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International Journal of Korean History > Volume 30(1); 2025 > Article
타협에서 자부심으로: 영광 3∙4호기 건설사업에서 “한국표준형” 원전 개념의 형성과 물질적 구현, 1983-1996*
Article

International Journal of Korean History 2025; 30(1): 193-240.

Published online: 6.30.2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22372/ijkh.2025.30.1.193

타협에서 자부심으로: 영광 3∙4호기 건설사업에서 “한국표준형” 원전 개념의 형성과 물질적 구현, 1983-1996*

박예슬**

**서울대학교

From Flaws to Pride: The Formation of the “Korean Standard” Nuclear Power Plant in South Korea, 1983-1996*

Yeseul PARK**

**Seoul National University, Ph.D. candidate

* I am deeply grateful to Jongtae Lim for his thoughtful guidance and critical insights, offered through careful readings of multiple drafts. I presented an earlier version of this research at the National History Conference (October 28, 2023). I would like to thank Hyungsub Choi for serving as a discussant, and Sanghyun Kim for his insightful comments at the conference. A more developed version was later presented at the International Workshop for Early Career Scholars in East Asia (IWECSEA, January 9–11, 2025). I received valuable feedback from all participants at IWECSEA, especially Sangwoon Yoo, who served as a mentor, and my mate Tsaiying Lu. My thanks also go to Heesoo Cho, Juyoung Lee, and the anonymous reviewers for their final comments and suggestions. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2022S1A5B5A17047596).

Submission Date: 4.30.2025       Completion of Review: 5.21.2025       Accepted: 5.22.2025

Copyright © 2025 Center for Korean History, Korea University

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

국문초록

이 논문은 한국형 원전의 효시로 알려진 영광 3∙4호기 건설사업을 중심으로, “한국표준형(한국형)” 개념의 형성과 그 의미 변화 과정을 분석한다. 이는 지금까지 원전 산업계가 한국표준형 원전을 일관된 기술 자립의 성취로 묘사해온 것과 달리, 이 개념이 정책적 비전에서 출발하여 기술 설계와 구성요소 선택이라는 구체적인 실행을 통해 점진적으로 구성된 결과물임을 보이려는 시도이다. 한국표준형 원전 개념은 1980년대 초 정부의 발전설비 체제 일원화 정책 이후 반복 건설을 정당화할 필요가 있었던 국내 원자력 관료들에 의해 만들어졌는데, 이 개념은 1980년대 초까지만 하더라도 외국에서 수입한 표준 원전 기술을 ‘한국 실정에 맞게’ 변형한 낮은 수준의 기술적 실행으로 간주됐다. 하지만 원전 건설이 착수되던 1980년대 후반이 되면, 이 개념은 수입 기술을 능동적으로 변형하고 재구성한 창의적 성과로 재정의됐는데, 이러한 변화는 단지 기술 관료들 사이의 담론의 전환이 아니라, 기술이전 협상, 원전 시공 등 원전의 물질적 구현과 맞물려 이뤄졌다. 결과적으로 1990년대 중반이 되면, 한국표준형은 기술 자립을 상징하는 개념으로 자리 잡게 되었다. 이 논문은 한국표준형의 개념 형성과 의미 전환 과정을 분석함으로써 1980-1990년대 한국 원자력 산업계에서 한국표준형으로 대표되는 기술민족주의적 신념이 정책적 비전과 물질적 실행을 통해 강화되는 양상을 밝히고자 한다.

주제어: 한국표준형, 한국형, 원자력발전, 기술 자립, 기술민족주의, 영광 3∙4호기


Abstract

This article examines how Korean nuclear technocrats formulated the concept of the “Korean standard” nuclear power plant in the 1980s and how its meaning shifted from a compromise to a symbol of national pride through the material realization of the Yeonggwang Units 3 and 4 construction projects. Initially seen as a flaw created by the active modification and adaptation of foreign standards within Korea’s limited technological environment, this concept was redefined as a creative transformation of foreign technologies through the actual construction of the plants by the 1990s. This shift, toward viewing the Korean standard reactor as a flawless achievement embodying Korea’s technological self-reliance, laid the foundation for a fervent techno-nationalist belief in the technological excellence and export potential of Korean-style reactors. By analyzing technical papers and reports written by Korean nuclear technocrats, this article highlights how the techno-nationalism, epitomized by the Korean standard, was reinforced through policy initiatives and material practices.

KeyWords: Korean standard, techno-nationalism, technological selfreliance, nuclear power, technology transfer


Introduction

The “Korean standard” nuclear power plant (韓國型 原電) project, which aims to construct nuclear power plants (hereafter NPPs) based on a “Korea’s own design,” has been a core initiative of the South Korean nuclear industry since the 1980s.1 The “Korean standard” NPP has been recognized not only as a significant achievement of the domestic nuclear industry, but also as a testament to the nation’s technological self-reliance. From the successful trial operation of the first Korean standard NPP, Yeonggwang Unit 3, in 1995, to the ground-breaking nuclear export contract with the United Arab Emirates in 2009, the significance of the Korean standard NPP has grown steadily.2 In May 2025, as South Korea was officially selected as the contractor for Units 5 and 6 of the Dukovany NPP in the Czech Republic—a key initiative of President Yun Seok-yeol’s administration—the symbolic status of the Korean standard NPP as a marker of national development and pride has been further reinforced, despite the political turmoil caused by President Yun’s recent impeachment.3
This study traces the origins of the “Korean standard,” a concept created by Korean nuclear technocrats4, during the project to build Yeonggwang Units 3 and 4 in the 1980s and early 1990s, to explain the roots of today’s fervent belief in these NPPs. Yeonggwang Units 3·4, each with a capacity of 1,000MWe, were South Korea’s 11th and 12th commercial nuclear power plants, located in the southwestern region of the Korean Peninsula. Construction began in the 1980s, and the reactors were completed in 1996, during a period when South Korea was accelerating its nuclear development.
Contrary to current perceptions, which have portrayed the history of the construction of Korean standard NPPs as an ideal case of technological self-reliance promoted collectively by Korean nuclear industry, Korean nuclear technocrats involved in the Yeonggwang project during the 1980s coined the concept merely as referring to a prelude to technological self-reliance, highlighting the technical flaws of the nuclear reactor model they developed. In other words, they initially conceived the idea of the Korean standard as an imperfect model to be further improved and accepted the necessity of compromising foreign models according to local needs. However, in the process of actually designing and building the Korean standard NPP, Korean nuclear technocrats reinterpreted it not as a compromise, but as a “creative transformation” of foreign models symbolizing the nation’s technological excellence.
Recent historical studies on technological development in the late 20th century South Korea have increasingly focused on how technological concepts emerged and how their meanings shifted depending on the ideological and political orientations of historical actors at the discursive level.5 Situated within this scholarly context, this paper further argues that material practices—particularly the design and construction of the Korean standard reactor—played a crucial role in shaping and transforming the meaning of the Korean standard concept, thereby contributing to the strengthening of techno-nationalism within South Korea’s nuclear industry. In other words, it shows that Korean techno- nationalism, as exemplified by the term Korean standard, is not a static or discourse-driven ideology, but a historically contingent construct whose meanings have evolved over time through entanglement with material practices.6
This paper aims to explore two dimensions of the Korean standard. The first concerns a policy-level vision formulated by Korean nuclear technocrats in the early 1980s—an abstract and strategic framework established prior to any concrete design decisions. In the wake of the 1970s oil shocks and under the constraints of limited domestic capabilities, Korean nuclear technocrats, who came to perceive the energy crisis as an existential threat to national development, believed that achieving technological self-reliance in the nuclear sector was essential. This conviction stemmed from the belief that nuclear power would serve as a crucial addition to the energy mix, enabling the diversification of energy sources and ensuring a stable power supply for sustained industrial development. As a means to this end, they laid out a broad policy vision, by selectively appropriating and modifying foreign standard models for constructing what would later be called the Korean standard NPP. What is noteworthy is that, under the conditions of Korea’s technological underdevelopment and institutional limitations in the early 1980s, their vision was perceived as a compromise, signifying a lower level of technological self-reliance compared to other foreign models.
The second dimension is the Korean standard at the design level, which emerged during the actual construction of NPPs. Beginning in 1987 with the construction of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 under a technology transfer agreement with Combustion Engineering (CE), Korean nuclear technocrats manufactured and assembled Korean standard NPPs aligned with their early 1980s policy vision. This material realization of this vision shifted their perception of the Korean standard NPP: what had once been regarded as a compromise was reframed as a symbol of national pride. They came to believed that actively cherry-picking and adapting reactor technologies from foreign firms to suit “Korea’s specific conditions” was the very process of creating an authentically “Korean” standard.
By examining the development of the Korean standard reactor, this case study contributes to expanding our understanding of nuclear development and policy formation during the post-Cold War era in South Korea.7 Recent scholarship in international nuclear history, particularly the work of Sonja Schmid, has analyzed how technocratic visions held by nuclear scientists and engineers in non-Western countries were deeply entangled with national policy.8 This article also investigates the intersection of technonationalist visions not only with policy formation but also with the selection and modification of specific reactor designs. In doing so, I will show how the notion of Korean standard became a central site for articulating national identity, technological ambition in South Korea’s nuclear history.

Technocratic Consolidation and the Birth of the “Korean standard” in the 1980s

The concept of the Korean standard emerged in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, during the initial stages of NPP construction in Korea, when Korean government shifted the contracting model from the “turnkey approach” to the “non-turnkey approach.” From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, when Korea first began to sign NPP construction contracts with foreign companies, the Korean government adopted the turnkey approach, in which foreign technology providers took full responsibility for the entire construction process due to Korea’s lack of prior experience in building and operating commercial reactors.9 However, in 1976, as Korean nuclear-related institutions sought to develop “our own nuclear technology” through various means, such as in-house research and development (R&D) or acquiring technology licenses from foreign companies, they decided to adopt the non-turnkey approach, changing the main contractor from foreign companies to a domestic company.10
Kori Unit 1, South Korea’s first NPP, was built in 1978 on a turnkey basis with the US company, Westinghouse. During the 1966 US-Korea summit, US President Lyndon B. Johnson allocated $50 million from a $300 million special loan for NPP construction. In cooperation with Westinghouse, the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO)—South Korea’s state-owned electric utility company—initiated the country’s first commercial nuclear power plant project.11 In this turnkey arrangement, Westinghouse assumed full responsibility for the project, including reactor design, equipment procurement, and construction. Although South Korea had laid the institutional foundations for nuclear research since the 1950s through the establishment of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Kori Unit 1 marked the country’s first foray into commercial nuclear power—so full reliance on a foreign contractor was considered inevitable.
Since the late of 1970s, however, Korean nuclear technocrats changed their approach to the non-turnkey contract system, in which domestic companies took part of main sections of plant construction. Because the turnkey model, in which foreign companies managed all aspects of plant construction, deepened South Korea’s dependence on foreign companies, requiring continuous payment of high licensing fees to them. Furthermore, relying on the turnkey contract system would lead to the introduction of reactor designs from multiple foreign companies, which could later complicate the management and operation of NPPs due to the lack of the integration of incompatible systems. Especially in the wake of the global oil shocks12 and President Park Chung-hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi)’s push for heavy chemical industrialization in the 1970s13, the shift to a non-turnkey approach provided Korean nuclear technocrats with a timely rationale to frame nuclear energy as a domestically manageable and strategic alternative, aligned with the state’s drive for energy diversification.14 Therefore, KEPCO began to actively pursue a non-turnkey approach to nuclear plant construction.
The shift to a non-turnkey system reflected not just a response to the energy crisis, but also a deeper aspiration for full technological autonomy among nuclear technocrats who had previously been involved in nuclear weapon-related research. Under the Park’s emphasis on self-reliant national defense in preparation for potential confrontation with North Korea, South Korean nuclear research institutions, which sought to increase their influence within the nuclear industry, attempted to acquire nuclear technology related with nuclear arms from Canada and France.15 However, following India’s successful nuclear weapons test in 1974, South Korea came under strong pressure from the United States to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.16 Under this constraint, Korean nuclear technocrats had to pursue alternative initiatives.
They turned their attention to the “localization(國産化)” project—pursuing the independent development of specific nuclear technologies—as an alternative strategy following the failure of nuclear weapons development efforts. Developing “localized” fuels was the first step toward technological self-reliance. From 1976 to the early 1980s, the successful “localization” of nuclear fuel development encouraged domestic nuclear institutions to extend their ambitions—from producing individual components locally to envisioning self-reliance at the level of the entire plant. Reinforced by the national discourse on energy crisis, this vision eventually led to the pursuit of a non-turnkey approach.
As a first step toward designating a domestic company as the main contractor in the NPP industry, the Korean government sought to merge the four major private power plant equipment corporations into a single, state-led entity.17 This effort culminated in the establishment of Korean Heavy Industries & Construction (KHIC, 韓國重工業) in 1980 as a state-owned enterprise to serve as the main contractor.18 When Chun Doo-hwan (Chŏn Tuhwan) seized power through a military coup in 1980 after Park Chung-hee’s administration, he forced the four major manufacturing corporations to withdraw from the NPP equipment manufacturing sector. The Special Committee for National Security Measures (國家保衛非常對策委員會),19 an advisory and consultative body headed by Chun, organized a series of negotiations among the four companies to merge them and establish a primary contractor for NPP construction projects. After several rounds of negotiations, the four major conglomerates agreed to withdraw from this sector and KHIC was established as a subsidiary of KEPCO.20 This marked the transition of the NPP equipment manufacturing sector to a state-led system.21
The concept of the Korean standard was developed to define KHIC’s role as the primary contractor for NPP construction projects and to ensure its continued involvement in NPP construction. After KHIC was designated as the main equipment supplier for the construction contracts of Korea’s 11th and 12th NPPs (later to be called Yeonggwang Units 3·4), both KHIC and KEPCO sought to secure a stable business volume for KHIC in future projects. The concept of Korean standard would enable KHIC to repeatedly build NPPs of the same design, providing an effective strategy not only for solidifying KHIC’s position in the nuclear industry but also for addressing its financial difficulties.
The concept of the Korean standard was officially introduced for the first time in 1984 in a Ministry of Energy and Resources (MER, 動力 資源部) report, entitled “The Draft Plan for Nuclear Power Technology Self-Reliance (原子力發電技術自立計劃(案)).22 Prior to this official introduction, however, a small group of Korean nuclear technocrats working in KEPCO-affiliated institutions had already began to develop the idea in the early 1980s, laying out an initial vision of what the Korean standard could be.

An Imperfect Standard: The Technocrats’ Vision of the “Korean standard”

It was Jeong Geunmo (Chŏng Kŭn-mo) and Shin Jaein (Sin Chaein), two prominent nuclear technocrats, who developed the concept of the Korean standard as the core framework for Yeonggwang Units 3·4. The process of developing this idea involved an active reinterpretation of foreign standards, tailoring them to fit “Korea’s specific conditions.” In other words, Jeong and Shin did not aim to directly adopt foreign standards without modification. They believed that such adaptation would be unrealistic, given that Korea’s nuclear industry had not yet reached the level of the so-called advanced nuclear countries. Instead, in order to develop what they called the “Korean standard,” it was essential to reinterpret foreign models in the Korea’s specific needs. Therefore, they saw the Korean standard created through this process as a compromise, rather than an ideal model symbolizing national technological self-reliance, as it would come to be seen from the 1990s onward.
Jeong played a pivotal role in laying the foundational framework of the Korean standard concept. He graduated from the Department of Physics at Seoul National University in 1959, earned PhD in applied physics at Michigan State University, and continued his career in the United States, including a period at MIT’s Department of Nuclear Engineering. After returning to South Korea in 1970 to consult on the establishment of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science, he was appointed president of the Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC) —a state-owned architecture and engineering firm under KEPCO—in 1982. At KOPEC, Jeong leveraged his knowledge and expertise he had acquired during his time in the United States, to establish the initial design principles and technological direction of the Korean standard nuclear power plant (NPP).23
The key feature of the Korean standard devised by Jeong Geunmo was the creation of an exemplar by selectively combining options from American standards. In the 1970s, the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) introduced four types of standard options for domestic NPP builders—Reference System, Duplication, License to Manufacture, and Replication—in order to streamline the licensing process, reduce plant construction time, and minimize repetitive technical reviews while maintaining regulatory oversight (Table 1).24
The four types of standardization in the US nuclear industry were shaped by its decentralized, market-driven structure, in which multiple private firms designed, manufactured, and operated NPPs according to their own proprietary reactor models.25 The AEC allowed these firms to choose one of the options that best suited their needs, thereby facilitating streamlined regulatory processes and shortened construction schedules.
However, Jeong’s vision of the Korean standard was a combination of the “Reference System” and the “Duplication” drawn from the US standardization framework. He proposed that KEPCO adopt the “reference system” by selecting a foreign model of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)—one of the primary components of an NPP—as a design basis for a “Korean version of the NSSS,” and pursue “duplication” by replicating this plant design across multiple domestic sites.26
In his 1984 article, “Standardization of the NPP design (原子力發電 所의 設計 標準化),” Jeong argued that Korea’s approach to nuclear standardization fundamentally differed from that of the United States, due to the unique conditions of the Korean nuclear industry, which made it difficult to develop a domestically originated design.
“Whereas US Architect-Engineering firms develop a generic design based on their accumulated experience in designing and constructing nuclear power plants, and then upgrade this design to build subsequent plants, the Korean approach involves importing a plant designed by a foreign company as a turn-key basis, operating and studying it, identifying problem and limitations, and then redesigning it by incorporating domestic manufacturing capabilities and local conditions. From the perspective of technological development, this essentially constitutes a form of reverse engineering.”27
In Jeong’s view, developing a Korean standard NPP required more than simply applying US standards; it demanded an active localization strategy tailored to South Korea’s specific circumstances. Unlike the United States, where firms had the technological capacity and experience to develop and refine their own models, Jeong believed that, South Korea, lacking such capabilities, could only establish a singular Korean standard NPP through modification and adaptation of foreign models “by improving their designs to reflect South Korea’s specific conditions.”28 His approach had fundamentally different implications from the US model. Whereas American standards provided firms with flexible options for streamlining the licensing process, Jeong’s strategy sought to establish only one identical Korean-style NPP design as an exemplar, which would enable KHIC to secure contracts through the repeated construction of plants based on that standardized design.29
It was Shin Jaein who brought Jeong’s vision of the Korean standard to fruition. After graduating from the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Seoul National University, he began his career as a researcher at KAERI in 1967 and later earned a PhD in nuclear engineering from MIT. Upon returning to South Korea in 1970s, he served as the head of the Nuclear Engineering Department at KOPEC and as the deputy director of the Advanced Power Technology Research Center, which operated under KOPEC’s umbrella and President Jeong’s leadership. At KOPEC, Shin elaborated on the core principles of the Korean standard concept and played a central role in translating them into a practical framework.30
Shin Jaein’s basic idea of the Korean standard—like Jeong’s emphasis on repeated building of an identical design—was articulated as the approach of “Duplication or Replication of a Reference Plant.” In his article, “Current Status and Prospects of NPP Standard (原電標準化 事業의 現況과 展望),” he further elaborated the framework in greater detail than Jeong, incorporating references to standardization models adopted in countries beyond the United States, including Italy and the United Kingdom.31
As shown in Table 2, Shin adopted the “Italy” approach, as a suitable option for Korea, it utilized 1000MWe pressurized water reactors (PWRs). In table 2, although Shin placed Italy and UK under the same category of standardization strategy, he made no mention of the UK when discussing the table. His omission of the UK was not explained, it seems that he regarded the UK’s 1300MWe plant model as inappropriate for application in Korea. Instead, he highlighted the Italian model as the appropriate path for Korea. He explained that in Italy’s case—given its relatively modest energy demand, constrained R&D investment, and limited technological capability—the country chose a strategy of “duplication or replication of a reference plant for multiple- unit construction.”32 In this sense, the core idea of the Korean standard, as he framed it—”duplication or replication of a reference plant”—was directly modeled after the Italian approach. He based this decision on the perceived similarities between Italy and Korea, particularly in terms of limited domestic energy demand and relatively low levels of investment in nuclear R&D.
While Shin drew inspiration from the Italian model, he did not replicate it directly; rather, he modified it to shape his own vision of the Korean standard. Yet, the rationale behind his revision was not always clearly articulated, making its internal logic appear somewhat ad hoc and lacking a consistent foundation. For example, his decision to reduce the capacity of the NPPs from 1000MWe to 900MWe was not grounded in technical data or standard engineering practices. It reflected a form of strategic improvisation. In other words, he considered 900MWe as a suitable capacity that South Korea’s underdeveloped nuclear industry could realistically handle. Interestingly, this choice reveals a paradox: 900MWe was also the capacity of one of the reactor models used in France, a country regarded as a leader in nuclear technology.
Shin also redefined the purpose of standardization. In the Italy/UK category, there were three purposes of the standardization: increasing affordability, shortening construction time, and increasing safety and reliability. In contrast, in the Korea category, Shin removed “shorten construction time,” and “increase safety and reliability” and added a new purpose: “accelerate self-reliance.” However, there were no clear criteria for this change in standardization objectives. This inconsistency is evident in another paper from the same year, where he presented shortening construction time as a way to improve affordability. He stated that standardizing the design and construction of NPPs could reduce the initial investment cost by 10% and shorten the construction period by about eight months, thereby saving about $170 million in construction costs. In addition, he mentioned in this paper that standardization could lead to benefits in accelerating self-reliance but he did not emphasize the issue of safety and reliability.33 In short, the goal of design standardization at that time was to increase the degree of pre-planning, which would allow construction problems and delays to be resolved more quickly and ultimately leading to cost savings, rather than to ensure safe and reliable construction.
Such improvisation was not limited to minor technical modifications of foreign models. Shin also established a hierarchical scheme of NPP standards, based on the technological capabilities and economic strength of each country. Within this framework, the Korean standard was placed at the lowest level for a realistic reason: Korea’s limited experience in NPP construction and its technological constraints. In Shin’s view, the Korean standard lagged behind the standards of technologically advanced countries with extensive experience in building NPPs.
In a 1983 article, Shin investigated foreign NPP standards to identify the optimal design and capacity for developing the Korean standard concept (Table 3). He categorized these standards into four levels, from Type A to Type D. Type A, the highest level, was assigned to the United States—an example that Korea could not realistically follow. Korea was assigned Type D, the lowest level, due to its limited experience and technological capacity. Italy, which Shin saw as having conditions similar to Korea’s, was categorized as Type C—a level slightly higher than Korea’s.34
Shin placed such middle-income countries as Korea, Spain and Taiwan into Type D, arguing that their underdeveloped technological capabilities and small domestic nuclear market required them to prioritize technological self-reliance as their primary goal, with economic efficiency as a secondary consideration.
However, despite the seemingly clear-cut categorization and progression of nuclear standardization in Shin’s typology, the boundaries and criteria between the stages were, in fact, rather arbitrary and ambiguous. For instance, the defining features of Type D—such as “partial technological self-reliance” and a “limited domestic market”— also appeared in Type C. Similarly, Type C’s characteristics, including “full or partial technological self-reliance” and “active expansion into international markets,” overlapped with those of Types B and A. Furthermore, the goals associated with Type A and B—streamlining licensing procedures, reducing construction timelines, improving safety and reliability, and expanding into international markets—were explicitly included in South Korea’s 1984 report on NPP standardization by the Ministry of Energy and Resources, as discussed in Section 2.35 In short, the criteria distinguishing these types were not clearly defined, and key features such as the degree of technological self-reliance, the scale of domestic manufacturing, and export capability were inconsistently distributed across categories.
In fact, this ambiguity in classification allowed South Korea to envision a potential shift towards higher levels of technological development such as Type C or B. In the 1980s, Shin argued that the construction of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 provided an opportunity to leapfrog from Type D—defined by a basic capacity to import foreign technology— to Type C, which involved incorporating modest domestic improvements into imported designs. In other words, he initially regarded the construction of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 as a transitional step from type D to C. However, the indistinct and discretionary nature of the typology later allowed Shin himself and other nuclear technocrats to retrospectively reposition the same project in the 1990s—not as evidence of technological underdevelopment, but as a springboard toward Type B-level advancement. In this sense, the constructed linearity of Shin’s framework did not constrain interpretation; rather, it enabled a flexible reframing of South Korea’s technological status.

Assembling the “Korean standard”: The Making of a Korean Nuclear Scientific Identity

In the mid-1980s, the concept of the Korean standard emerged not merely as a design blueprint, but as a set of practices shaped by nuclear technocrats to embody a vision of building a uniquely suited to Korea’s needs and identity. This section examines how Korean nuclear technocrats implemented technonationalist idea at the level of material construction, focusing on two key strategies pursued by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI): the “Joint design” strategy, and the adaptive development of the NSSS, led by Korean nuclear technocrats. It shows that the material realization of the Korean standard NPPs marked a turning point—one through which they began to reframe the Korean standard as a source of national pride and institutional legitimacy. This process, ultimately solidified a distinct technonationalist belief in Korean-style NPPs.
Although the Korean nuclear technocrats successfully conceptualized the Korean standard, they could not immediately enter into construction contracts due to the inherently fragmented governance structure of the contractual framework. As discussed in Section 2, while KEPCO oversaw the overall contracts for NPP construction and KHIC was nominally designated as the main contractor for equipment manufacturing, in reality, several nuclear-related institutions, established since the late 1950s, took the lead in specific sections within the broader framework. For example, in the contract structure of the Yeonggwang Units 3·4 project, architecture and engineering (A/E) responsibilities were assigned to KOPEC36, the importation of the NSSS design was managed by KAERI, and Hyundai Construction took charge of the construction phase of the project. Meanwhile, KHIC was involved only in the manufacturing aspect of the NSSS design, as well as in the production of turbine generators (T/G) and balance of plant (BOP) components (Figure 1).
This fragmented contract structure aligned with KEPCO’s intention to construct Korean standard NPPs within a short period—an essential step toward technological self-reliance by allowing the involvement of other firms with more experience than KHIC. At the 8th Industrial Policy Deliberation Council (産業政策審議會) held on September 22, 1987, the revised “Guidelines for the Rationalization of the Power Equipment Manufacturing Industry (發電設備 製造業의 産業合理化 基 準),” initially approved in July 1983, stipulated that KHIC would act as the main contractor responsible for manufacturing both the primary components—namely, the NSSS—and the secondary components, known as the BOP, ordered by KEPCO. However, although the revised guidelines officially designated KHIC as the primary contractor for both NSSS and BOP manufacturing, this structure was soon challenged in practice. Other entities, such as KAERI and Hyundai Construction, asserted their superior technical expertise and prior experience in nuclear projects, contending that KHIC alone lacked the capacity to meet the urgent construction timeline. As a result of this institutional competition, key responsibilities were redistributed: KAERI took charge of NSSS design and oversight of technology transfer, while Hyundai Construction assumed responsibility for equipment installation and on-site construction to accelerate the process.37
This fragmented structure, in which different institutions were responsible for different technical domains, necessitated multiple technology transfer agreements with foreign suppliers. KAERI, responsible for the NSSS design, utilized a “Joint design” strategy to shorten technology transfer fee and training periods. Contrary to a typical technical training agreement, in which the technology recipient undergoes a fixed training period with payment before constructing a plant, the joint design strategy skipped the training period entirely, with the technology supplier and recipient working directly together to build the plant.38 Specifically, South Korea was able to avoid paying training fees to the foreign technology supplier by shortening the training period, and to acquire various technologies needed for constructing Korean standard NPPs through the joint construction of the plants.39 KAERI had already employed this strategy during a mid-1980s Light Water Reactor development project, gaining firsthand confidence in its efficiency and applicability.
Since the Korean nuclear technocrats who had chosen the joint design strategy needed to proceed with the bidding process beginning in October 1985, their priority was to maximize their acquisition of foreign technology, as their plan was to reorganize technologies from abroad to create the “Korean standard.” They selected Combustion Engineering (CE) as the NSSS design provider from among the four options: Westinghouse and CE from the United States, Framatome from France, and AECL from Canada. The reason they chose CE was that it expressed its willingness to provide “all commercial PWR NPP technologies” to South Korea over a 10-year period starting in 1987. This included both existing technologies and new advancements developed during the contract period, particularly those related to the System 80 NSSS, the model for the Yeonggwang Units 3·4. Furthermore, this agreement encompassed approximately 4,000 technical documents, 167 types of computer code, 193 patents licenses, classroom and on-the-job training, technical advice, and free participation in R&D activities.40 This could be seen as an unfavorable contract for CE, but the company had to accept the scheme given its situation. CE had been unable to construct NPPs domestically after the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, a partial reactor meltdown that froze new plant construction in the US, and therefore increasingly reliant on securing overseas orders.
Having secured CE’s commitment to extensive technology transfer, the Korean nuclear technocrats proposed the joint design strategy to CE to learn the core technologies of the NSSS in a more practical and condensed manner. To promote cooperation between the recipient and the supplier, CE agreed to invite a small number of Korean nuclear technocrats and scientists for short-term secondments to its design center in Windsor, Connecticut, USA. These Korean trainees would return to Korea with CE enignieers to work together on the design of the Yeonggwang Units 3·4. During their stay in Windsor, each Korean scientist was expected to specialize in specific aspects of NPP design under the guidance of CE engineers, thereby developing expertise in particular technological areas.41
In the process of materializing the idea of the Korean standard envisioned by nuclear technocrats like Jung and Shin, KAERI scientists did not simply aim to replicate CE’s design as it was. Instead, their goal was to develop a truly “Korean-style” reactor—one that integrated modifications based on “design changes of existing plants, equipment manufacturing, construction, operation, and maintenance experiences, all carefully tailored to Korea’s specific conditions.”42 It was Kim Byungkoo (Kim Pyŏngku), a pivotal actor in NSSS development, who shaped the concept of “Korea’s own reactor design.” To achieve this, Kim and other nuclear scientists actively reconfigured CE’s technologies by integrating them with their own technical knowledge and operational experience accumulated from prior collaborations with other foreign vendors.
From this point on, Kim and KAERI scientists perceived these technical adjustments not as mere minor tweaks, but as active and creative transformations essential to developing a reactor “tailored to Korea’s specific conditions.” In a 1987 technical paper, Kim analyzed the design features of reactors previously constructed in South Korea and proposed an optimal reactor configuration for Yeonggwang Units 3·4. Rather than treating CE’s original System 80 design as an ideal model, Kim emphasized its limitations in the South Korean context. For instance, when it came to replacing the tube bundle, a key component inside the steam generator’s casing, CE proposed cutting off the upper shell of the steam generator and replacing only the tube bundle instead of removing the entire unit. This method was intended to simplify tube bundle replacement within the confined space of the containment building. However, Kim criticized CE’s proposal, arguing that it would take too long to replace the bundle and increase the risk of radiation exposure.43
Kim also argued that the Korean standard NPP should be developed though an appropriate hybrid model incorporating designs from other companies, pointing out the deficiencies in various components of the CE reactor. For Kim, what mattered most was to develop an NPP optimized for Korea’s specific conditions, so he occasionally recommended incorporating designs from Westinghouse, another nuclear reactor company, instead of solely relying on CE’s design. In the Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS)44—the system that maintains the volume of the primary coolant in the reactor—he recommended using both a reciprocating charging pump and a centrifugal charging pump, whereas CE’s original design primarily relied on a reciprocating charging pump alone.45 Since CE’s charging pump, a reciprocating pump designed for low flow rates, was unsuitable for South Korean conditions, he proposed using a combination of both reciprocating and centrifugal pumps.46
When the actual construction of the reactors commenced in 1989, this material implementation of the Korean standard reactor led to a fundamental shift in Korean nuclear technocrats’ and scientists’ perceptions of the Korean standard itself. In December 1990, one year after the start of the construction, KAERI published the Evaluation Report of NSSS System Design Technology Self-Reliance, which evaluated the self-reliance progress of the Yeonggwang Units 3·4 at the project completion rate of 61%. According to the report, although some deficiencies remained, Korean nuclear technocrats were generally satisfied with the overall level of technological self-reliance in system design, as certain fields had reached a level sufficient for independent design.47 In other words, Korean nuclear technocrats began to view the Korean standard reactor not as an adaptation of foreign technology, but as a tangible achievement of technological self-reliance.
By the time Yeonggwang Unit 3 was completed in 1995, Korean nuclear technocrats’ confidence in the Korean standard reactor had become consolidated, particularly regarding issues of safety. The 1995 Casebook on Design Improvements of Nuclear Power Plants(原電 設計 改善 事例集) described the Yeonggwang Units 3·4 as an “optimized design” that enhanced safety by using the latest technologies available to the nuclear industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically, the Korean nuclear technocrats judged that these reactors fulfilled all the safety evaluation criteria set by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after the TMI accident. In terms of reactor system design, these reactors—based on System 80 and supplemented by the ARKANSAS-2 design—were considered “proven-safe” because they “applied design concepts that reflected the latest regulatory trends.”48 In other words, whereas in Shin Jae in’s vision in section 3, the issue of safety rarely discussed in favor of efficient plant construction, the actual construction process involved the active application of diverse safety standards. This shift in the mindset of the Korean nuclear technocrats evolved into a stronger ideological commitment: the Korean standard NPP, including Yeonggwang Units 3·4, came to embody national identity and pride in homegrown technological capability.

[Epilogue] “A Patchwork Reactor”: Anti-Nuclear Perspectives on the Korean Standard Reactor

As construction began on Yeonggwang Units 3·4 in the late 1980s, perceptions of the Korean standard NPP began to shift within Korea’s nuclear industry. Korean nuclear technocrats sought to position the project as a cornerstone for the construction of advanced “Korean standard” NPPs. They redefined it as a symbol of technological progress while carefully obscuring the conceptual, contractual, and design flaws that had emerged during the early stages of formulating the idea of the Korean standard.49
Their efforts to craft this new definition proved successful. By the time the plant neared completion in 1995, Yeonggwang Units 3·4 were no longer viewed as flawed prototypes as they had been in the mid-1980s. Instead, they were celebrated as a flawless achievement embodying Korea’s technological self-reliance: the first “Korean standard” NPPs built with 95 percent domestic engineering capability.50 For example, in its 20-Year History of KOPEC, published in 1995, KOPEC categorized the development of nuclear power technology and project implementation into several distinct phases, as shown in Table 4.
Yeonggwang Units 3·4 were designated as the starting point of the “Stage of Building a Technological Self-Reliance Base,” which was distinguished from the earlier “Stage of Establishing a Technological Foundation” in the early 1980s. This classification reflected KOPEC’s assessment that the project signaled the beginning of South Korea’s capacity to absorb, adapt, and refine advanced nuclear design technologies from abroad, thereby laying the groundwork for domestic technological capacity. After the mid-1990s, the construction of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 became enshrined as a representative success story, widely celebrated as a symbol of Korea’s technological self-reliance in the nuclear sector.51
However, outside the nuclear industry, anti-nuclear or anti-pollution activist groups ironically embraced the earlier version of the “Korean standard”—originally proposed by nuclear technocrats before mid-1980s—to reinforce their criticism of nuclear power.52 By portraying Yeonggwang Units 3·4, the first Korean standard NPPs, as a mere “patchwork(짜깁기)” of borrowed foreign technologies, they argued that the modifications made to CE’s original design introduced key technological vulnerabilities. The term “patchwork reactor” became a catchphrase frequently invoked throughout the 1980s and 1990s to highlight the perceived risk associated with Korean NPPs.53 This line of critique gained particular visibility in 1988, when the National Assembly’s Committee on Economy and Science (國會經濟科學委員會) summoned the nuclear technocrats, including the former president of KEPCO and KHIC as well as Han Pilsun, to testify at a parliamentary audit. During the session, they were subjected to intense questioning regarding the decision to reduce the power capacity of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 and the potential safety implications of that decision.54
In short, on the one side, nuclear technocrats viewed their modifications to the original design, such as reducing the reactor’s capacity, as a pragmatic and resourceful strategy to adapt the technology to Korea’s specific energy demands and limited domestic resources. By the 1990s, they had successfully rebranded the reactor as a milestone in Korea’s pursuit of technological self-reliance. One the other side, however, outside the nuclear industry, this reactor continued to face criticism. Activists and critics dismissed it as a flawed version of the “Korean standard,” branding it as unreliable due to perceived compromises that deviated from ideal international norms.

Notes

1  In this paper, terms such as “Korean standard,” “Korean nuclear technocrats,” and “Korean nuclear scientists,” refer to those in South Korea, unless otherwise specified. The distinction between North and South will be made only when necessary; This paper follows the McCune-Reischauer romanization system, but widely used spellings are adopted for certain personal names.

2  Ŭngkŭn No, “｢Han’guk’yŏng wŏnjaro｣ shidae kaemak [Dawn of the ‘Korean Reactor’ era],” Kyŏnghyangshinmun, September 11, 1994, 7; Ŭit’ae Kim, “Yŏnggwangwŏnjŏn 3hogi shiunjŏn 1chuiltchae chŏngsang hwan’gyŏng yŏnghyang tŭng ‘sŏnggongjŏk’ [Yeonggwang Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3, Successful Operation on the First Week with Normal Environmental Impact, etc.],” Kyŏnghyangshinmun, September 22, 1994, 13.

3  Yŏngch’an Na, “[T’anhaek ik’onomi] ‘24cho’ t’imk’oria ch’ek’o wŏnjŏn, ‘t’anhaekkwa pyŏlgaero anjŏngjŏk ch’ujin’[[Impeachment Economy] ‘24 trillion’, Team Korea Czech Nuclear Power Plant, ‘Stable Progress Regardless of Impeachment’],” Bloter, December 15, 2024; Chaeho Lee, “Ch’ek’o ‘han’gukkwa wŏnjŏn’gyeyak chiyŏn ŏpsŭl kŏt’ [Czech: ‘No Delay in Nuclear Power Contract with Korea’],” Naeilshinmun, December 12, 2024; Chuwŏn Lee, “Han’guksuryŏgwŏnjaryŏk, Ch’ek’o tuk’obani wŏnjŏn such’ul…24chowŏn kyumo [Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd, Export Nuclear Power Plant to Czech Dukovany about KRW 24 trillion],” Sŏul Public News, November 21, 2024.

4  “Nuclear technocrats” refers to experts with scientific or engineering training who initially worked in technical roles but gradually assumed leadership in project management and nuclear policy planning in South Korea.

5  Hyungsub Choi, “Emerging Opportunities: Nanoelectronics and Engineering Research in a South Korean University,” History and Technology 30, no. 4 (2014); Jaeyoon Im, “Kisultoip, kungnae R&D kŭrigo kisul kuksanhwa: sŏn’gyŏnghwahang p’olliesŭt’ŏ p’illŭm chejogisulgwa kŭ pohorŭl tullŏssan nonjaeng punsŏk, 1976–1978 [Technology Importation, R&D, and ‘Domesticizing’ a Technology: The Debate over Whether Sungkyung’s Polyester Film Technology Should Be Protected, 1976–1978]” (master’s thesis, Seoul National University, 2016); Yeseul Park, “Kuksanhwaŭi kisulchŏngch’i: han’guk chunggyŏngsuro haengnyŏllyo kuksanhwa saŏbŭi chŏn’gae, 1976–1989 [Techno-nationalism and the Nuclear Fuel Development Project in South Korea, 1976–1989]” (master’s thesis, Seoul National University, 2021); Hyungsub Choi, “Hanil kisul kyoryuwa kuksanhwa kaenyŏmŭi pyŏnhwa [The Shifting Notion of Kuksanhwa and the Technological Exchange between South Korea and Japan],” Ilbonbip’yŏng no. 24 (2021); Sangwoon Yoo, “Pandoch’e yŏkkonghagŭi kisulsa: TV ŭmhyang chipchŏk’oeroŭi kaebal, 1977–1978 [A History of Semiconductor Reverse Engineering: Development of TV Sound Integrated Circuits, 1977–1978],” Kwahakkisurhakyŏn’gu 22, no. 3 (2022).

6  Abou B. Bamba, “Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France, and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast,” Journal of Modern European History 8, no. 1 (2010); Chihyung Jeon, “A Road to Modernization and Unification: The Construction of the Gyeongbu Highway in South Korea,” Technology and Culture 51, no. 1 (2010); Hiromi Mizuno, Aaron S. Moore and John DiMoia, eds., Engineering Asia: Technology, Colonial Development and the Cold War Order (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018); Daniel Pérez-Zapico, “Electrical Futures for a Regenerated Spain: Electricity, Engineering and National Reconstruction after the 1898 ‘Disaster’,” History and Technology 39, no. 1 (2023); Jihye Yang, “Sup’ungdaemŭl t’onghae pon puk’an sanŏpshisŏrŭi pojon, p’agoe, yŏksa [Assessing the Preservation, Development, and Remembrance of North Korean Industrial Facilities Through the Iconic Sup’ung Dam],” Yŏksabip’yŏng no. 143 (2023).

7  The following studies can offer the history of nuclear power regime in South Korea. Deokhwa Hong, Han’guk wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏn sahoegisulch’eje: kisul, chedo, sahoeundongŭi kongdonggusŏng [The Sociotechnical Regime of Nuclear Power Development in Korea: The Co-production of Technology, Institutes, and Social Movements] (Hanurak’ademi, 2019); Doekhwa Hong, “Palchŏn’gukkawa wŏnjŏnsanŏbŭi hyŏngsŏng: Han’gukchŏllyŏkkongsa chungshimŭi wŏnjŏnsanŏpku-jo hyŏngsŏng kwajŏngŭl chungshimŭro [Shaping Civil Nuclear Industry in Korea: Focusing on the Bureaucratic Politics in Developmental State],” Konggan’gwa sahoe 26, no. 1 (2016); Seongjun Kim, “Han’guk wŏnjaryŏk kisul ch’eje hyŏngsŏnggwa pyŏnhwa, 1953–1980 [Formation and Changes in the Technological Regimes of the Nuclear Program in South Korea, 1953–1980]” (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2012); Sunsil Oh, “Han’guk hyŏndae chŏllyŏkch’egyeŭi hyŏngsŏnggwa hwaksan, 1945–1980 [Construction of Electric Power System in South Korea, 1945–1980]” (PhD diss., Seoul National University, 2017); Yeseul Park, “Kuksanhwaŭi kisulchŏngch’i”; Sunjin Yun and Eunjeong Oh, “Han’guk wŏnjaryŏk palchŏnjŏngch’aegŭi sahoejŏk kusŏng: wŏnjaryŏkkisurŭi toip ch’ogi(1954–1963nyŏn)rŭl chungshimŭro [A Study on the Social Construction of the Nuclear Power Generation Policy in Korea: Focused on the Introduction Processes of Nuclear Technology],” Hwan’gyŏngjŏngch’aek 14, no. 1 (2006).

8  Sonja D. Schmid, “From ‘Inherently Safe’ to ‘Proliferation Resistant’: New Perspectives on Reactor Designs,” Nuclear Technology 207, no. 9 (2021); Sonja D. Schmid, “Of Plans and Plants: How Nuclear Power Gained a Foothold in Soviet Energy Policy,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (2018); Sonja D. Schmid, “Organizational culture and professional identities in the Soviet nuclear power industry,” Osiris 23, no. 1 (2008). In addition, the history of nuclear technology development in non-Western countries can be found in the following studies. Sonja D. Schmid, “Nuclear Colonization?: Soviet Technopolitics in the Second World,” in Entangled Geographies, ed. Gabrielle Hecht (The MIT Press, 2011); Sonja D. Schmid, Producing power: The pre-Chernobyl history of the Soviet nuclear industry (MIT Press, 2015); Carlo Patti, “The Origins of the Brazilian Nuclear Programme, 1951–1955,” Cold War History 15, no. 3 (2014); Carlo Patti, Brazil in the global nuclear order, 1945–2018 (JHU Press, 2021); Robin E. Möser, “‘A Fly in the Ointment’: Apartheid South Africa’s Transnational Nuclear Network during the Cold War, 1953–1976,” Cold War History 25, no. 1 (2024); Robin E. Möser, Disarming Apartheid: The End of South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme and Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968–1991 (Cambridge University Press, 2024).

9  Chonghun Lee, Sarainnŭn chŏllyŏksa [Living History of Electricity II] (Han’gukchŏllyŏkkongsa, 1988), 120–121; Kyŏngho Hwang, “Wŏnjaryŏkkisurŭi charippangan [Independence Plan for Nuclear Technology],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 6, no. 4 (1986): 4.

10  Kwahak Kisulch’ŏ Wŏnjaryŏk-kuk Wŏnjaryŏk Chŏngch’aek-kwa, “Chuyo Saŏp Kyehoek (Che 4-ch’a O-kaenyŏn Kyehoek ŭl Chungsim ŭro: Wŏnjaryŏk Sanŏp ŭi Kuksanhwa) [Key Business Plans (Focusing on the 4th Five-Year Plan: Localization of the Nuclear Industry],” Wŏnjaryŏkwiwŏnhoe(2) Ch’ŏl (1976), Management Number of National Archives of Korea: BA0242853.

11  Sunsil Oh, “Hyŏpsang t’eibŭl wie noin kaebal kyehoeksŏ: che2ch’a chŏnwŏn(電 源) kaebal kyehoek surip kwajŏngŭl chungshimŭro [Coordinating a Rational Power System for South Korea],” Han’gukkwahaksahak’oeji 40, no. 3 (2018): 400–401; Seongjun Kim, “Han’guk wŏnjaryŏk kisul ch’eje hyŏngsŏnggwa pyŏnhwa, 1953–1980”, 172–180.

12  Daniel Yergin, The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (Simon & Schuster, 1991); Timothy Michell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (Verso, 2011).

13  Hyung-A Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–1979 (RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Sungsoo Song, Han’gugŭi sanŏp’yŏngmyŏnggwa kisulpalchŏn [Industrialization and Technological Development in South Korea] (Tŭllyŏk, 2021), 99–120; Peter Banseok Kwon, Cornerstone of the Nation: The Defense Industry and the Building of Modern Korea under Park Chung Hee (Harvard University Press, 2024), 83–91.

14  Tongnyŏkchawŏnbu, Tongnyŏkchawŏnhaengjŏng 10nyŏnsa [The 10-Year History of Energy Resources Administration] (Tongnyŏkchawŏnbu, 1988), 9–33. The argument that South Korea, lacking indigenous energy resources, needed to diversify its energy portfolio and pursue nuclear power development in the wake of the oil shocks can be readily found in publications by nuclear technocrats in the 1980s. A few representative examples include the following: “Wŏnjaryŏksaŏp onŭlgwa naeil-han’gugŭi wŏnjŏn ŏdikkaji wanna [Today and Tomorrow of the Nuclear Power Industry: How Far Has Korea’s Nuclear Power Advanced?],” Taehanjŏn’gihyŏp’oeji 10 (1986): 98–100; Sejong Kim, “Changgijŏnwŏn’gaepalchŏngch’aek [Long-Term Electric Power Development Policy],” Chŏn’giŭisegye 32, no. 12 (1983): 6–11; Ryung Park, “Han’guk wŏnjŏn p’yojunhwa kibonbanghyang [Basic Guidelines for the Standardization of Korean Nuclear Power Plants],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 5, no. 12 (1985): 12.

15  The self-defense strategy of the Park’s administration was triggered by the Nixon Doctrine, announced by US President Richard Nixon in 1969. Nixon aimed to reduce military involvement in Asian allied countries and planned the withdrawal of US forces from the Asia-Pacific region, including South Korea. In the context of the ongoing confrontation with North Korea, Park Chung-hee perceived the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea as a serious security crisis and began to advocate for the self-defense strategy as a response to the US pullout. Junkab Chang, “Niksŭn haengjŏngbuŭi ashia tet’angt’ŭwa hanmigwan’gye [Nixon Administration’s Asia Détente and Korean-American Relations],” Yŏksawa kyŏnggye (2009); Insook Park, “‘Chŏnhwan”gwa ‘yŏnsok’: Niksŭn (Richard Nixon) haengjŏngbu ‘tet’angt’ŭ’ chŏngch’aegŭi sŏnggyŏk [‘Change’ and ‘Continuity’: The U.S. ‘Détente’ Policy during the Nixon Administration],” Miguk’aknonjip 38, no. 3 (2006); Seukryule Hong, “Niksŭntokt’ŭrin’gwa pakchŏnghŭi yushin ch’eje [The Nixon Doctrine and the Park Chung-hee Yushin Regime],” Naeirŭl yŏnŭn yŏksa 26 (2006); Sehyeon Sim, “1970nyŏndae chajugukpangdamnon’gwa chŏngch’aege kwanhan yŏn’gu [Study on the Self-Reliant National Defense Discourses and Policies in 1970s],” Chŏllyakyŏn’gu 24, no. 3 (2017); Han’gukkisulgyŏngyŏngyŏn’guwŏn, 70~90nyŏndae chuyo kwahakkisulchŏngch’aegi kwahakkisulpalchŏn’gwa sanŏppalchŏne kiyŏhan sŏnggwajosa punsŏk [An Analysis of the Contributions of Major Science and Technology Policies from the 1970s to the 1990s to Scientific and Industrial Development] (Kwahakkisulbu, 2007), 5; Han’gukwŏnjaryŏkyŏn’guso, Han’gugwŏnjaryŏkyŏn’guso 30nyŏnsa [The 30-Year History of Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute] (Han’gukwŏnjaryŏkyŏn’guso, 1990), 171–172.

16  South Korea suspended negotiations for a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in early 1976 and officially halted its nuclear weapons development program in December of the same year. Central Intelligence Agency, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking (Central Intelligence Agency, 1978); “In, chihahaekshirhŏm sŏnggong [India Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear Test],” Tong’aIlbo, May 21, 1974, 1; Henry Kissinger, “Han’gukŭi haengmugiwa misail kaebal kyehoek [South Korea’s Plan to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles],” in Haeoesujipkirongmul pŏnyŏkchip II: miguk p’odŭ taet’ongnyŏng tosŏgwan sojang kirongmul, 1970nyŏndae hanmigwan’gye(ha), ed. Kukkagirogwŏn (Kukkagirogwŏn, 2006), 66.

17  It included Hyundai Yanghaeng (現代洋行), Daewoo Heavy Industries (大宇重工 業), Hyundai Heavy Industries (現代重工業), and Samsung Heavy Industries (三 星重工業). This fragmented structure stood in contrast to other sectors of the Korean nuclear industry—such as power supply and nuclear R&D, which were firmly embedded within a state-led framework, managed respectively KEPCO and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI).

18  Han’gukchunggongŏpchushik’oesa, Hanjungbalchŏnsa [History of Korean Heavy Industries & Construction] (Han’gukchunggongŏpchushik’oesa, 1995), 241–243; “Balchŏn·chech’ŏl sŏlbi pumunesŏn Hyŏndaeyanghaengi tokchŏmgisero… [Hyundai Yanghaeng Dominates in Power and Steel Plant Equipment Sector…],” Tong’aIlbo, July 16, 1977, 3; “Palchŏnp’ŭllaent’ŭ samwŏnhwa ch’ejero yuksŏng [Development of a Trilateral System for Power Plants],” Maeilgyŏngje, June 10, 1978, 7; “Han hae 20ŏkpultchari kongsa pulppumnŭn kukchesujujŏn wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏn 7,8hogie 6kuk 11kaesa megŏt’on’gŭp kakch’uk [International Bidding War for $2 Billion Projects: Six Countries and Eleven Companies Compete for Megaton-Grade Nuclear Power Units 7 and 8],” Kyŏnghyangshinmun, September 29, 1978, 3; “Hyŏndaeyanghaeng Ch’angwŏn’gigyegongjang 11wŏl ch’akkong kungnae ch’oedaegyumo [Hyundai Yanghaeng to Break Ground on Changwon Machinery Factory in November, the Largest in the Country],” Chosŏnilbo, October 7, 1976, 3; Younggoo Park, “Han’gukkwa IBRD: 1970nyŏndae hyŏndaeyanghaeng sat’aewa chŏngch’aeksajŏk ŭimi [Korea and IBRD: Case of ‘Hyundai International Incorporated’ in the 1970s and Its Policy Historical Implications],” Chiyŏkkwasegye 39, no. 1 (2015): 103.

19  The new military government, which seized political power in a military coup on 12 December 1979, declared nationwide martial law and planned the establishment of the Special Committee for National Security Measures to suppress the democratic protests in May 1980. On May 27, this committee, with Chun Doo-hwan as the executive chairman, was officially established, as an advisory body to the president. However, it performed the role of a “super-constitutional body (9),” going beyond its intended advisory function. Soonyang Kim, “Chŏngch’ijŏk kyŏkpyŏn’giŭi kwadojŏngbugiguŭi kusŏnggwa hwaltonge taehan yŏn’gu: Kukkabowibisangdaech’aegwiwŏnhoewa kukkabowiippŏp’oeŭirŭl chungshimŭro [An Analysis of the Composition and Activities of Interim Government Institutions: With Reference to the Emergency Committee for National Protection and the Legislation Council for National Protection],” Han’guksahoewa haengjŏngyŏn’gu 33, no. 1 (2022).

20  The withdrawal of major private companies from the power equipment sector and the establishment of KHIC marked the beginning of South Korea’s standardization initiative, as discussed in the following study. Deokhwa Hong, Han’guk wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏn sahoegisulch’eje: kisul, chedo, sahoeundongŭi kongdonggusŏng, 139–150.

21  At first, in September 1980, the Chun administration considered a plan where Daewoo Heavy Industries took the lead of KHIC. However, due to Daewoo’s excessive demands, such as priority in government projects and the issuance of six NPP orders within the year, the government dismissed Daewoo’s management and incorporated KHIC as a public enterprise under KEPCO. Han’gukchunggongŏpchushik’oesa, Hanjungbalchŏnsa, 272–273.

22  Tongnyŏkchawŏnbu, “Wŏnjaryŏk palchŏn’gisul charipkyehoek [Plan of Nuclear Power Technology Independence],” Kisulcharip’wabangan (1984), 58, 65, Management Number of National Archives of Korea: BA0242879.

23  Dongwon Kim and Stuart W. Leslie, “Winning Markets or Winning Nobel Prizes? KAIST and the Challenge of Late Industrialization,” Osiris 13 (1998).

24 

Table 1
Four Types of American Standard
Reference System After an approval of a safety analysis report (SAR) for the parts of NPPs, NPP equipment suppliers would not need to undergo reevaluation during the construction and operation permit applications.
Duplication This is the practice of continuing to build NPPs at more than one site with the same design.
License to Manufacture This type is applied when constructing a floating nuclear power plant, which obtain a license for the design regardless of the site and then move the plant to an offshore site. Off-Shore Power System, a subsidiary of Westinghouse, uses this method.
Replication This involves using an NPP design that has already been approved as a foundation, improving the design to meet site characteristics or updated licensing standards, and then constructing the plant.

“APPENDIX F: Discussion of the Concepts of Site Designation and Plant Standardization,” Nuclear powerplant siting and licensing: hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, Ninety-third Congress, second session on H.R. 11957, H.R. 12823, H.R. 13484, and S. 3179: 396–406 (https://exhibits.stanford.edu/atomic-energy/catalog/zv121gn7107); Leonard M. Trosten, David M. Moore, “Nuclear Power Plant Standardization: Promises and Pitfalls,” William & Mary Law Review 15 (1974): 529–531; Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Powerplant Standardization: Light Water Reactors (1981), NTIS order#PB81–213589: 32–39.

25  John L. Campbell, Collapse of an Industry: Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy (Cornell University Press, 1988).

26  The NPP system could be divided into two part: the primary parts, such as the NSSS and Turbine Generators (T/G)—both responsible for power generation— and the auxiliary part, called Balance of Plants (BOP).

27  Geunmo Jeong, “Wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏnsoŭi sŏlgye p’yojunhwa-han’gukchŏllyŏkkisul( chu)ŭi saŏbŭl chungshimŭro [Standard of Nuclear Power Plant Design- Focusing on the Project of the Korea Power Engineering Company],” Chŏn’gihak’oeji 32, no. 8 (1983): 472.

28  Geunmo Jeong, P’yojunwŏnjaryŏkpalchŏnso sŏlgyee kwanhan yŏn’gu [Design Studies on the Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants] (Han’gukchŏllyŏkkisulchushik’oesabusŏl sŏnjinjŏllyŏkkisuryŏn’gugaebalsent’a, 1985), 20.

29  Geunmo Jeong, “Wŏnjaryŏkpalchŏnsoŭi sŏlgye p’yojunhwa-han’gukchŏllyŏkkisul( chu)ŭi saŏbŭl chungshimŭro,” 470–473.

30  Hŭibeom Park, “Wŏnjaryŏk hak’oejange shinjaein paksa tangsŏn [Dr. Shin Jae-in Elected President of the Korean Nuclear Society],” Chŏnjashinmun, August 24, 2001; Jaein Shin, “Puk’ani Uranium ŭl iyonghae Haekp’okt’an ŭl mandŭl kanŭngsŏng hŭibak... kyŏlguk p’ŭllut’onyum chaech’ŏriro hoegwihal kŏt [It is unlikely that North Korea will produce a nuclear bomb using uranium... Ultimately, they are expected to return to plutonium reprocessing],” Wŏlganchosŏn (2003); Han’gukkisulgyŏngyŏngyŏn’guwŏn, 70~90nyŏndae chuyo kwahakkisulchŏngch’aegi kwahakkisulbalchŏn’gwa sanŏppalchŏne kiyŏhan sŏnggwajosa punsŏk, 32.

31  Jaein Shin, “Wŏnjŏnp’yojunhwasaŏbŭi hyŏnhwanggwa chŏnmang: sŏlgye p’yojunhwarŭl chungshimŭro [Current Status and Prospects of the Standard Project of Nuclear Power Plant-Focusing on Standard Approach of Plant Design],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 5, no. 4 (1985): 15–16.

32  Jaein Shin, “Wŏnjŏnp’yojunhwasaŏbŭi hyŏnhwanggwa chŏnmang: sŏlgye p’yojunhwarŭl chungshimŭro,” 16.

33  Jaein Shin, “Sŏlgye·shigong p’yojunhwarŭl t’onghan wŏnjaryŏk palchŏn tan’ga chŏlgam [Cost Reduction of Nuclear Power Generation through Design and Construction Standardization],” Wŏnjaryŏk’hakhoeji 17, no. 4 (1985): 342.

34  Jaein Shin, “Han’guk’yŏng wŏnjŏn p’yojunhwa saŏbŭi hyŏnhwanggwa chŏnmang [Current Status and Prospects of the Standard Project of the Korean NPP],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 4, no. 3 (1984): 15–17.

35  Tongnyŏkchawŏnbu, “Wŏnjaryŏk palchŏn’gisul charipkyehoek,” 65.

36  KOPEC initially established in 1975 as a joint venture with Burns and Roe and converted into an independent domestic company in 1976.

37  Han'gukchunggongŏpchushik'oesa, Hanjungbalchŏnsa, 367–368, 406–410.

38  Pilsun Han, Maensonŭi kwahakcha Han Pilsun [Han Pilsun: The Barefoot Scientist] (Pittabuksŭ, 2016), 165–171.

39  J.H. Ahn, K.I. Han, “Korean experience in self-reliance for nuclear power technology (a case study in the Republic of Korea),” in Nuclear power in developing countries: Its potential role and strategies for its deployment. Proceedings (IAEA, 2000), last accessed June 5, 2025, https://inis.iaea.org/records/2qk6t-j6170.

40  Giin Han, Wŏnjaro kyet'ong sŏlgyesaŏbunyŏng chonghappogosŏ (yŏnggwang 3,4hogi mit yŏnggwang 5,6hogi) [Comprehensive Report on the Operation of the Reactor System Design Project (Yeonggwang Units 3 & 4 and Yeonggwang Units 5 & 6)] (Han'gukwŏnjaryŏkyŏn'guso, 1993), 1–10, 1–17, Management Number of KAERI: KAERI-MR-223-93.

41  Since the initial secondment to Windsor in December 1986, which included 37 engineers in the NSSS part, 11 in the fuel part, and 5 KEPCO officials, KEPCO continued to send additional personnel on an irregular basis until the opening of the design center in Daejeon in April 1989. Han'gukkisulgyŏngyŏngyŏn'guwŏn, 70~90nyŏndae chuyo kwahakkisulchŏngch'aegi kwahakkisulbalchŏn'gwa sanŏppalchŏne kiyŏhan sŏnggwajosa punsŏk, 63–64.

42  Byungkoo Kim, “Kaapkyŏngsuro NSSS sŏlgye mit wŏnjŏn p'yojunhwa [NSSS Design of Pressurized Water Reactor and Standard Approach of Nuclear Power Plant],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 7, no. 3 (1987): 35.

43  Byungkoo Kim, “Kaapkyŏngsuro NSSS sŏlgye mit wŏnjŏn p'yojunhwa,” 28.

44  The Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS)—the parts that maintain the volume of the primary coolant in the reactor—were the charging pump, which added or removed coolant from the primary coolant system, and the drain system, which extracted coolant from the primary system, adjusted its volume, and then purified and adjusted its chemical composition.

45  Byungkoo Kim, “Kaapkyŏngsuro NSSS sŏlgye mit wŏnjŏn p'yojunhwa,” 29, 36–38.

46  The charging pump, a component of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) that regulates the chemical properties and volume of the reactor coolant system, comes in two types: reciprocating pumps and centrifugal pumps. Reciprocating pumps are used in low-flow, high-pressure conditions, while centrifugal pumps are employed in medium-to low-pressure operations or situations requiring high flow rates and the transport of large volumes of fluid.

47  Yŏnggwang 3·4hogi saŏppu, Wŏnjarogyet'ongsŏlgye kisulcharip 1ch'a p'yŏnggabogosŏ (yoyak) [Evaluation Report of NSSS System Design Technology Self-Reliance (Summary)] (Han'gugwŏnjaryŏkyŏn'guso, 1990), 63–78.

48  Han'gukchŏllyŏkkongsa, Sŏlgyekaesŏn saryejip [Casebook on Design Improvements of Nuclear Power Plants] (Han'gukchŏllyŏkkongsa, 1995), 1–13.

49  Suk Hŏ, “Wŏnjŏnkisulcharip ch'ujinhyŏnhwang mit kwaje [Current Status and Challenges in Promoting Nuclear Power Technology Independence],” Wŏnjaryŏksanŏp 9, no. 8 (1989): 16–20; Tongnyŏkchawŏnbu, “Wŏnjaryŏk palchŏnkisul charipkyehoek,” 67.

50  “Yŏnggwang wŏnjŏn 3·4hogi Jun’gong ŭimi kisul charip 95% wŏnjŏn such'ulguk ‘toyak’ [Significance of the Completion of Yeonggwang Nuclear Units 3 and 4: 95% Technological Independence and ‘Leap Forward’ for Nuclear Power Exporting Country],” Maeilgyŏngje, October 21, 1996, 3; Ŭngkŭn No, “｢Han'guk'yŏng wŏnjaro｣ shidae kaemak [Dawn of the ‘Korean Reactor’ era].”

51  Han'gukchŏllyŏkkisul, Segye sokŭi miraerŭl sŏlgyehamyŏ: Han'gukchŏllyŏkkisul( ju) 20nyŏnsa: 1975–1995 [Designing the Future in the World: 20-Year History of Korea Power Engineering Company, Inc.: 1975–1995] (Han'gukchŏllyŏkkisul, 1995), 263.

52  In Korea, Anti-nuclear or anti-pollution activist groups had been sporadically active until the mid-1980s, with failure to create a common anti-nuclear agenda. It was not until September 1988, with the establishment of the Pollution Elimination Movement Union (PEMU), a nationwide coalition organization—combining student-led anti-pollution movement groups and women's environmental activist groups—that an organized anti-nuclear movement became possible. Influenced by one of the democratization movements in Korea, characterized by its anti-imperialism and focus on the reunification of Korea, the PEMU viewed opposition to nuclear power as a means to achieve liberation from and “the independent reunification of the homeland and the realization of democracy,” while escaping from US imperialism. For this goal, it sought to expand its alliances for the anti-nuclear movement. The construction of Yeonggwang Units 3·4 was a prime target for the PEMU, seeking to unite and rally sporadic anti-nuclear activities. Dongho Shin, Chayŏnŭi ch'in'gudŭl1: hwan'gyŏng undong 25nyŏnsa [Friends of Nature 1: A 25-Year History of the Environmental Movement] (Toyosae, 2007); Sangrok Lee, “Breaking the Myth of Nuclear Power Omnipotence in the Cold War era: Discourse on Nuclear Power and the Movement against the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants in South Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s,” International Journal of Korean History 28, no. 2: 133–179; Konghaech'ubangundongyŏnhap, “Ch'angnipsŏnŏnmun [Founding Statement]” September 10, 1988, last accessed June 5, 2025, https://ecoarchive.org/items/show/34068; Han'gukkonghaemunjeyŏn'guso, Nae t'ang'i chugŏkanda: Konghaemunjeŭi in'sik [My Land is Dying: Awareness of Pollution Issues] (Irwŏlsŏgak, 1983); Han'gukkonghaemunjeyŏn'guso, “Wŏnjaryŏk palchŏnso kŏnsŏrŭl chungdan hara [Stop Building Nuclear Power Plants],” Konghaeyŏn'gu 4 (1984): 1.

53  “Ap'ŭro modŭn charyo konggae...chosa chiwŏnhagetta [All Materials Will Be Released…We Will Support the Investigation],” Iryoshinmun, September 4, 1988; Yŏl Ch'oe, “Yŏidoe haekpalchŏnsorŭl seundamyŏn… [If a Nuclear Power Plant Were Built in Yeouido…],” Han'gyŏrye, April 7, 1989, 7. The term “patchwork reactors” used to describe Yeonggwang Units 3·4 can also be found in writings by other members of Pollution Elimination Movement Union. Sŏnmin Pang, “‘Noeŏmnŭn t'aea’ podo ch'unggyŏk haekpalchŏnso kŏnsŏl kŏmt'orŭl [Shocks of ‘Brainless Fetus’ Report, Need to Consider Nuclear Power Plant Construction],” Han'gyŏrye, August, 9, 1989, 6; Sangkyu Hwang, “Haekkwallyŏn chŏngborŭl modu konggaehara yŏronjojakŭro kungmin sogiryŏ haesŏn andwae [All Nuclear-Related Information Must Be Disclosed. Do not Deceive the People by Manipulating Public Opinion],” Han'gyŏrye, April, 21, 1989, 6.

54  Yongsu Lee, “Wŏnjŏn 11·12hogi toip ŭihok chipchung ch'ugung kwahakkisulch'ŏ kukkam [Intense Scrutiny of the Ministry of Science Technology Regarding the Introduction of Nuclear Units 11·12 at the National Assembly Audit],” Tong'aIlbo, October 20, 1988, 12; Hong Kim, “Wŏnjŏn 11·12hogi kwayŏn anjŏnhan'ga [Are Nuclear Units 11 and 12 Truly Safe?],” Chosŏnilbo, October 2 1, 1 988, 8.

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Figure 1
Contract Structure of Yeonggwang Units 3·4.
Source: Deokhwan An, CEhyŏng kyŏngsuroŭi ch'oginoshimsŏlgyerŭl wihan saŏpkwalli kisulkŏmt'opogosŏ [A report on the project management for initial core design of the CE type LWR] (Han'gukwŏnjaryŏkyŏn'guso, 1993), 17. Partially revised by the author for English spelling.
ijkh-30-1-193f1.jpg
Table 2
Shin’s ideas of the standards in different countries.
Country Types - Capacities Method Purpose
France 900MWe, 1300MWe – PWR Phased duplication Develop own model, explore overseas markets, and shorten construction time
Germany 1300MWe – PWR Improvement of the reference power plant Development own model, explore overseas markets, shorten construction time, accelerate licensing and permitting
Italy/UK 1000MWe – PWR (Italy)
1300MWe – PWR (UK)		 Copy by reference plant design (Technology transfer of W NSSS) Increase affordability, shorten construction time, Increased safety and reliability
US 1300MWe – PWR, BWR Reference system, duplication, license to manufacture, and replication Accelerate licensing and permitting
Korea 900MWe – PWR Copy by reference plant design Increase affordability, accelerate self-reliance

Source: Jaein Shin, “Wŏnjŏnp’yojunhwasaŏbŭi hyŏnhwanggwa chŏnmang: sŏlgye p’yojunhwarŭl chungshimŭro,” 16. Partially revised by the author.

Table 3
Shin’s division of four types of standards.
Type Background of Standardization Purpose of Standardization Countries
A (Advanced, 先進型) Ownership of domestically developed key equipment (NSSS, T/G); Possession of advanced technologies; Vast domestic market (Excluding the UK); Active expansion into international markets. Prevention of licensing delays (Reference System, Duplication, License to Manufacture, and Replication); Reduction of construction timelines; Expansion into international markets United States, Canada, West Germany, (United Kingdom, France)
B (Development, 開發型) Utilization of NSSS developed in other countries; Complete technological self-reliance or possession of advanced technologies; Vast domestic market (excluding Japan); Active expansion into international markets Development of domestic models; Improvement of safety and reliability; Reduction of construction costs; Expansion into international markets France, Japan, United Kingdom (PWR)
C (Improved, 改良型) Utilization of key equipment developed in other countries; Full or partial technological self-reliance; Limited domestic market; Active expansion into international markets Improvement of cost-effectiveness; Advanced technological self-reliance and simplification of regulatory requirements; Expansion into international markets Sweden, Belgium
D (Technological self-reliance, 技術自立型) Purchase of key equipment developed in other countries; Partial technological self-reliance; Limited domestic market; Export-oriented nuclear policy Improvement of cost-effectiveness; Enhancement of technological self-reliance and domestic production rates; Expansion into international markets Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Taiwan

Source: Jaein Shin, “Han’guk’yŏng wŏnjŏn p’yojunhwa saŏbŭi hyŏnhwanggwa chŏnmang,” 15.

Table 4
Four Stages of the Development of Nuclear Power Technology and Implementation Mode. Source: Han'gukchŏllyŏkkisul, Segye sokŭi miraerŭl sŏlgyehamyŏ: Han'gukchŏllyŏkkisul(ju) 20nyŏnsa: 1975–1995, 263.
Stage Period Key Projects Technological Stage Implementation Mode
Formative Stage 1970s Kori Units 1·2 Introduction to Basic Technologies; Understanding of NPP Design Concepts Foreign-Led Turnkey Contract
Stage of Establishing a Technological Foundation the early 1980s Kori Units 3·4; Yeonggwang Units 1·2; Uljin Units 1·2 Acquisition of Design Technologies; Analysis and Review of Advanced Technologies; Leading Roles in Large-Scale NPP Design Projects Foreign-Led Split Procurement
Stage of Building a Technological Self-Reliance Base the late 1980s ~ the early 1990s Yeonggwang Units 3·4; Uljin Units 3·4 Adoption, Assimilation, and Improvement of Advanced Design Technologies; Establishment of Technological Self-Reliance Base Domestic-Led Split Procurement
Stage of Self-Reliance From the mid-1990s Yeonggwang Units 5·6; Uljin Units 5·6 Establishment of Independent Design Competence; Design Standardization; Enhancement of Economic Efficiency Domestic-Led Split Procurement
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