

The First Russo-Chinese Allied Treaty of 1896

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Up to the end of XIX century the Russo-Chinese relations cannot be named friendly. Two empires had never war between them, but were afraid of each other, suspiciously concerned to plans and actions of the neighbour. The concluded agreements covered either questions of border, or development of trade. However a lot of changes took place in the region by the end of XIX century. The way to the allied treaty of Russia and China was uneasy: it had demanded serious revision of policy both in Petersburg and in Peking.

The principal cause, moved two empires to the allied relations, was the Korean question, which was shaken in the second half of 1880th. The kingdom which was in vassal dependence from China became the aim for undisguised Japanese claims. This was the main case of instability in the Far East that time. In the beginning of 1890th Russia and China aspired to preserve status quo in the region because they were weak and dreamed only to protect their own boundaries.

Soon Petersburg started to elaborate its new interests on Pacific. The Great Siberian railway, the final decision on which construction was accepted on a turn 1880-1890th, has caused a lot of various assumptions, concerning its future role and value for Russia. New (since August, 1892)

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Minister of Finance S.Iu. Witte prepared the plan of economic penetration into China and capture of Far Eastern markets for quickly growing Russian industry.

For the first time Witte was not interested in friendly relations with China. In the beginning of 1893 he has supported a note of «the doctor of the Tibetan medicine» P.A. Badmaev and has presented the text to emperor Alexander III¹. Badmaev affirmed that Ch'ing's authority in China was fragile, soon empire would be in the fast disintegration under the press of national and liberation movement and that Russia had to use this advantage. However nobody seriously developed this question and the offers of «the doctor of the Tibetan medicine» did not become a policy of Russia: they looked too nonprofessional and adventurously.

Nevertheless, in the beginning of 1890th the positions of Petersburg and Peking on the Korean question seemed to be more similar than divided. The Russian diplomats believed that China has been interested to involve Russia in the problems of kingdom in order to use it as a counterbalance to the Japanese aggressive aspirations². Alexander III, who was not well informed in a world policy, has resolutely supported the growth of Russian activity and influence in Korea, contradicting a cautious opinion of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs³. Tsar liked idea of protectorate but the ministry was afraid of protests of other countries and did not solve on its establishment⁴. Russia was too little in military force in the Far East for to carry out a similar measure⁵. Therefore Minister for Foreign Affairs N.K. Giers had instructed the representative in Seoul K.I. Vaeber to declare the king, asked Petersburg's protectorate, that Russia would promote Korea in opposition to the Japanese pressure and would like to increase the influence in kingdom, but no more than that⁶.

Really, political interest of Petersburg based on preservation status quo on peninsula, the kingdom did not represent interest in economic sense as could not serve as a significant commodity market for the Russian goods. In Russia was considered, that Korea a minimum for hundred years lagged behind Japan, and the local craft and trade were on a medieval, fair level of development⁷. Even in the end of 1897 the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs stressed: «we have no trading interests in this country and, possibly, will not have it still long»⁸. The complacency of Russia was also promoted by incorrect estimation of the Japanese policy in Korea. Participants of Special conference on April, 26th (May, 8th) 1888 have wrongly concluded, that after the Chino-Japanese arrangement of 1885 in Tianjin the Japanese government «has not only refused any personal plans to Korea, but one time showed even full indifference to the future destiny of the country»⁹. Therefore they have solved, that Russia should not interfere with the Chino-Japanese relations, being limited to support of Korean territorial integrity. By opinion of participants, «obtaining of Korea would not only promise us any benefits, but also would not fail to cause rather adverse consequences»¹⁰.

The Chino-Japanese war 1894-1895 which have flashed because of Korea had blown up fragile calmness in region. The Median Empire was not capable to resist with the military force to the Country of a Rising Sun, and was required to have the strategic ally. Two currents views existed in the Chinese rulers. One of them inclined to search the union with the Great Britain. Another, more numerous and influential, supported by empress Tz'u-hsi, has turned the look towards Russia. They did not idealize Petersburg and its policy. The fact of construction of the Siberian railway up to border with China already caused there fear, that Celestial Empire «will have to leave a peaceful life on border». Nevertheless, by the opinion of Li Hung Chang, Russia was for China simultaneously the largest friend interested in kind relations in the Far East and the largest enemy who wished to dominate over Ch'ing's empire¹¹.

Even prior to the beginning of military actions when the Korean question has found acuteness, Peking has addressed to England for support, however London has caused the intermediary by some guarantees concerning Korea¹². Simultaneously general-governor of Chihli Li Hung Chang who had a leading role more than 10 years in the Korean policy, on June, 8th, 1894 has entered into negotiations in Tianjin with K.I. Vaeber, replaced the Russian envoy, and then with A.P. Cassini who has come back on June, 20th from vacations. Cassini has expressed

interest in prevention of the Chino-Japanese war at once and has promised support.

Cautious actions of Russia in Tokyo had not brought success, and the Chino-Japanese crisis developed in the war. China has started to suffer defeats at once therefore. Despite of futility of the last negotiations between Li Hung Chang and Cassini, their contacts have proceeded. In the end of September empress Tz'u-hsi has sent the offer to prepare the union with Russia to vice-king Weng T'ung-ho, the leader of a party of war¹³. Cassini himself had pessimistic opinion, he drew China affairs in most gloomy paints, predicting overthrow of a dynasty of Ch'ings and disintegration of empire and has opposed an intermediary role of Petersburg (he thought that non-interference testified to unselfishness of Russia)¹⁴.

Russian officials showed less interest than Cassini to the Chinese requests. The majority of them believed in that moment, that the «implied» ally of Russia was Japan - the Pacific squadron wintered in Japanese ports. Actions of Japan were so rectilinear and aggressive, that there were favored to Russia more likely. The aspiration of Tokyo to affirm in Korea was obvious and challenging, besides was not accompanied with necessary diplomatic preparation. Therefore Petersburg had ample opportunities both to protect desired status quo, and to increase influence on the Far Eastern problems, struggling with Great Britain¹⁵. Russian rulers had no any aggressive plans to Korea. They represented their role as judges in the fight between China and Japan, forcing to listen to the powerful voice at the decision of the region's destiny as a whole¹⁶. First of all Petersburg worried that «Korea, being itself insignificant, could, owing to the weakness, serve the instrument of the hostile purposes against us» for England and Japan¹⁷. However, separate local authorities in Vladivostok expressed «feverous aspirations» to an immediate campaign to Korea to force out Japanese therefrom. But after sensible reflection they came to conclusion that it is not so favourable to Russia to interfere with this war¹⁸. Russia did not still apply for Korea¹⁹. Only sea officers continued to dream of nonfreezing port at the Korean coast for

what they were ready to borrow, not at once, a part of Korea with an outlet to the open sea²⁰. But their desire did not find practical reflection in the Russian policy.

S.Iu. Witte, the future creator of Russian Far East policy still had no distinct representations about the position of Russia toward China. At Special conference on August, 9th (21), 1894 Minister of Finance has emphasized, that Chino-Japanese war disturbed not so much interest, except the case of London's intervention in events, «that is why we should repulse England in case of display its ambitious plans»²¹. In the end of September-October, 1894, he wrote more frankly to prince V.P. Meshcherskii, with whom he maintained confidential relations: «so far we have nothing to do in the Chino-Korean question. I think we should not interfere with this problem now, as far as England does not interfere. And if it interferes, we should make diversion not in the Amur region and Pacific, and in Central Asia. If England does not interfere with this war, let Japanese and Chinese fight and reconcile with each other. Our time will come after railroad from Petersburg reaches Vladivostok»²².

In the beginning of 1895 Peking has passed to more vigorous actions, already aspiring to involve Russia in war with Japan. For the sake of it Chinese rulers offered to concede to Russia Xinjiang, to allow navigation on the river Sungari and to give commercial laws to Shansi and Hankow²³. At last Peking made up its mind: on February, 13th (25), 1895 deputy of Minister for Foreign Affairs N.P. Shishkin informed Nicholas II that the Chinese envoy had officially asked Russia to help his country with negotiations with Japan²⁴.

By this time the Russian officials have become animated, because of defeat of Celestial Empire was abundantly clear. Pessimism of Cassini was replaced by reflections that China is required in the loan in 300-400 million lams to liquidate consequences of war and this can take advantage for reception of some concessions, including concession with the railway in Manchuria²⁵. Again the envoy has entered into negotiations with Li Hung Chang in February, 1895, however Chinese man while was cautious and did not promise anything concrete. Cassini replied his interlocutor,

who was almost in desperate position, that Russia is ready to interfere only in case when the war will infringe on its essential interests²⁶.

Achieving more active intervention of Russia, Peking has directed special embassy to Petersburg. Nicholas II has given audience to the delegation on February, 6 (18), 1895. Chinese were accepted in Russia «with hasty complaisance» in general, on V.N. Lamsdorf's expression. At the same time he has noted an appreciable divergence of diplomats and «not diplomatic» supporters of the union with Celestial. The tsar felt sympathy to the last. He also sympathized with China and agreed with a reason of Peking, that if Japan will gather in Asia too greater force it should not leave Russia indifferent²⁷.

Synchronously with Cassini and without the coordination with other Russian ministries the Ministry of Finance has started the elaboration of the plan of the railway in Manchuria, but only from Tsurukhaitui up to Blagoveshchensk («northern» variant of future project Chinese Eastern railway - CER). In February, 1895 Witte has presented a note about it to Nicholas II²⁸. Probably he has obtained more distinct representation about the Far East policy by this time. Minister of Finance has already started to probe ground in China, having addressed for the help to A.D. Startsev, well known Russian merchant in Tientsin. He has informed Witte on opinion «the Chinese mandarins»: «it is better to remove Russian border on one thousand versts and to have the old neighbour, than to suffer Japanese on continent». Startsev believed, that assistance of Russia to the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese peace «gives us the full right of carrying out of road through Manchuria in direction Nikol'sk - Ninguta - Tsitsihar – Tsurukhaitui» and that it is necessary to operate («the present moment considers very successful. Money is required terribly»). Last circumstance speaks that the merchant assumed to coordinate the loan to China and construction of railway²⁹. Witte shared such approach apparently.

However in the beginning of 1895 when rout of China became obvious, Petersburg had a question: whether to act for independence of Korea or to take advantage of a situation and to demand to itself territorial

compensation (most likely, in China). This dilemma was discussed in Special conferences on January, 20th (on February, 1st) and on March, 30th (on April, 11th) 1895. Participants of discussion converged in one: Russia is not interested to worsen relations neither with the clashing parties, nor with the great powers. Employment of the Korean island Kargodo or even a part of Manchuria was supposed as an extreme reciprocal measure on aggression of Japan. But participants have decided to search the consent with England and to strengthen a Pacific squadron³⁰. Russia was ready to turn a blind eye to possible territorial purchases of Japan in China, but just not on the Korean peninsula³¹. This attitude based on destiny for own boundaries, and also for freedom of navigation across Korean strait³². The section of Korea could lead to occurrence of the British advanced post like port Hamilton in 1884 near to seaside area. Such opportunity was considered in Petersburg as the extremely undesirable situation.

Sharp turn in Petersburg intentions has occurred some later, in the spring of 1895 and it has been connected with conditions of Shimonoseki treaty concluded on April, 17th, 1895. Defeated China conceded to the Country of the Rising Sun island Formosa (Taiwan), islands Penhuledao, Liaotung peninsula, recognized full independence of Korea and has undertaken to pay the contribution in 200 million lans³³. Russia was especially worried about a concession of Liaotung peninsula to Japan. By time of Special conference on March, 30th (on April, 11th) 1895, when requirements of Tokyo to Peking became known³⁴, appointed shortly before it Minister for Foreign Affairs A.B. Lobanov-Rostovskii has formulated the purposes of Russia in the Far East as: «purchase of nonfreezing port by us on Pacific and connection to us of some part of Manchuria necessary for more convenient carrying out of the Siberian railway»³⁵. The main enemy of Petersburg in the East was found in England, and the possible ally - Japan. It is natural, that achievement of objects in view was supposed to achieve due to China. However at Special conference Minister of Finance has resolutely declared the Country of a rising sun as the basic opponent of Russia in the Far East

(«hostile actions of Japan are directed mainly against us») and has demanded to not admit it on the continent at any cost, not stopping even before war. Witte assured, that section of China will occur «in not far future», was ready to concede to Japan Formosa, «in an extreme case» - the south of Korea, «but only not Manchuria»³⁶. Apparently, by this time Minister of Finance has ripened in general the wide geopolitic program of actions in the Far East. The Central Asia, from his point of view, should become Russian «not in sense of a material gain and [we had] to force it to serve our purposes and our interests»³⁷. At such statement of a question the railway in Manchuria became first of all the instrument of economic expansion of Russia to China, including its central and southern areas.

After that Petersburg has not only organized a collective demarche of powers in front of Japan, having forced Tokyo to give up Liaodong peninsula, but also together with France has carried out the loan to China for payment of the contribution in 230 million lans (30 million were added for returning of peninsula), activity of the Russian policy in Celestial has considerably amplified. Leaders of Ministry of Navy actively searched for nonfreezing harbour for winter parking of the Pacific squadron.

Cassini has returned to a railway question and has addressed in Tsungli-Yamen on October, 2nd (14) with the offer to continue Great Siberian railway before connection with the Chinese roads in Manchuria. But he has got the answer that China prefers to construct railways independently³⁸.

By that moment Petersburg seemed to have firmly solved to get a concession to construct of the Russian railway on the Chinese territory. However the detailed project was not still elaborated. Surprisingly, but some ministries operated in this question separately. Besides the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Amur general-governor S.M. Dukhovskoi at his own risk, not advised anybody, in August of 1895 has sent to Manchuria four Russian officers for a review of a route of the future railway. Besides that some parties of geodesists of Ministry of Railways under a kind of scientists-researchers already worked in Manchuria in secret³⁹. Only on

October, 23rd (on November, 4th) 1895 Minister of Communications M.I. Khilkov has notified Lobanov-Rostovskii about sending privately groups of engineers to lead research of possible directions of the railway in Manchuria⁴⁰. Certainly, Minister of Communications did it with Nicholas II consent which he received on May, 12th (24), 1895. But this action was a greater surprise for Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In the end of 1895 hearings about construction of Russian railway through Manchuria went not only across all Siberia, but also were discussed in China⁴¹.

All thus numerous and not coordinated among themselves actions should leave at Peking impression of leded strong press on Median empire which is undertaken by Russia and France, demanding concessions as a payment for the organization of the loan. Certainly, it frightened Chinesees and served as a push for reciprocal actions.

In the meantime discussion about what was necessary to demand from China still actively proceeded in Petersburg. The Ministry of Finance having concentrated on a railway question, by the end 1895 has decided to achieve a southern direction of a line (from Chita up to Vladivostok)⁴². On October, 3rd (15) Witte has stated this idea to emperor, having rejected Badmaev's plans of a construction of road to the center of China⁴³. On October, 30th (on November, 12th) 1895 Minister of Finance has presented Nicholas II the report in details with the plan of the railway across Manchuria up to Vladivostok (1500-2000 versts). Lobanov-Rostovskii considered similar road dangerous: by his opinion, it could shake durability of China, stimulate activity of other powers there, especially of England, which wished to dominate over the Yellow sea. Therefore Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia tended to its northern variant - up to Blagoveshchensk. Nobody in Russia discussed the idea of the union with China. On the contrary, in archive of the Ministry of Finance among papers, concerning the future CER, the project of the confidential agreement with China was kept with documents only about payments of percent under the loan with use of customs incomes⁴⁴. Such contract was supposed to be coordinated to concession on the railway. Witte's initiative has coincided on time with active actions of France

which also has intended to build the railway in the south of China. Nicholas II, having read through the message on it from Cassini, has concluded: «I think that now is the time for negotiations with China for reception of concession on construction the railway from Transbaikal region direct to Vladivostok through Manchuria»⁴⁵. Since this moment the question on the Russian railway in Manchuria became at last a part of official policy of Petersburg.

On November, 18th (30), 1895 Minister for Foreign Affairs, having received the command of tsar to discuss this question with Minister of Finance, has supported Witte's idea about necessity of the prompt negotiations with China with the purpose of reception of concession for «private company» to construct and operate the railway from Chita up to Vladivostok for 80 years which did not coordinate with the agreement on the union. On November, 21st (on December, 3rd) Nicholas II has approved the report of the minister⁴⁶. Next day, on November, 22nd (on December, 4th), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has sent Cassini the telegram with the assignment immediately to enter negotiations with the Chinese officials in occasion of concession⁴⁷. Apparently, those days Witte has prepared also the instruction to the envoy for negotiating. The basic maintenance of the future agreement on construction CER (construction of the railway should be presented to Russian «private» company, the treaty foresaw «help» to company of the Ministry of Finance, participation of China in profits) were reflected in it⁴⁸. However in a draft copy of the document the minister has designated the purpose as the railway from Chita-Nerchinsk not up to Vladivostok, and up to coast of Pacific. Witte, possibly, had similar plans, this fact has reflected in reports of the Charge d'Affaires of England in Petersburg. He was informed about the stories of the Russian engineers who conducted researches in Manchuria, has learned, that Russia planned to build the railway from Sretensk up to Tsitsihar, and therefrom it was supposed to conduct a line in three directions: up to Port Arthur, up to Peking and to Vladivostok⁴⁹.

However two days later, on November, 24th (on December, 6th), the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs has ordered Cassini to suspend negotiations for specification of Russian intentions. These corrected conditions in the form of the project of concession on a construction of the railway «within the limits of China in a direction from Chita to Vladivostok» have been presented by Witte to Nicholas II on 27 of November (on December, 9th) 1895.

Russian envoy in Peking has received the project of the Russo-Chinese agreement and the memorandum to it, written in the Ministry of Finance, possibly, in February, 1896. The general sense of the project was in granting concession on construction of the railway in Manchuria for a private society to realize it for 6 years, a duty of the Chinese authorities to protect road from robbers. The exact line did not stipulate in the agreement, supposed, that the basic items will be established under the agreement of the Chinese and Russian governments. The society was granted the right of priority of a construction of branches deep into China from the basic line if the Chinese government decided to do it. Peking acquired the right of the repayment of road after 80 years. The sum was fixed as a nominal cost of shares (according to its profitableness for last 5 years before the repayment) and the bonded capital, and also the special sums directed on repayment of the share capital. Witte who have invented this condition for calm of Chinese, has been assured, that they would not have enough money to realize this operation⁵⁰.

Memorandum accompanied the project which also has been prepared in the Ministry of Finance⁵¹, contained arguments for negotiating in Peking: as this road was necessary to the China to protect against a possible attack of Japan and as it was difficult for Celestial Empire to build one independently. The essential moment was the mention of Vladivostok as terminal point of the railway. The text of the allied treaty was not applied to these documents. Probably, the rank of the envoy which obtained Cassini looked too low for negotiations about so important document (it was assumed by G.V. Efimov)⁵². But other answer is more probable: the allied agreement was not necessary for Russia. Only Peking considered it in rigid coordination with concessions, including the railway in

Manchuria. Petersburg aspired to concentrate that it would like to receive in China for the assistance.

Having received the order and the draft agreement on road, Cassini started from sounding of ground in Peking. It has occurred, apparently, in the end of February, 1896⁵³. Russian diplomat has met serious difficulties at once. Chinese did not wish to give concession on the railway to a foreign power, declaring intention to build it independently. They were worried not only by the fact of occurrence of the Russian railway on territories of Median empire but also by precedent after which the other powers could start to demand granting to themselves of railway concessions. Therefore general-governor of Chihli Wang Feng-ts'ao has prepared for Chinese emperor the report on necessity of construction of the Chinese Manchurian railway up to Shanhaikwan. In spite of that speech while went only about a construction of the first section of 190 versts up to the city of Dalinhe. Empty Chinese treasury had no enough money even for it, and the report, I think, has been intended for Russians.

At that time the calm was kept in Peking. Cassini has entered into official negotiations only on April, 6th (18th), 1896, having transferred Russian offers to prince Ch'ing⁵⁴. The envoy assured, that the railway would be favourable not only Russia, but also to China, stimulating economic development of Celestial⁵⁵. The answer of Peking was disappointed: the Chinese dignitaries were given by him for the answer of 12 days, have declared that they are afraid of new enterprise and possible loss of independence therefore, so they repeated the former decision: to build the railway themselves⁵⁶. The persistence of Tsungli-Yamen has caused at Cassini an attack of fury: he rigidly talked to ministers, roughly pressed on them, threatening with the union of Russia with Japan⁵⁷. But all actions have not finished successfully.

The positive moments after the first exchange of opinions were few: Pokotilov has noted that Chinese do not tighten negotiations and go on subject discussion⁵⁸. Petersburg after shot thought above happened, has decided to transfer the negotiations to Russia, using arrival of special embassy led by Li Hung Chang for participation in crowning Nicholas

II⁵⁹. Witte has carefully prepared for arrival of the Chinese envoy: after his departure out of Suez canal Li Hung Chang was met and was accompanied all the way up to Petersburg by prince E.E. Ukhtomskii⁶⁰.

The trip to Russia and then to Europe had enormous value for Li Hung Chang. By the opinion of Peking, after signing Shimonoseki treaty with too heavy conditions the dignitary has got in disgrace. He has lost an arrangement of emperor, has been deprived a rank of general-governor. Cassini even has solved, that career of Li Hung Chang has ended⁶¹. Only the success of embassy gave the disgraced bureaucrat chance to return to glory and authority. In the other case his political life really would come to the end (the second failure in a row).

Li Hung Chang went to Petersburg with the offer: China itself builds the railway, but on Russian money, using Russian standards and under direction of Russian engineers⁶². Chinese envoy has arrived in Petersburg on April, 18th (30), 1896. Already on the day of arrival he has started the discussion with Witte on the questions, concerning constructions of the Russian railway in Manchuria⁶³. «It would be more quickly and less charge and besides it would be possible to detain offensive actions of Japan. If China will build the railway itself one will not be ready 10 years later», - Minister of Finance convinced the interlocutor. If China will disagree on Russian offers Petersburg will construct railway up to Nerchinsk and «will wait for an opportunity, but only from that time Russia will not render assistance to China»⁶⁴. Witte has generally repeated the position was stated in Peking by Cassini and that was rejected by Tsungli-Yamen⁶⁵.

Li Hung Chang in the answer has reproduced the decision of Chinese government, that China should build railroad itself⁶⁶. Envoy of Celestial has also arrived to Petersburg with intention to conclude the allied treaty with Russia, but Witte was interested first of all in concession on the railway. This has mainly defined the maintenance of negotiations: the contract has receded into the background, and the basic discussion rotated around the railway in Manchuria. Despite of a radical divergence in approaches, the participants started to discuss details. Li Hung Chang has

conceded in wide track (Russian), but has insisted on the name of road – «Chinese East» (Witte offered – «Manchurian»), on restrictions of transportation of armies (transit only). The term after which Peking had an opportunity to redeem the railway has been reduced from 80 till 36 years also on demand of the Chinese. However, Witte considered this condition insignificant: Minister of Finance believed that China will not have enough resources to realize it later. The compromise has been reached in a question on customs payments. Witte achieved their full cancelling for all goods intended for construction of a highway (actually there were opportunities of duty-free transportation to China any quantity of commodities of the unlimited nomenclature). As a result delegations have agreed that their rate would be reduced by third. It suited Minister of Finance: even such indulgence should «facilitate to our goods in a competition to the foreign goods imported into China by sea»⁶⁷. Witte has also brought up with Li Hung Chang about Russian railway to one of ports of China, but he has encountered rigid resistance of the Chinese. Under the information of the English ambassador in Petersburg N. O’Conor, the Minister of Finance insisted on the railway up to Talienwan so that the main terminal of the Siberian railway has been built there⁶⁸. Witte approved that his interlocutor agreed on road up to the Yellow sea, but with narrow, non-Russian track, the same has been accepted on line Tientsin-Shanhaikwan⁶⁹.

After negotiations with Witte, Li Hung Chang had confidential hour and a half audience with Nicholas II on April, 23rd (on May, 5th)⁷⁰. The translator was the senior son of Li Hung Chang - Jing Fan. Questions of the conclusion of the allied treaty were discussed on this meeting again. Tsar has repeated already known arguments, assuring Li Hung Chang in the peaceful intentions: Russia already had too much lands to aspire to get still more⁷¹. The meeting has made deep impression upon the envoy of Peking⁷². His correspondence with Chinese government retained an impression, that after this conversation in a position of the highly experienced Chinese dignitary there has come crisis and he decided to accept Russian conditions.

Using it, Witte and Lobanov-Rostovskii at the following meeting with Li Hung Chang have rigidly raised the question about the immediate conclusion of the agreement on the railway. They were agreed to insert some corrections in Russian project according the wish of Peking envoy: the railway cannot serve as a pretext for intrusion into China or infringement of the sovereign rights of Chinese emperor. Li Hung Chang has accepted the document offered to him basically that has installed optimism of Lobanov-Rostovskii: «if idea comes off there will be a great deal»⁷³. However there were many contradictions. Li Hung Chang agreed to sign only the allied treaty, but Witte and Lobanov-Rostovskii caused its signing by the simultaneous conclusion of the agreement on the railway⁷⁴.

Then the participants have rested against other problem: Li Hung Chang insisted on the engagement of contract first, and then - concession; Lobanov-Rostovskii demanded the sign of concession before the contract. Li Hung Chang has recognized in the next telegram to Peking that it is not possible for China to construct a railway and that, by his opinion, the question on road and the allied treaty are indissolubly connected with each other⁷⁵. Tsungli-Yamen insisted on three conditions: mutual aid on a case of the conflict to Japan, opening for navigation of the rivers Sungari and Huchun, China brings 5 million taels in the Russo-Chinese bank (was founded in October, 1895)⁷⁶. Li Hung Chang has received this instruction on May, 4 (16th), on the same day he has sent Russian projects at the discretion of Tsungli-Yamen⁷⁷. Li Hung Chang suggested: «Russia now wishes to get friendship with us. In the maintenance of the treaty there are no especial artful intentions. If we shall refuse it, we shall lose sympathy of Russian for ever»⁷⁸. Li Hung Chang readiness to conclude the treaty has been supported by Witte's promise to pay him personally 3 million rubles stage by stage⁷⁹.

However Peking has decided to make some changes into contract: on May, 11th (23) Li Hung Chang was offered to insist on removal of two last conditions (the right of Russia to transport on the future railway in China unlimited quantity of troops and 15-years term of the treaty), and also to distribute its action to threats from England and France. But the

Russians even before reception of the order from China on May, 7th (19) has declared Li Hung Chang that changes in the text will not be admitted. On May, 14th (26) Peking has received the telegram from the envoy that if the Russian project do not accept entirely negotiations would interrupt. Next day Tsungli-Yamen after discussion a situation has surrendered and removed any objections⁸⁰. Received the consent of Peking on May, 18th (30th), Li Hung Chang has signed the text of the Russo-Chinese confidential treaty in Moscow on May, 22nd (on June, 3rd)⁸¹.

The defensive union of two empires against Japan included the sanction to construct of the Russian railway on territory of Manchuria with the right of its repayment for Peking⁸². On June, 1st (13th) Li Hung Chang has left from Russia for Germany. Nevertheless, Tsungli-Yamen has shown discontent after his departure, that Li Hung Chang has agreed for Russian size of a track and has tried to return to European, narrower standard, but it was unsuccessful⁸³.

However it was still required to achieve ratification of the agreement by Chinese emperor. For achievement of success Cassini has addressed for the help to empress Tz'u-hsi. Showing gravity of intentions, the Russian envoy has threatened with departure if the contract will not be confirmed immediately. Frightened Tz'u-hsi has simply forced emperor to ratify against his will the document. Having achieved desirable, Cassini has left Peking on September, 18th (30), 1896⁸⁴.

The Russo-Chinese allied treaty was confidential, however its maintenance has quickly become known. It was promoted by the Chinese. Soon Li Hung Chang during conversation with the French envoy in Peking O. Gérard has left from a room, «having forgotten» on a table the notebook with the text of the Russo-Chinese treaty⁸⁵. The Russian officials did not inform their European ally on the conclusion of the agreement with Celestial.

On October, 28th, 1896 Chinese newspaper «North China Daily News» already in third time has published the text of the pseudo-treaty, contained introduction and 12 articles as thought to be signed by Cassini with the Chinese government in Peking. Despite of a number of essential

discrepancies with original text, the publication as a whole has truly reflected the maintenance of real Russo-Chinese treaty. The document informed on the conclusion of the defensive union between two empires for protection of territorial integrity of China and the Russian Far East region. According it the right to lead a part of the Siberian railway on territory of China was given to Russia and to have its special protection (railway guard). Others conjectures were false: as thought port Kiaochou was ostensibly transferred Russia in rent to 15 years, in case of war Petersburg could use of Port Arthur and Talienwan. China has also undertaken to translate the army on European manners and to involve for this purpose Russian officers only. Except for cleanly strategic reasons the convention reflected Witte's economic plans. It appeared that Russia would like to have economic domination in Southern Manchuria, to participate in development of mountain riches in Girin and Heilungkiang provinces and to catch concessions on construction of railways Shanhaikwan – Mukden – Girin and Shanhaikwan – Port-Arthur under Russian standards⁸⁶. In spite of the fact that the text of the newspaper publication was repeatedly denied both Russian, and the Chinese officials, lot of people have got an impression, that it reflected really existed arrangement.

The text of the Russo-Chinese secret treaty of 1896 remained inaccessible to researchers for a long time. The first, who has familiarized with it and has entirely reprinted in the book, was P.N. Simanskii⁸⁷. He has quoted the text of the document from the letter of Ministry for Foreign Affairs to P.M. Lessar on February, 25th, 1902 in which Russian envoy in Peking acquainted with its maintenance. However Simanskii's work also was confidential and was published in quantity of only seven copies. The Russian press after the Russo-Japanese war wrote about the contract with correcting repeating of its sense, referring on foreign press⁸⁸.

Certainly, the agreement with Russia basically differed from unequal contracts, which China has forcedly signed with a number of the western powers in the second half of XIX century, after opium wars. Secret treaty of 1896 has issued the first union of China with the European power in

the history of Celestial. However the agreement cannot be named strong as it was based on absolutely different interests. If China searched for an ally in opposition of Japan to itself, Russia would like to receive a number of the concessions from Peking, which facilitated access in Celestial, especially - concession on the railway in Manchuria. Minister of Finance Witte intended to make its part of the Great Siberian railway with an output to nonfreezing port, believing, that such line would become the major transport highway connecting the Europe and Asia. Witte did not conceal, that in his plans economic domination in Northern China of the middle of 1890th was only the first stage, but purpose was the leading role of Russia in all Far East and in the Central Asia. This grandiose dream at all did not consider weak opportunities of the Russian economy. It is not surprising, that less than two years later as more rectilinear Witte's colleagues, especially Minister for Foreign Affairs M.N. Murav'ev, send to power actions and in December, 1897 have insisted on capture of Port Arthur. Boxing rebellion of 1900, a campaign of Russian armies to Peking and occupation of all Manchuria have dispelled all doubts of Celestial rules, with whom they deal, and have actually given up as a bad job the allied treaty. In spite of the fact that formally it continued to operate up to 1911, China adhered to neutrality during the Russo-Japanese war.

In the Russian and Soviet historiography China on the turn of the century often appears as a victim of «imperialistic» aggression, as the subject of policy of some great powers. Meanwhile, the history of the conclusion of Russo-Chinese treaty of 1896 shows, as Peking successfully used a difference in interests of «imperialists», whenever possible pushing together their foreheads, and under own initiative went on rapprochement with the some countries. In Russian case even now difficultly unequivocally to answer a question who whom manipulated and who of whom has changed in these multistage combinations.

For Russia undoubtedly fact is that finally it not only has not succeeded in ambitious plans, but also was involved in an aggressive policy without precise prospect on success. Witte has encountered resistance of the great

powers to be strong in the financial attitude than Russia (England, the USA) quickly lost influence on Far East policy. His opponents (military minister A.N. Kuropatkin, Bezobrazov's group and some others) operated rectilinearly, eventually this policy has turned back unsuccessful military collision with Japan 1904-1905 after which Russia has managed to reserve CER and sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria only.

Preparation and the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese allied treaty of 1896 has revealed also rather important phenomenon for the Russian authority. Already at the first stages of this process it was obvious, that political decisions are accepted not by one center and not from the uniform point of view, and represent not coordinated, and sometimes contradicting each other actions. Absence of unity was the major symptom of system crisis of autocracy which strengthened only in the further and finally led to crash of Far East policy of imperial Russia.

Key Word: Russo-Chinese relations, Eastern Chinese railway, S.Iu. Witte, Li Hung Chang, Russia and Sino-Japanese war

Notes :

- 1 Badmaev's note for Alexander III about the tasks of Russian policy in Asiatic East, February 13 (25), 1893 // *Za kulisami tsarizma. Arhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva. L., 1925. S.49-75.*
- 2 Letters of E.K. Biutsov to R.R. Rosen, 1882 // Russian State Historical archive (RGIA). F.1038. Op.1. D.110.
- 3 Alexander's III remarks on the report of A.N. Speyer to N.K. Giers, February 10 (22), 1885 // Archive for foreign policy of Russian Empire (AVPRI). F.161. V-Az. Op.181. 1885. D.45. L.63-68.
- 4 Pak B.D. *Rossia i Korea. M., 1979. S.85.*
- 5 M. Zhdanov's note about Russian policy in Korea, 1884-1895, February 20, 1896 // AVPRI. F.340. Op.584. D.89. L.117-118; Pak B.D. Op. cit. S.81-84.
- 6 Instruction of N.K. Giers for K.I. Vaeber, May 3, 1885 // AVPRI. F.191. Op.768. D.6. L.14-39.

- 7 [Vasil'ev]. Torgovoe I ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Korei // Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh I statisticheskikh materialov po Azii. Vyp.XVII. SPb., 1888. S.1-35.
- 8 Zapiska po povodu uvolneniia g. Browna ot dolzhnosti nachalnika koreiskikh tamozhen, November 2, 1897 (draft copy) // AVPRI. F.340. Op.584. D.89. L.81 ob. The instruction given by A.N. Speyer in September, 1895 in which diplomat was recommended to pay attention to development of the Russo-Korean overland trade and on the economic questions in general, interesting the Ministry of Finance, were in contradiction to it (Pak B.B. Rossiiskaia diplomatiia i Korea. Kn.2: 1888-1897. M., 2004. S.129-130). However Speyer really did a little in this respect.
- 9 Journal of Special conference, April 26 (May 8), 1888 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.56.
- 10 Journal of Special conference, April 26 (May 8), 1888 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.55. Details of the decisions of Special conference see: Pak B.B. Op. cit. S.11-13. This policy proceeded and in the beginning of 1890th (Pak B.B. Op. cit. S.35).
- 11 Memoirs of the viceroy Li Hung Chang. L., 1913. P.123; Schulman I.J. China's Response to Imperialism, 1895-1900. Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University, 1967. P.137-140.
- 12 Istoriia diplomatii. T.2. M., 1963. S.305.
- 13 Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.22.
- 14 Lamsdorf V.N. Dnevnik 1894-1896 gg. M., 1991. S.140, 156-157.
- 15 Special note of M.N. Giers for Nicholas II, June 9, 1894 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №1-2 (50-51). S.15-16.
- 16 Extract from the letter of A.P. Cassini, December 30, 1894 // Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. S.156-157. Nicholas II has marked on the letter: «Quite right».
- 17 Journal of Special conference, August 9, 1894 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.64.
- 18 N.G. Matiunin to M.N. Nikonov, December 17, 1894 // Manuscript Department of the Russian National library (OR RNB). F.521. Op.1. №90. N.G. Matiunin supported independence of Korea, believing, that its connection to Russia is unprofitable because of complications. Beside that the fact will make inevitable capture of Manchuria (Matiunin N.G. Ob otnosheniiah Korei k inostrannym gosudarstvam // Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh I statisticheskikh materialov po Asii. Vyp.LVIII. SPb., 1894.

S.1-32).

- 19 Summary of the attitude of the Navy ministry to the Chino-Japanese war, July 26, 1894 // Russian State archive of Navy(RGA VMF). F.417. Op.1. D.1465. L.9-13.
- 20 N.M. Chihachev to N.P. Shishkin, January 27, 1895 // RGA VMF. F.417. Op.1. D.1465. L.18. In April, 1895 the Pacific squadron has left Kobe and Iokogama and has passed in Chefoo (China). After Shimonoseki treaty the squadron has concentrated in Vladivostok. Command has decided to search for more convenient port (the basic attention was paid on Kiaochou) (Russko-Iaponskaia voina 1904-1905 gg. Ch.1. Russkie morskije sily na Dal'nem Vostoke s 1894 po 1901. Pg., 1918. S.66-75). after E.I. Alekseev's trip in the summer 1895 E.I. Alekseev has also noticed places for desirable bases in Korean ports Mazanpo and Kargodo. But they had lacks: Kargodo was too close to Japan, and Masanpo was necessary to strengthen and connect by railway with the basic line of the Siberian railway (S.81-84). Navy minister N.M. Chihachev also considered as a variant other Korean port - Shestakov (S.121). To the beginning of 1896 E.I. Alekseev has tended to variant of Kargodo, but for this purpose Russia should strengthen the influence in Korea. By opinion of admiral, Russians had to obtain «the organization of its [Korean] armed forces, construction of railways, telegraphs and the wide right of use of ports and southern archipelago» (S.142). In general, it did not contradict the policy of S.Iu. Witte, but hardly supposed simultaneously friendship with Japan. F.V. Dubasov, who replaced E.I. Alekseev in the autumn of 1896 has gone round the Korean coast, having stopped the choice on Masanpo. He was even more categorical, than the predecessor: «war of Russia with Japan is inevitable, it is represented at the same time and desirable as the best output and the most expedient sanction of all difficulties» (S.197). However, it was the point of view exclusively the seamen, not supported neither in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor in the Ministry of Finance. More details see: Choi Dokkyu. Rossiia v Koree: 1893-1905 gg. (Politika Ministerstva finansov i Morskogo ministerstva). SPb., 1996. S.83-121.
- 21 Journal of Special conference, August 9, 1894 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.65.
- 22 RGIA. F.1622. Op.1. D.1018. L.195 ob. – 196 ob.
- 23 Efimov G.V. Istoriiia russko-kitaiskogo dogovora 1896 g. // Sovetskoe

kitaevedenie. 1958. №2. S.24.

- 24 AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.3053. L.47-48.
- 25 A.P. Cassini to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, January 8 (20), 1895 // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.113. L.9-14.
- 26 Narochnitskii A.L. Kolonial'naia politika kapitalisticheskikh derzhav na Dal'nem Vostoke. 1860-1895. M., 1956. S.683-684.
- 27 Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. S.143-144. Note on February 6 (18), 1895.
- 28 Second draft copy of letter A.B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A.P. Cassini, December 7 (19), 1895 // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.1099. L.31-32; Simanskii P.N. Sobytiia na Dal'nem Vostoke, predshestvovavshie russko-iaponskoi voine (1891-1903 gg.). Ch.1. Bor'ba Rossii s Iaponiei v Koree. SPb., 1910. S.71; Romanov B.A. Rossia v Man'chzhurii (1892-1906). Ocherki po istorii vneshnei politiki samoderzhaviiia v epohu imperialism. L., 1928. S.83.
- 29 Makeev to S.Iu. Witte, May 25 (June 6), 1895 // RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.18. L.10.
- 30 Journal of Special conference, January 20 (February 1), 1895 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.67-74.
- 31 Nihamin V.P. Diplomatiiia russkogo tsarisma v Koree posle iapono-kitaiskoi voiny (1895-1896 gg.). Po dokumentam arhiva vneshnei politiki Rossii // Istoriia mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenii, istoriia zarubezhnyh stran. M., 1957. S.138-139.
- 32 Summary of the attitude of the Navy ministry to the Chino-Japanese war. July 26, 1894 // RGA VMF. F.417. Op.1. D.1465. L.9-13; Ignat'ev A.V. S.Iu. Witte – diplomat. M., 1989. S.40-43.
- 33 Chino-Japanese peaceful treaty, April 17, 1895 // Grimm E.D. Sbornik dogovorov i drugih dokumentov po istorii mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenii na Dal'nem Vostoke (1842-1925). M., 1927. S.94-98.
- 34 They were announce by Japanese envoy in Russia T. Nissi on February 9 (21), 1895 (Ignat'ev A.V., Melikhov G.V. Dal'nii Vostok v planah i politike Rossii. Proishozhdenie russko-iaponskoi voiny // Istoriia vneshnei politiki Rossii. Konets XIX – nachalo XX vv. M., 1997. S.135).
- 35 Special note of Minister for Foreign Affairs for Nicholas II, Mart 25 (April 6), 1895 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.75.
- 36 Journal of Special conference, Mart 30 (April 11), 1895 // Krasnyi arhiv. 1932. №3 (52). S.78-83.

- 37 Letter of A.B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A.P. Morenghaim, coordinated with S.Iu. Witte, May 11 (23), 1895 // Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. S.176.
- 38 Lensen G.A. Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1899. University Presses of Florida, 1982. Vol.II. P.493.
- 39 N.I. Grodekov to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 20 (November 1), 1895 // RGIA. F.1626. Op.1. D.157; Romanov B.A. Op. cit. S.84.
- 40 Lamsdorf V.N. Op cit. S.282.
- 41 Memorandum of engineer Bogomolov for S.Iu. Witte, October 5, 1895 // RGIA. F.560. Op.26. D.25. L.193.
- 42 Second draft copy of letter of A.B. Lobanov-Rostovskii to A.P. Cassini, December 7 (19), 1895 // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.1099. L.31-32. D.D. Pokotilov (the agent of the Ministry of Finance) was sent to China by S.Iu. Witte in September, 1895, who has warned him about possible participation «to demand concessions on construction of the railway through Manchuria» (D.D. Pokotilov to S.Iu. Witte, February 10 (22), 1896 // RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.10. L.35-36).
- 43 State Archive of the Russian Federation(GARF). F.601. Op.1. D.688.
- 44 RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.18. L.3-5.
- 45 Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. S.315. Note on November 15 (27), 1895.
- 46 AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.3053. L.148-149. Text of the note was repeated by V.N. Lamsdorf in his diary (Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. P.327-328).
- 47 This telegram was mentioned by Cassini in his report on December, 8th (20th), 1895 (AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.113. L.259-264). The Ministry of Finance has informed D.D. Pokotilov on the assignment on November, 22nd (on December, 4th) 1895 (RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.13. L.20) and he offered his services: to address to the Chinese government with the petition on behalf of private syndicate.
- 48 Draft copy of memorandum S.Iu. Witte for A.P. Cassini, n/d // RGIA. F.323. Op.1. D.425. L.53-64.
- 49 Charge d'Affaires B. Goschen to R.A. Salisbury, February 27, 1896 // Public Record Office. Foreign Office (PRO FO). 65/1514. P.103-104. He has partly confirmed, and has partly specified these data on March, 12th, 1896. The main line supposed to make from Tsitsihar up to Talienshan, minor - up to Vladivostok, and S.Iu. Witte ostensibly was against this branch (letter on Mart 12, 1896 // PRO FO. 65/1514. P.155-156).
- 50 Proekt kontsessii na postroiku i ekspluatatsiiu v Severo-Vostochnom Kitae

zhelesnoi dorogi ot odnogo iz punktov na zapadnoi granitse Heilutsziaskoi provintsii do odnogo iz punktov na vostochnoi granites Girinskoi provintsii, n/d [before November 27 (December 9), 1895] // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.1099. L.11-20.

51 AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.1099. L.21-30.

52 Efimov G.V. Op. cit. S.30.

53 D.D. Pokotilov to P.M. Romanov Mart 20 (April 1), 1896 // RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.18. L.39.

54 A.P. Cassini to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 9 (21) and 20 (May 2), 1896 // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.114. Ch.1. L.45-46, 63-70; Simanskii P.N. Op. cit. S.79-81.

55 Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.495.

56 Simanskii P.N. Op. cit. S.79-81. G.A. Lensen considered, that Cassini was polite and itself has given (!) to Chinese of 12 days for preparation of the answer (Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.495; Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.148).

57 Tsungli-Yamen to Li Hung Chang, St. Petersburg, «Third Moon, 20th day» // St. Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies. Archive of orientologists. R.1. Op.1. №1. L.266-267.

58 D.D. Pokotilov to S.Iu. Witte, April 19 (May 1), 1896 // RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.18. L.86-90.

59 Appointment of Li Hung Chang the chapter of embassy to Russia became the important success of A.P. Cassini gained after long difficult negotiations in the winter 1896 (Solov'ev Iu.Ia. Vospominaniia diplomata 1893-1922. M., 1959. S.67; Efimov G.V. Op. cit. S.30).

60 Iz arhiva S.Iu. Witte. Vospominaniia. T.1. Rasskazy v stenograficheskoi zapisi. SPb., 2003. Kn.1. S.439.

61 A.P. Cassini to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 1 (13), 1895 // AVPRI. F.143. Op.491. D.113. L.195-196.

62 E.E. Ukhtomskii to Nicholas II, Mart 11 (23), 1896 // PGIA. F.1072. Op.2. D.6. L.1. Tsungli-Yamen seems to have a little softened the opinion in comparison, Cassini was notified with it.

63 Though their first meeting, under Witte's information, had exclusively ceremonial character (Witte S.Iu. Op. cit. S.440-441).

64 Li Hung Chang to Tsungli-Yamen, «Third moon 21st day, 22nd year of Kuang-hsu) // St. Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies. Archive of orientologists. R.1. Op.1. №1. L.267-268; Witte S.Iu. Op. cit. S.441-442.

- 65 Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.499.
- 66 Witte's remarks on the M.G. Zel'manov's note on the history of construction Siberian railway // RGIA. F.560. Op.28. D.249. L.335.
- 67 Special report of S.Iu. Witte for Nicholas II about agreement on CER, September 28 (October 10), 1896 // Witte S.Iu. Sobranie sochinenii i dokumental'nykh materialov. T.1. Kn.2. Ch.1. M., 2004. S.253. Minister of Finance made a mistake in his intention.
- 68 N. O'Connor to R.A. Salisbury, May 9, 1896 // PRO FO. 65/1514. P.264-276.
- 69 S.Iu. Witte to M.N. Murav'ev, August 20, 1897 // RGIA. F.560. Op.29. D.135. L.8 ob.
- 70 N. O'Connor to R.A. Salisbury, May 6, 1896 // PRO FO. 65/1514. P.253-255.
- 71 Li Hung Chang to Tsungli-Yamen, «Third moon 24th day, 22nd year of Kuang-hsu) // St. Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies. Archive of orientologists. R.1. Op.1. №1. L.268-269; Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.154-155.
- 72 Li Hung Chang has met with Nicholas II, according memoirs of Chinese, 5 or 6 times, only time or two from them were under official conditions. Other meetings passed in private atmosphere, behind a glass of tea or a glass of wine. However the Chinese dignitary has not informed their details (Memoirs of the viceroy Li Hung Chang. L., 1913. P.200).
- 73 Lamsdorf V.N. Op. cit. S.380. Note on May 1(13), 1896; Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.155.
- 74 Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.499-500.
- 75 Li Hung Chang to Tsungli-Yamen, «Third moon 27th day, 22nd year of Kuang-hsu» // St. Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies. Archive of orientologists. R.1. Op.1. №1. L.269-270.
- 76 Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.500.
- 77 Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.156; Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.501.
- 78 Li Hung Chang to Tsungli-Yamen «Fourth moon 2nd day, 22nd year of Kuang-hsu) // St. Petersburg Institute of Oriental Studies. Archive of orientologists. R.1. Op.1. №1. L.271. Li Hung Chang has gone on the conclusion of the agreement at all not because of Witte's pressure. This fact is confirmed by his behavior. Meeting the British ambassador in Petersburg N. O'Connor, the Chinese spoke with him about everything, only not about the discussions in Russia. If it would feel necessity to be released from pressure, undoubtedly, Chinese envoy would use time-tested means - has announced the maintenance of negotiations with Witte as the agreement still has not

- been signed (N. O'Connor to R.A. Salisbury, May 9, 1896 // PRO FO. 65/1514. P.264-276).
- 79 Details see: Romanov B.A. Op. cit. S.115-117. Certainly, it is necessary to mean, what not bribes defined the fact of the conclusion of the treaty and its maintenance, but China's necessity for the ally.
- 80 Schulman I.J. Op. cit. P.160-163; Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.502.
- 81 Some circumstances of preparation and signing of the contract are stated in Witte's memoirs (Witte S.Iu. Op. cit. S.438-449).
- 82 Soiuznyi russko-kitaiskii dogovor 22 maia 1896 g. // Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami 1856-1917. M., 1952. S.292-294.
- 83 Lensen G.A. Op. cit. P.504-505.
- 84 North China Daily News. October 28, 1896.
- 85 Solov'ev Iu. Ia. Op. cit. S.59.
- 86 Mc Murray J. Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919. N.Y., 1921. Vol.1. P.79-81.
- 87 Simanskii P.N. Op. cit. S.82.
- 88 So G.N. Trubetskoi quoted the maintenance of the secret treaty in article «Rossiia kak velikaia derzhava» (Velikaia Rossiia. Sbornik statei po voennym I obshchestvennym voprosam. Kn.1. M., 1911), referred the publication in «Daily Telegraph», February 15, 1910.

〈국문초록〉

1896년 제1차 러-청 조약

이고르 루코야노프(러시아 과학아카데미 상트페테르부르크 역사연구소)

이 글은 러시아와 청의 대외정책이라는 맥락에서 1896년 러-청 조약의 준비 과정과 그 결과를 다루었다. 특히 두 나라가 이 조약을 통해 여러 가지 다양한 이익을 추구하였음을 밝히고자 하였다. 러시아의 입장에서 볼 때 러-청 조약은 러시아가 극동아시아에서 유리한 고지를 차지할 수 있는 기회였던 한편 경제적인 측면에서도 팽창(재정장관 S. lu. Witte의 계획)할 수 있는 기회였다. 그러나 청은 일본에 함께 대항할 수 있는 동맹국으로서 러시아를 택하였으며, 결국 러-청 조약은 잠재적으로 적어질 수 있는 나라들 간의 책략이었던 셈이다. 이 글에서는 특히 조약 체결과정에서 나타나는 청의 능동적인 외교책에 초점을 두었다. 러시아와의 연합과 관련한 청 조정내의 투쟁을 살펴 보기위해 카시니 조약(Cassini Convention) 등을 다루었다.