that this Pacific naval base should be built in the Philippines, which the U.S. had seized from Spain in 1898. The U.S. however remained uncertain whether this base should be built in Manila or in Subic Bay.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the simple fact was that given Japan's potent naval power, as exhibited during the Battle of Tsushima, it could seize the Philippines at anytime it so desired, with very little the U.S. could do to stop it. Roosevelt's order that a reassessment of the Philippines military defenses be carried out and that an in-depth report on the plans to defend Hawaii be submitted, can be understood as having been borne out of the above-mentioned circumstances.<sup>11</sup>

Roosevelt's decision to abandon the plans to establish a base in the Philippines in favor of one in Hawaii was based on the following factors: First, Roosevelt felt that under the prevailing circumstances, the defense of the Philippines was in effect an impossible task.<sup>12</sup> The reason for this inability, Roosevelt believed, was that the U.S. could not muster the naval forces needed to carry out this task as there was no U.S. naval facility in the Pacific. The establishment of a naval base in the Pacific, Roosevelt argued, was essential for the U.S. as such a facility was required in order to maintain the best battle order in the Pacific.<sup>13</sup> In short, while the U.S. was aware of the need to construct a naval base in the Pacific, the indefensible nature of the Philippines caused Washington to change its

mind and build this base in Hawaii. However, a small-scale ship repair facility would be built in Subic Bay.

Second, the U.S. perceived the construction of a naval base as a key factor in assuring the defense of Hawaii. The strategic location of Hawaii made it such that should it fall into Japanese hands, Tokyo could target the West Coast of the Continental U.S.<sup>14</sup> This was because the security of the West Coast states, Panama Canal, Alaska, and the Philippines would be greatly compromised if Pearl Harbor fell into enemy hands. The U.S. was especially concerned that its access to the Pacific Ocean could be jeopardized should the Panama Canal come under attack. Moreover, the fortification of Hawaii would have to be carried out in order to keep a close eye on the 7-8000 foreigners (Japanese) residing on the islands. Such a move was necessary in order to avoid the taking of hostile actions by these Japanese nationals should a war break out. Furthermore, the defense of Hawaii and Manila Bay were considered to be a more urgent task than that of Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. As such, for the U.S., Hawaii represented the key to the Pacific.<sup>15</sup> Third, Pearl Harbor possessed ideal conditions for the establishment of a naval base.

Fourth, Japan would perceive a U.S. failure to build a naval base in Hawaii as a clear sign that Washington's will to defend its possessions in the Pacific had been greatly decreased, and make according use of this fact.<sup>16</sup> In other words, the lack of a military base in Hawaii would result in increasing Japan's territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the Philippines. Fifth, should the U.S. allow Japan to seize the Philippines, this would serve as proof of the U.S. inability to defend its overseas territories. Such a situation could lead to Germany attempting to seize control of the Caribbean Sea and of other islands in the Pacific Ocean. Thus, the U.S. could envision a worst-case scenario in which all of its overseas colonies would be lost.

However, the building of a naval base in Hawaii was perceived as having the following effects: First, it would make it possible to establish Hawaii as a defense perimeter. Even for the potent Japanese navy, Hawaii represented a far-off target. Moreover, such a move would allow the U.S.



to tightly control the Japanese nationals residing in Hawaii. Second, the fact that a U.S. naval facility existed in Hawaii might give Japan cause for caution. What's more, the fact that the U.S. would now possess the retaliatory force needed to respond to a Japanese attack could serve to deter Japan from initiating such an action in the first place. Furthermore, without completely destroying the American fleet in Hawaii, Japan could never be assured that a move to grab the Philippines would yield anything more than a temporary result. Japanese strategists would have to be constantly aware of this fact. Lastly, this naval base could also serve to increase U.S. diplomatic influence in East Asia. For Japan, which desired to gain a foothold on the Asian mainland in order to consolidate its gains from the Russo-Japanese War, this proposed base in Hawaii represented a threat to its rearguard.

The U.S. Congress gave their approval to Roosevelt's plan to transfer the site of the proposed naval base. Moreover, the Congress also approved the proposed budget for this naval base by a margin of 246-1.<sup>17</sup> This budget included the fees needed to build the adjacent waterways, dry docks, and the base itself.<sup>18</sup> As a result, the construction of Pearl Harbor was begun in earnest from the spring of 1909.

However Roosevelt was of the opinion that the establishment of a naval base at Pearl Harbor alone would not be sufficient to protect the Philippines. Roosevelt's assertion was based on his assessment that the Battle of Port Arthur had proven the futility of ground troops when not backed up by a potent naval fleet. Thus, Roosevelt believed that the Russo-Japanese War had shown that a potent naval force was the key to success in war.<sup>19</sup> In other words, the most important variable with regards to the defense of the Philippines was the U.S. ability to beef up the size of its fleet in the Pacific. However, such an increase in capabilities was impossible at that time. The problem was made worse by the fact that the Congress not only refused to allow the U.S. to increase the scale of its fleet, but refused to entertain the possibility of the militarization of the Philippines altogether.

In December 1907, Roosevelt submitted his annual report to Congress

in which he pleaded for the repeal of the bill announced in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (December 1905) that called for only one new battleship to be commissioned every year. Conversely, Roosevelt asked that 4 new Dreadnought-type battleships be built every year, that the number of destroyers and PT boats be increased significantly, that permission be granted for the building of a naval base and the necessary naval facilities in the Pacific.<sup>20</sup> However, the Congress turned down this request. Roosevelt felt that if the Congress continued to deny his requests, the U.S. would find itself barely able to maintain its current level while the expansion-oriented Japanese would continue to augment their naval power, a situation which would soon result in tipping the scales in favor of the latter.

Furthermore, Roosevelt was also forced to acquiesce to the fact that the Japanese fleet was more efficient than the one he had at his disposal. Not only was the Japanese fleet already more efficient than its American counterpart, but its constant development of new types of ships meant that its advantage would only increase with time if things remained as they were.<sup>21</sup> Thus, the U.S. naval forces in the Pacific would for the conceivable future remain inferior to the Japanese fleet. Even if Roosevelt had received the go ahead from Congress to forge ahead with his plan to beef up the U.S. naval capacity, it would have remained impossible for some time to station the U.S. fleet in the Philippines. Just as ground defenses are ineffective if not backed up by a potent navy; this navy is itself useless if it does not have access to naval facilities, a fact that was clearly driven home to Roosevelt by the fate that befell the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima. Thus, even if an increase in the scale of the naval forces was brought about that would make it possible to establish an independent fleet in the Pacific, the overall effect of such a move would be mitigated if not accompanied by the construction of a main naval base and nearby support facilities. This was the reasoning behind Roosevelt's decision to build the proposed naval base in Hawaii rather than in the Philippines. Thus, the plan essentially became that of defending the Philippines from Hawaii.

The problem which the U.S. faced in this regards was that a significant amount of time would be required to establish this naval base and to beef up the fleet. The overarching opinion at that time was that a period of at least four years was needed to construct and deploy a 1<sup>st</sup>-class battleship. In this regards, the construction of Pearl Harbor was only completed in 1934. Another concern related to this decision to establish the Pacific naval base in Hawaii was that such a move might give the impression that the U.S. was in effect abandoning the Philippines. This move was akin to the now-famous Acheson line drawn up in 1949 in that it effectively moved the U.S. defense perimeter to Hawaii, or 8828 km away from Manila Bay.<sup>22</sup> When viewed from afar, this decision appeared to signal the U.S. withdrawal from the western Pacific. How could the U.S. guarantee the security of the Philippines during this transitional period?

In this regards, the U.S. prepared two sets of policies to stall for time while they established a Pacific naval base and increased their naval power. One was the so-called 'Big Stick' strategy in which the U.S. would make a naval show of force in the Pacific in order to make clear the real face of the 'American peril' to the Japanese, and thus deter Japan from using a policy of holding the Philippines hostage. As part of this show of force the U.S. from December 1907- February 1909 deployed all 16 of its battleships across the Pacific Ocean, a voyage of some 80,000 kilometers. The other policy course simultaneously pursued by the U.S. was a 'goodwill' strategy towards Japan, which involved using diplomatic means to assure the security of the Philippines.

These two policy courses, namely the big stick and goodwill strategies, were first raised in June 1904, and became the official axes of the U.S. policy in the Pacific in February 1905. Here, the complementary nature of these two approaches should be pointed out. The goodwill strategy was required to assure that the big stick policy did not result in the outbreak of a war; conversely, the big stick policy was needed to add some teeth to the good-will approach.

These two policies were soon put into effect. As such, while the goodwill approach was clearly on display in the Taft-Katsura Agreement,

in the U.S. role as an intermediary in the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty reached during the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in the significant concessions made by the U.S. to Japan in the Gentleman's Agreement; the U.S. was also actively preparing for a show of force in the Pacific as part of its big stick policy.

The fact that the circumstances in which the U.S. found itself in made such a show of force impossible to carry out a regular basis only reinforced the importance of its goodwill policy. While such a show of force was only possible by actually deploying the fleet into action, the U.S. was at this point unable to carry out such deployments on a regular basis. Moreover, there was much doubt within the U.S. government as to whether the Congress would approve the funds needed to carry out repetitive shows of force. Such excessive displays of naval power might also unnecessarily agitate the Japanese. Moreover, another problem associated with shows of force in the Pacific was the power vacuum that such a deployment would leave behind in the Atlantic. As it was, the U.S. was unable to ensure that Germany would not step in to fill this vacuum left behind by the U.S. deployment of its fleet in the Pacific. Thus, it was imperative for the U.S. to at this juncture reach an agreement with Japan. In January 1907, Roosevelt secretly told the owner of the LA-based newspaper the *Times-Mirror* Harrison Gray Otis that it was now time for the U.S. to seek a concord with the Japanese.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, what was the U.S. willing to offer Tokyo in exchange for such an agreement? First and foremost, the U.S. was willing to reach a Gentleman's Agreement on the issue of Japanese emigration to the U.S. However, the U.S. remained adamant in its refusal to allow the immigration of Japanese laborers. As such, the U.S. sought and obtained an agreement that would place the responsibility for curbing Japanese immigration to the U.S. on the shoulders of the Japanese government. However, the reality was that if the Japanese government decided to go back on its word, this matter would once again become a contentious bilateral issue. Thus the U.S. needed to offer another concession to the Japanese in order to play for time. This is where the Manchurian card

came into play. As is well-known Korea and Manchuria represented essential ingredients in any Japanese schemes for expansionism. As the U.S. had already played the Korea card by signing the Taft-Katsura Agreement, the only card it still possessed in its arsenal was the Manchurian one. What's more, Japan was eager to have the spoils it had seized in Manchuria from Russia in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese recognized by the international community. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese and Russo-French agreements of 1907 included provisions that recognized Japan's position in Manchuria. Japan now desired to receive similar recognition from the U.S. As U.S. Presidents have the right to exercise their executive authority whenever they see fit, such an agreement with the U.S. thus became possible at this juncture, with the result being the Root-Takahira Agreement.

To summarize, the U.S., having witnessed the impressive naval show of force put on display by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War, was forced to come to the conclusion that in the immediate future it would be impossible for it to protect its overseas territories of Hawaii and the Philippines from the Japanese. This situation raised questions within the U.S. as to how it would go about assuring the security of these two areas. As part of the solution to this problem the U.S. made the decision to establish a Pacific naval base in Hawaii, and to increase the scale of its navy in order to be able to field an independent navy in the Pacific. Thus, the U.S. was of the mindset that by taking such measures it would be able to not only directly assure the defense of Hawaii, but also of the Philippines through the threat of retaliation which would now emanate from Hawaii. The problem with this plan was that a certain period of time would be needed to put it into action, and thus all confrontation with Japan would have to be avoided during this time. In this regards, the U.S. put into action a dualistic approach to Japan that was exemplified by the big stick and goodwill policies. While the U.S. would make clear its determination to defend its Pacific territories through a naval show of force in the region, it would also show its goodwill by reaching an agreement with Japan. The latter part of this strategy would later result in

the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement.

### **The Failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference and the Race to Build Dreadnought Battleships**

The need for such a U.S.-Japan agreement was not only preordained by the U.S. inability to defend its possessions in the Pacific for the foreseeable future. Rather, the ever-worsening situation in the Atlantic required that the U.S. concentrate its forces in the area. Thus, the U.S. was of the mindset that its militarily inferior status in the Pacific would only get worse as time wore on. This unfavorable turn of events for the U.S. was in large part the result of the failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference held from June 15 to October 18 of 1907.

Roosevelt had expected that this conference would result in an agreement to limit the number and scale of battleships. The U.S. desire to reduce the number of battleships was based on two factors: First, the main powers were by this point engaged in a spiraling arms race to build up their naval forces. This contest for naval supremacy had already reached worrying proportions by the time the Second Hague Conference was convened. The countries at the forefront of this increasingly volatile struggle for naval supremacy were Germany in the Atlantic, and Russia and Japan in the Pacific.<sup>24</sup> The rapid expansion of German naval power in the Atlantic and the rebuilding of the Russian fleet in the Pacific would in all likelihood have the effect of forcing Japan and England to undertake similar upgrades of their own naval forces. This increase in German and Japanese naval power was expected to place a heavy burden on the U.S. which straddled both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Second, the U.S. was in no position to increase its own naval forces during this period. Roosevelt had persistently petitioned Congress from 1903-1907 to sanction the expansion of America's naval forces, only to be rebuffed by the later. In 1903, in response to the German passage of a law authorizing its naval build-up, the U.S. government developed a plan to

expand its own navy in order. With the crisis in Venezuela serving as the impetus, the U.S. began to draw up plans to construct 48 battleships and 24 heavily-armed cruisers over the next ten years.<sup>25</sup> However, this plan was rejected by the Congress, which instead approved, under certain limited circumstances, the construction of only a few battleships. These circumstances included the outbreak of an unexpected crisis, the formulation of a direct Presidential order, as well as a Congressional decision that such a step was indeed in order.

The rapidity at which such ships could be built was another important factor. At the beginning of October 1906, the U.S. military assessed that even if the Congress were to give the green light for the construction of two battleships a year, the U.S. would be unable to keep up in the global race to become the second strongest navy in the world after England, with that position in all likelihood going to the U.S.' main enemy Germany. If the Congress approved the construction of two such ships a year, by 1915 it would possess 30 ships in its flotilla, while England would boast a fleet of 56, France and Germany would have approximately 38 each, while Japan would have 14.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. faced the daunting task of having to separate its fleet in order to be able to have a toehold in both oceans. Thus, Roosevelt was of the mindset that the U.S. needed to construct four new battleships every year. However, in 1907, the Congress refused a demand to increase the naval fleet by four Dreadnought-type battleships a year.<sup>27</sup> In 1908, Roosevelt once again petitioned the Congress to increase the size of the naval armada, only this time claiming that the request had been made by the U.S. military as well.<sup>28</sup> This time, the Congress approved the construction of two new such battleships a year.<sup>29</sup>

What kind of position would the U.S. find itself in if it were not only unable to prevent the ongoing naval race between the main powers, but also incapable of convincing the Congress of the need for the U.S. to follow suit? First, the U.S. strategy of assuring the simultaneous defense of both oceans would have to be abandoned. The U.S. basic blueprint for this simultaneous defense strategy was that of assuring that its naval

power was on a par with Germany's in the Atlantic, while maintaining superiority over Japan in the Pacific. Second, the Orange War Plan, which involved stationing the entire fleet in the Atlantic and rapidly deploying them to the Pacific whenever a crisis occurred, would also have to be given up. However, Germany's increase in its naval power now made it impossible for the U.S. to deploy its fleet outside of the Atlantic. Moreover, the increase in the scale of the Japanese fleet would put pressure on the U.S. to not even attempt to safeguard these territories in the first place, as the U.S. would not risk creating a power vacuum in the Atlantic to take part in a war oceans away which it had no chance of winning to begin with.

Moreover, in the U.S. case there was a possibility, although extremely remote, that the ongoing competition between Germany and England would somehow lead to an alliance between the two European powers, something which the U.S. considered to be the worst case scenario. Should Germany and England reach the conclusion that there was more to gain from cooperation than from the continuation of the costly naval buildup, a reconciliation between the two could be brought about. In this regards, Roosevelt was very much aware of the fact that these two nations had attempted to forge alliances with one another in areas such as Africa, Central America, and East Asia. The possibility of such cooperation between these two nations was further driven home to Roosevelt by the Anglo-German Convention and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Venezuelan Crisis. The U.S. Black War Plan established right before WWI, which was based on a worst case scenario in which the U.S. would find itself isolated as a result of the forging of an alliance between Germany and England, is clear evidence of the tremendous fear which Washington had of such an alliance between England and Germany.

Even if Germany and England failed to forge such an alliance, the U.S. would still find itself in an unenviable position if it did not garner the support of London, as the European powers allied with England would refuse to join hands with the U.S. in trying to thwart German power. Meanwhile, France and Russia signed a military alliance with England.



Moreover, Russia was not about to forget the fact that the U.S. had backed Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. For its part, Spain had a deep grudge towards the U.S. stemming from the War of 1898. Italy was also expected to join England and France in an alliance. What's more, Austria would also side with Germany. Should all of this come to pass, then the chances of the predictions made by Alfred Thayer Mahan of a war breaking out between the U.S. and Germany because of the isolation of the former would be greatly increased. Mahan's predictions were based on the following hypotheses: First, the economic rivalry between the two countries would precipitate a German attack on the American East Coast, an attack for which Germany would receive the support of England. In such a case, the other countries of Europe, which harbored some antipathy towards the U.S. and feared England, could be expected to remain neutral.<sup>30</sup> This kind of scenario was a constant fear for American naval strategists from 1898 onwards.<sup>31</sup> More succinctly, Germany did not have to worry about its rearguard and simply deploy its forces in the direction of the Caribbean Sea. The general perception within U.S. society was that a war with England was inconceivable as this would not only involve a war between people of the same race, but in essence be tantamount to a civil war.<sup>32</sup> It was these circumstances that led Roosevelt to reach the conclusion that limits should not only be placed on the current naval capacity of other countries, but that the future expansion of such capacity should also be limited.

Another goal which Roosevelt sought to achieve through the Second Hague Peace Conference was that of curtailing the actual size of battleships. This, he felt, was necessary for the following reasons: First, this period saw the appearance of new Dreadnought-type battleships. These battleships first introduced by the British in 1906, were capable of overwhelming existing battleships in all respects, including in terms of size, armaments, speed, firepower, accuracy and cruising capacity. The emergence of these ships had the effect of making all the other powers scurry to try to acquire them for themselves. Thus, a new era soon opened in which a nation's naval power was judged by the number of

Dreadnought-type battleships it had in its arsenal, which represented a marked break with the past when the total number of ships in a flotilla had been the yardstick used to measure a country's naval power. Thus, all the ships the U.S. now possessed in its fleet were in essence destined for the scrapheap of history. Moreover, even those ships which were still in production and had yet to leave the port now became outdated. Of course, the U.S. also became actively involved in the production of such Dreadnought-type battleships. Having gained the necessary technology from an Englishman, the U.S. was able to commission its first Dreadnought-type battleship, the USS Delaware, in 1907.<sup>33</sup> In short, the battleships<sup>34</sup> which Roosevelt had long pleaded with the Congress to grant him the right to deploy were now outdated.<sup>35</sup>

Second, the appearance of these new Dreadnought-type battleships forced the U.S. to conduct a complete overhaul of its defense strategy. The main reason for this was the change from the piston-style engines to the new turbine based ones which exhibited higher speed and cruising capacities. Thus, it would soon be possible to envision a battleship which could cruise non-stop across the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, Germany would no longer require the advanced base and coaling station which it had heretofore needed to reach the Caribbean. Should such a situation indeed come to pass, then the 3000-mile wide Atlantic Ocean would no longer serve as a natural barrier protecting the U.S. from a European attack. Moreover, the advancements made in shipbuilding technology had the effect of shortening the time needed to build such ships, thus meaning that the U.S. response period was now also shortened. As such, the U.S. could find itself in a situation in which it wound up on a losing side of a conflict before it had time to transfer its economic power into military might. Roosevelt suggested that the size of battleships be limited to 15000-ton class vessels in order to prevent the spiraling out of control of each country's budget and avoid the subsequent collapse of the national economy. However, this kind of explanation was in fact a mere smokescreen for his real intentions. The true reason why Roosevelt sought to limit the size of battleships during the Second Hague Peace

Conference was to prevent the construction of Dreadnought-type battleships.<sup>36</sup>

Third, as this increase in the size of battleships would take away the military function of canals, the U.S. had no choice but to attempt to bring about curbs on the size of such vessels. Roosevelt was of the mindset that under the current situation in which the U.S. was hard-pressed to expand its fleet because of the continued opposition of the Congress, the strategic value of the Panama Canal would make up for the numerical inferiority of U.S. battleships.<sup>37</sup> While the canal made it possible to shorten the length of the trip between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, should the size of these battleships be increased to the point where they could no longer pass through the canal, the U.S. would lose this inherent advantage as in order to compete with its real and imagined foes, the U.S. would also have to increase the size of its ships.

Fourth, should the canal be rendered useless, the psychological restraint on the U.S. foes caused by the possession of such a canal would also be lost. In other words, the canal served as a kind of deterrent to Japan when the U.S. fleet was in the Atlantic, and conversely, to Germany when the U.S. navy was deployed in the Pacific. These can be identified as the reasons why Roosevelt sought to limit the size of battleships during the Second Hague Peace Conference. Although Roosevelt was an advocate of the need to expand U.S. naval power, the above-mentioned factors forced him to adopt the stance during this conference that such naval buildups should be curtailed in order to prevent budgetary crises.<sup>38</sup> As such, if the U.S. could not match the naval power of the other main powers, it should focus on curtailing any future increases in its potential enemies' naval capacities.

However, Roosevelt was, for the following two reasons, aware from the onset that the chances of securing such an agreement were slim. First, there was too much distrust between the main powers, with much of it stemming from the emergence of this new form of vessel which possessed attributes incomparable to any existing ships. Any country which did not possess these Dreadnought-type battleships would suddenly find itself no

longer able to deter those that did. This was the main reason why despite the obvious strains on the budget, the main powers were desperate to acquire these vessels. Second, there was no way of enforcing such an agreement.<sup>39</sup>

Roosevelt felt that under these circumstances, the best course of action for the U.S. was to construct as many of these new vessels as possible. However, the opposition of the Congress made this plan unattainable. Given the characteristics of the U.S. democratic system, the opposition of the Congress in effect resulted in creating an additional structural and fundamental limitation. As long as the Congress withheld its approval, the President could not gain access to even one red cent of the money that would be needed to bring this plan to fruition. In other words, the democratic system itself emerged as an obstacle to the increase of battleships. Meanwhile, nations in which the military had a great amount of influence over politics such as Germany, Japan, and Russia were able to rapidly carry out the entire process, from design to deployment, of acquiring such vessels. In particular, as these countries' legislative assemblies only served to rubber stamp the decisions made by the military, the acquirement of the necessary funds to build these battleships did not present any problems. Cognizant of the new reality in which the outcome of naval battles would be decided in rapid form, Roosevelt could not help but feel stifled by the situation the U.S. found itself in.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, there was no other method for Roosevelt to increase the U.S. naval power but to keep trying to convince Congress of the need to do so while playing for time on the international scene until its fleet could be brought up to par. This was the second reason why the U.S. needed to pursue an agreement with Japan.

Furthermore, the signing of an agreement with Japan also contained the added benefit for the U.S. of putting them in England's good graces as well. In particular this proposed U.S.-Japan agreement would allow, for the following three reasons, Washington to join in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. First, England had been imploring the U.S. to join its military alliance with Japan since 1898. Second, the fact that the U.S. was also

being courted to join a proposed tripartite alliance with China and Germany was not without causing concern in England. If such a tripartite structure between Germany, China and the U.S. were in fact erected, England believed that this would put the U.S. and itself on an unavoidable collision course. This was the main reason why England sought out an entente with Germany over the China question in 1900, an agreement that was later cancelled before even being ratified. England urged the U.S. to exercise caution with regards to this alliance proposed by China and Germany as Washington's joining of such a grouping meant open conflict with the Anglo-Japanese alliance.<sup>41</sup> Third, England was of the mindset that should they come into conflict with the U.S. this would spell disaster for London. In this regards, England perceived the need to avoid an open conflict with the U.S. in order to mitigate any possibility of the latter launching an invasion of Canada. A report published by the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1904 on potential scenarios for a Anglo-American war over Canada further drove home the point to London that war with Washington should be avoided at all costs. This decision was reconfirmed in 1909 following the submission of a report by the Colonial Office Defense Committee which claimed that given the U.S. potent offensive capabilities, England could not hope to protect its interests in the Western Hemisphere should a war break out between the two nations. As a result, the possibility of a war with the U.S. was completely eradicated from all future British war plans.<sup>42</sup> This was the main reason why the proposed U.S.-Japan agreement would in essence allow Washington to join the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

As mentioned above, the assurance of amicable relations with England was a key factor for the U.S. in terms of ensuring the security of its assets in the Atlantic. This was because the failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference had made it so that the only nation which was now capable of curbing the naval contest was England. England's blocking of Germany's access to the North Sea, which was their main route to the Atlantic Ocean, would result in reducing the U.S. defense burden in this area and allow Washington to concentrate its forces in the Caribbean Sea. This was the

reason why Roosevelt felt that any potential conflict between the U.S. and Japan should not be allowed to affect relations with England.<sup>43</sup> In short, as the U.S. could not respond to the naval competition being waged as a result of the failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference through military means, it was forced to seek out diplomatic methods of doing so. Here, it was important for the U.S. to secure amicable relations in order to maintain its own close ties with England. This was another reason why Roosevelt felt the need to sign the Root-Takahira Agreement.

## Conclusion

In the above sections, a review of the international background to the Root-Takahira Agreement was carried out. In the first half of this paper, an attempt was made to prove that the decision to build the Pacific naval base in Hawaii was the first factor which led to the signing of this agreement. Meanwhile, in the second half of this paper, an effort was made to prove that the failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference was another dynamic which came into play with regards to the signing of this agreement. The following basic methodology was used to ascertain these facts. First, the author showed how the U.S. expected a power vacuum to be created during the period in which this new naval base, which was originally slated to be built in the Philippines, would be constructed in Hawaii. In other words, in order to protect its overseas territories in the Pacific, the U.S. would have to play for time while the naval harbor was being built. This was the first reason why the U.S. agreed to sign the Root-Takahira Agreement.

The second reason why the U.S. pursued such an agreement with Japan was because of the failure of the Second Hague Peace Conference. The failure of this conference forced the U.S. to concentrate its naval forces in only one ocean. Moreover, the failure of this conference created four major concerns for the U.S. 1) the advent of a period of unlimited naval competition between the major powers. However, the U.S., because of the

opposition of the Congress, found itself hard-pressed to deploy the necessary amount of battleships. 2) The emergence of the new Dreadnought-type battleships. These battleships were capable of overwhelming existing battleships in all respects, including in terms of size, armaments, speed, firepower, accuracy and cruising capacity. However, here again, the U.S. once again found itself at an obvious disadvantage as the Congress, which did not even sanction the expansion of the numbers of the older types of battleships, could not be expected to even consider the possibility of approving the construction of this new type of battleship. 3) Should this naval competition lead to the advent of bigger and bigger ships than the U.S. would face a new problem, that of getting its fleet to pass through the Panama Canal. Moreover, should such bigger battleships be built by other countries, the U.S. would have no other choice but to follow suit as this increase in size would naturally be accompanied by a concurrent increase in firepower. Should this situation come to pass, then the U.S. fleet would have to sail all the way south to the tip of South America in order to make their way into the Pacific Ocean. By means of reference, during the Spanish-American War of 1898, it took the very latest models of the U.S. fleet 68 days to undertake such a journey. Thus, the Panama Canal would be rendered useless by such an increase in the size of battleships. 4) A long period of time would be needed to complete the construction of the Panama Canal. These factors forced the U.S. to have to choose which ocean they would deploy their naval forces in. In the end, the U.S. opted to secure the Atlantic Ocean. As a result of this decision, the U.S. found itself faced with the thorny problem of how it would protect its territories in the Pacific following the advent of the power vacuum created as a result of the removal of its naval presence from the area. The U.S. opted for the use of diplomatic overtures towards Japan as a means of preserving its territories in the Pacific.

The above facts lead to the following conclusions: First, the Root-Takahira Agreement was the result of the strategic and military mindset of U.S. policymakers, who was focused on the security of the U.S. overseas territories. The decision to construct the naval base in Hawaii rather than

in the Philippines forced the U.S. to play for time until this base could be made operational. Moreover, the failure of the Hague Conference forced the U.S. to concentrate its military power in one Ocean, while securing the other through diplomatic means. These two factors were the main background to the U.S. establishment of a strategy that was based on the use of diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan, in order to protect its territorial possessions in the Pacific until the proposed base could be made operational. This resulted in the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement.

Second, this agreement can be perceived as the American response to the Russo-Japanese War. The strong showing of the Japanese navy in the Russo-Japanese War had the effect of forcing the U.S. to build its proposed naval base in Hawaii rather than in the Philippines as had originally been intended. The American strategists reached the conclusion that there would be no way to defend this proposed base in the Philippines from a Japanese attack. Moreover, the construction of a naval base in the Philippines could in fact precipitate such a Japanese attack. On the other hand, if the U.S. did not go ahead with the construction of this base, Japan might misconstrue this as a sign that the U.S.' will to defend its territories in the Pacific had been weakened. In order to ensure that Japan did not underestimate the U.S.' determination, the decision was made to proceed with the construction of the base in Hawaii. Hawaii's geographical location would make it such that Japan would have to exercise more caution when contemplating an attack on the U.S. base. What's more, the retaliatory force made available to the U.S. once it started to station its naval fleet in this base in Hawaii, would allow the U.S. to simultaneously assure the security of Hawaii and the Philippines. Thus, any Japanese attempt to seize the Philippines would now inherently have to include plans to destroy the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. However, a significant period of time would be needed to complete the construction of this naval base. Therefore, the U.S. had to avoid all conflict with Japan until this base could be completed; in other words, they had to play for time. The U.S. was of the belief that this Root-Takahira Agreement would serve this very purpose. Another reason why the failure of the Second



Hague Peace Conference led to the Root-Takahira Agreement can be traced back to the Russo-Japan War. This war clearly proved that naval power was the key to victory in any military conflict, a fact which had previously only been hypothesized by military strategists. In short, the Root-Takahira Agreement should not be regarded as falling within the spectrum of the open door policy but as having been based on the U.S. military and strategic assessment of the Russo-Japanese War.

Third, the U.S. should not be perceived as having abandoned the open door policy altogether either. As such, the presence of references to the open door policy in China within this agreement should not be perceived as representing nothing more than diplomatic formalities. The provision of the agreement calling for the respect of China's independence and territorial integrity based on the notion of the open door policy clearly illustrates the U.S. desire to assure that China was not carved up by foreign powers. In addition, if this division of China could be avoided, then the U.S. could in all likelihood forestall the European nations' requests that a similar fate befall South America. As such, the division of China by foreign powers could lead to the eventual separation of South America. In this regards, this provision of the Root-Takahira Agreement was a very important one for the U.S. However, it must also be made clear that, for the following reasons, the open door policy in China was not the eventual goal of the U.S. 1) this provision was not included in the original draft of the agreement, but rather later added by the acting chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department Willard Straight, who was one of the main advocates of the open door policy in China. While previous studies have focused on the fact that because this provision was only included at a later date, it actually represents the true purpose of the Root-Takahira Agreement, in reality, all this proves is that the open door policy was not the main reason why such an agreement was sought in the first place. 2) As the U.S. is based on a presidential system, the President's perceptions have a deep impact on American foreign policy. Roosevelt was very skeptical about China's ability to preserve its territorial integrity. Moreover, he was of the mindset that the

implementation of the open door policy in Manchuria would only be possible through a war with Japan; and that given Japan's tremendous naval power, which was put on display during the Russo-Japanese War, the pursuit of this open door policy could in fact be used by the Japanese as an excuse to attack the U.S. own territories in the Pacific. Moreover, the President's right to exercise his executive authority wherever he sees fit would have made it possible for him to push harder for this open door policy to be included as a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy and pursued accordingly. The veracity of this claim is clearly supported by the dollar diplomacy advocated by Roosevelt's successor in the White House William Howard Taft.

Of course, if Roosevelt had objected this provision would not have been included in the final version of the Root-Takahira Agreement, and this no matter how much Willard Straight pushed for it. Then why did Roosevelt and Japan agree to have this provision included in the agreement? Because this provision, which called for the securing of the territorial integrity of 'China', was written in such a way that gave each side leeway with regards to whether Manchuria should be considered as part of China or not. As such, the U.S. could interpret this provision as implying that Manchuria was in fact a part of China, while Japan could argue that the two should be treated separately. In other words, this provision was the U.S. way of feeling out Japan about its attitude towards the U.S. own Pacific territories, while also presenting it with a means of regaining a measure of the stature it would lose as a result of its inability to do anything but acquiesce to the Japanese demands that their preponderant rights in Manchuria be recognized. In Japan's case, this provision allowed them to cloak their expansionist ambitions while giving them a free hand in Manchuria. Briefly stated, the provision regarding the open door policy in China was included so that the U.S. could cover up its loss of face, while, on the Japanese side, this served as a cloak for its expansionist ambitions. In addition, its inclusion meant that should a President appear on the scene who regarded it as being very important, the open door policy could become the cornerstone of U.S. policy.

Fourth, another factor which should not be overlooked was the influence of the changes in East Asian policy on the U.S. decision to sign the Root-Takahira Agreement. Since 1898 U.S. East Asian policy was based on two overarching goals: the open door policy in China and the securing of the Philippines. With these objectives in mind the U.S. announced its open door policy in China and decided to erect a naval base in the Philippines. The U.S. mindset was that a balance of power would have to be maintained between Japan and Russia if these two objectives were to be achieved. If a balance could be reached between these two countries in Manchuria, then the U.S. could implement its open door in Manchuria. Moreover, these two countries competition in Manchuria would mean that neither could afford to turn their attention to the Philippines. Thus, this was the U.S. strategy prior to the Russo-Japanese War. This was also the reason why the U.S. provided military, diplomatic, and economic support to Japan from the time the war broke out until it played the role of mediator in getting the Portsmouth Agreement signed.

However, Japan's defeat of Russia rendered this U.S. balance of power strategy no longer feasible. As such, the U.S. could no longer assure its economic interests and the security of the Philippines through this strategy. This can be regarded as the point in time in which U.S. strategy in East Asia underwent a change. This new U.S. approach was based on a combination of the so-called 'Big Stick' and 'Goodwill' strategies. This new approach involved the use of military power to pursue the U.S. national interests in the Atlantic, i.e. the use of a big stick, while using the goodwill strategy involving diplomatic measures to assure its interests in the Pacific. This strategy was first announced in April 1903 at the height of pre-war hostilities between Russia and Japan, and officially adopted in December 1904 as the actual war raged on. Roosevelt's announcement that the U.S. would take on the role of policeman in the Caribbean and Central America was impossible to back up without the necessary naval forces. Thus, the area in which this big stick policy was to be applied was set.

If this was the case, then how could the U.S. assure the security of its

territories in the Pacific? Roosevelt appears to have clung to the idea of assuring the security of the U.S. Pacific dominions by maintaining the balance of power between Japan and Russia until the Battle of Tsushima. However, the complete destruction of the Russian naval fleet during this battle forced the U.S. to accept that it was no longer possible to maintain the military balance of power in the region. However, there was no way that it could at this juncture abandon its big stick policy in the Caribbean. Japan's military victory over Russia rendered the U.S. plans to build a naval base in East Asia for all intents and purpose futile. Furthermore, the U.S. would have to redeploy its fleet from the Caribbean in order to respond to a Japanese attack. Rather than doing so, they decided to simply leave their Pacific territories for the most part unprotected. As a result of this new reality, the U.S. two objectives in East Asia, the protection of its territories and the continuation of the open door policy in China, became contradictory goals. Moreover, this fact became increasingly clear as time went by. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, the international situation increasingly favored Japan as Tokyo was able to forge an alliance network with England, France, and Russia. This was in essence the circumstances which forced the U.S. to abandon its previous policy of attempting to play Russia off against Japan in order to preserve its own interests, and why it found itself with no other option but to pursue an entente with Japan. In other words, the seed of this U.S. policy of employing diplomatic measures towards Japan as a means of protecting its territories in the Pacific was first planted during the Russo-Japanese War.

The final conclusion reached by this paper is that the Root-Takahira Agreement served not only as the basis of the disarmament talks held in Washington in 1921-22, but also provides us with clear insight into the military theories which were at work in the Pacific War which began in 1941 with the attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor. This is because the U.S. main objective during this Washington Conference was the imposition of limitations on the size of battleships' tonnage in order to curtail the Japanese navy's ability to conduct long-range operations. In other words,

this conference would allow the U.S. to place limits on the number and size of Japanese battleships. A similar philosophy was applied during the London Naval Conference and the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. All of these endeavors resulted in angering the Japanese military which subsequently withdrew from all disarmament talks. The U.S. harbor in Hawaii was finally completed in the mid-thirties, with the advent of an independent U.S. naval fleet in the Pacific becoming a reality by the end of that decade. In addition, the U.S. also concentrated its efforts on the construction of military fortifications on an island in the Pacific so that they could dispatch their B-17 bombers, as the outbreak of war in Europe resulted in creating a vacuum of power in Southeast Asia into which the U.S. wanted to assure no power stepped into. In addition, the Panama Canal, which was expected to double the strength of the U.S. Navy was completed in 1916. Therefore, as a result of these factors the U.S. would be able to soon complete its construction of its tremendous defense network in the Pacific. All of this resulted in making Japan unable to delay a war with the U.S. any longer. As I have mentioned earlier, the main reason why the U.S. signed the Root-Takahira Agreement in 1908 was precisely to play for the time needed to complete this Pacific defense network. To summarize, the same basic philosophy which led the U.S. to sign the Root-Takahira Agreement with Japan governed U.S. policy towards Japan in the aftermath of WWI. If this is in fact the case, then would it be too much to assert that the Pacific War also has its origins in the factors that led to the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement?

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Notes :

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  - 13 Braisted, *op. cit.*, p.241.
  - 14 *Letters*, Vol. V, No.4571 註 1, TR to Francis Emroy Warren, 1908. 1. 17.
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  - 17 *Letters*, Vol. V, No.4615 註 1, TR to Joseph Gurney Cannon 1908. 2. 29.
  - 18 *Letters*, Vol. V, No.4571 註 1, TR to Francis Emroy Warren, 1908. 1. 17.
  - 19 *Letters*, Vol. IV, No.3481, TR to Herman Speck von Sternberk, 1905. 3. 3.
  - 20 Roosevelt's report to Congress was submitted on December 3, 1907: *State Papers As Governor and President, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt* Vol.

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- 30 Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p.62.
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