Introduction
Pukhansan, with its steep and rugged terrain, has long served as a natural fortress. Under the Chosŏn dynasty, its military value increased further due to its proximity to Hanyang, the capital. As a centralized monarchy, Chosŏn placed the highest priority on protecting the capital, where the royal court resided. From the eighteenth century onward, as Hanyang’s population and logistical functions expanded, capital defense became even more critical. Accordingly, the state reinforced its outer defense perimeter—most notably through the development of Pukhansansŏng.
Amid recurring invasions from the late sixteenth century, the Chosŏn court began preparing the Pukhansan and T’angchundae region as a designated sanctuary(pojangchŏ, 保障處) for the royal family, officials, and civilians. In the early eighteenth century, fortifications such as Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundaesŏng were constructed, while grain and firearms were stockpiled, and troop mobilization systems under the Samgunmun, Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, and Kwansŏngso were revised.
The 1728 Musin-ran Rebellion marked a turning point. Although rebels failed to approach the capital or Pukhansansŏng, the conspiracy of Yi Sasŏng, commander of the P’yŏngan Provincial Army, alarmed the court. King Yŏngjo responded by prioritizing capital defense and mobilizing multiple commands. Emergency protocols were enacted in the Pukhansansŏng area, which, though it saw no direct combat, played a key role in stabilizing the capital and disrupting rebel coordination.
This experience revealed both the strengths and limitations of the existing defense system. In response, the court reorganized Pukhansansŏng, not as a designated sanctuary, but as a key base for outer defense. In the late 18th century, large-scale military reorganization were carried out, reinforcing the Pukhansan region as a vital defensive perimeter.
Previous studies on the Musin-ran have focused largely on southern campaigns.1 Research on Pukhansansŏng’s transformation has clarified its evolving role but has not fully explored the Musin Rebellion’s formative impact.2
This study reexamines the northern defense zone’s reorganization by positioning the Musin-ran as a catalyst. Primary sources such as the Chosŏnwangjosillok, Sŭngjŏngwŏnilgi, Kamrannok, and Ch’uankŭpkugan were utilized. Through these materials, details of the defense operations during the Musin-ran and the subsequent reorganization of the defense system at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae could be examined.
Chapter 1 anaylzes the development of Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae as emergency sanctuaries. Chapter 2 investigates the defense system’s actual performance during the Musin-ran. Chapter 3 reviews the post-rebellion reorganization and the strategic redefinition of these fortresses, highlighting their transformation into integral components of the capital’s outer defense.
The Formation of the Pukhansansŏng Defense System Prior to the Musin-ran
After relocating its capital to Hanyang in the late 14th century, Chosŏn established city walls, organized a rotational central army (Pŏnsangbyŏng), and built external granaries linked to the Choŭnje system3 While these measures created a basic security framework, vulnerabilities remained since major granaries like Kwanghŭngch’ang and Kunjach’ang along the Han River lay outside the city walls.4 By the 16th century, the decline of the Pŏnsangbyŏng system worsened vulnerabilities, resulting in the capital’s abandonment and warehouse plundering during the Imjin War.5
In response, the Chosŏn court developed a strategy to relocate the royal family and court to fortified sanctuaries(pojangchŏ, 保障處) such as Kanghwa-do and Namhansansŏng during emergencies.6 During the second Manchu Invasion(Pyŏngja Horan), although the royal court successfully retreated to Namhansansŏng, it was soon besieged by Chʻing forces and ultimately forced to surrender, revealing the limitations of the defense plan.7 After the war, the Treaty of Chŏngch’uk(Chŏngch’uk yakch’o) restricted the construction of defenses around the capital, halting major improvements into the late 17th century.8
In the 18th century, various limitations of the existing sanctuaries became increasingly apparent, one example being Kanghwa-do, where tidal changes solidified the mudflats and made land access easier.9 The growing capital population highlighted the need for defense reorganization. In late Sukchong’s reign, coastal piracy and Chʻing advice led the government to secure supplies, restructure forces, and reinforce surrounding defenses.10
In the early 18th century, during the late Sukjong period, the Chosŏn court sought to develop the nearby Pukhansan and T’angchundae areas as new sanctuaries. Pukhansan’s rugged terrain made it a suitable refuge for the royal family and officials in emergencies, while T’angchundae, located on hilly ground along the route to Ŭiju and near the Hongjech’ŏn stream, could serve as a rear support base.
Between 1711 and 1714, fortress construction along Pukhansan’s ridgeline was carried out, followed by the addition of a middle-wall (Chung-sŏng) after King Sukchong’s inspection. In 1712, the Kyŏngrich’ŏng was established to oversee facilities, supplies, administration, and military affairs, while the defense structure was reorganized to incorporate the Three Military Commands(Samgunmun: Hunryŏndogam, Ŏyŏngch’ŏng, Kŭmwiyŏng), and a monk corps(Sŭngyŏng).11
By 1714, Sangch’ang, Chungch’ang, and Hach’ang warehouses were completed within Pukhansansŏng, storing military grain and weapons. The Kyŏngrich’ŏng oversaw grain reserves via a loan system(Hwan’gok), supplying nearby counties. Each of the Three Military Commands also secured independent grain stocks and stockpiled firearms, including matchlock muskets(ch’och’ong) and flintlock cannons(pulanggi-p’o).12
Due to the rugged terrain of Pukhansansŏng, transporting and storing supplies was difficult, prompting the construction of additional warehouses in the flat T’angchundae area. The road between Ch’angŭimun and T’angchundae was first repaired to secure a transport route.
By 1714, P’yŏngch’ang (Flat Warehouse) was established under the management of the Kyŏngrich’ŏng to store part of the military grain (kunhyanggok), and it was composed of an upper and lower warehouse (sangch’ang and hach’ang).
Meanwhile, T’angch’unch’ang, also known as Sŏnhyech’ang, was operated by the Sŏnhyech’ŏng and was designed to hold 40,000 sŏk of rice collected through the taedong system, intended for public use in peacetime and military supply in wartime.13
With the establishment of grain warehouse facilities at T’angchundae, efforts were made to organize military formations and defense strategies for the protection of Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae. As outlined in Table 1, a comprehensive defense plan was formulated in 1715, designating both sites as sanctuaries for the royal family, court, and civilians during emergencies. Troops for Pukhansansŏng’s defense were to be drawn from the Three Military Commands and the civilian population.
The Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, tasked with defending T’angchundae, originated from the Ch’ongyunggun under King Injo to oversee Kyŏnggi forces. Based in Samch’ŏng-dong, it had Inner and Outer Divisions: the Inner included Abyŏng and Jangch’ogun troops in counties and tunjŏn, while the Outer consisted of Sogogun units from Suwŏn, Changdan, and Namyang for regional defense.
Pyohagun, responsible for courier and special tasks, was also incorporated into both divisions. Unlike the Inner Division forces performing rotational service(yunhoebŏnsang) or the Sogogun which functioned as reserve forces, the Pyohagun maintained the characteristics of a standing force. In return for their service, Pyohagun soldiers were granted exemptions from miscellaneous labor duties and received benefits such as the assignment of guarantors(poin, 保人). By the later years of King Sukchong’s reign, the number of Kyŏngpyohagun, who served directly under the command of the Ch’ongyungsa at the Chongyungch’ŏng headquarters in the capital, had increased to around one thousand.
Until the late 17th century, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng lacked an independent defensive base or mustering point(sinji, 信地), and in case of revolt, the court’s plan was to retreat to Kanghwa-do. Although the 1704 reorganization strengthened the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng to a force of about 13,000 men, its troops remained dispersed across Kyŏnggi-do without a centralized assembly point.14
Measures were taken to enable Ch’ongyungch’ŏng troops, both inner and outer divisions, to assemble around T’angchundae as a new strategic point. This secured for Ch’ongyungch’ŏng a specific operational base and a defined defensive role. Alongside, the organization of military units and deployment of forces around T’angchundae was also completed.
Following the preparation of military supplies and defensive forces, construction of fortifications in the area was carried out up to 1718. An earthen wall was built from Inwangsan west of T’angchundae to Hyangnobong in Pukhansan, spanning over 2,200 steps, with Hanbukmun and a watergate established near the Hongjech’ŏn plain. This fortification was later known as T’angchundaesŏng. Although some stone was used, much of the construction consisted of vulnerable earthworks. Construction was halted halfway due to opposition citing famine and epidemic concerns, leaving T’angchundaesŏng incomplete.15
Despite this, a defensive system combining fortifications, grain reserves, military supplies, organizational restructuring, and mobilization plans was largely established by the early 18th century, making Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae into new refuge points. Within Pukhansansŏng, a Pukhansansŏng Pyŏljang post was first created in 1714 to oversee facilities and stationed forces.16
In 1721, this position was elevated to Kwansŏngjang, a senior third rank(chŏng samp’um) official post, and the Kwansŏngso organization was formally established to manage the fortress’s defense.17 The Kwansŏngjang managed the facilities, supplies, and stationed forces of the Three Military Commands and the monk corps(Sŭngyŏng) located within Pukhansansŏng.18
By the early 18th century, the Kwansŏngso had established itself as the central military authority responsible for the defense of Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae.19 In emergencies, forces from the Kwansŏngso, Chongyungch’ŏng, the Three Military Commands, the monk corps, and citizens of the capital were to mobilize under Kwansŏngso leadership to escort and protect the royal family and court at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae.
Defense Operations and Limitations at Pukhansansŏng during the Musin-ran
Following the late Sukchong reign, the Pukhansansŏng area, including T’angchundae, was designated as a sanctuary with fortified defenses, organized troops, and stockpiled grain and arms. After the Musin-ran rebellion in 1728(4th year of King Yŏngjo), the defense system was revised, as the uprising exposed both strengths and weaknesses in the existing structure.
The Musin-ran, led by Yi In-jwa, was a large-scale rebellion by elements of the Soron and Namin factions dissatisfied with King Kyŏngjong’s death and King Yŏngjo’s accession. Although rebel forces mobilized across the Samnam region, they failed to breach the defenses of Hanyang and Pukhansansŏng.20
At the outset, however, Yi In-jwa’s faction sought to coordinate with internal collaborators, notably Nam T’ae-jing, then, then Deputy Commander of the Royal Guards(Kŭmgun Pyŏljang), and Yi Sa-sŏng, Provincial Commander of P’yŏngan Province(P’yŏngan Pyŏngsa).21 The rebels also spread rumors that, in collusion with elements of the central army, they would set fire to the warehouses and armories within the capital.22
Yi Sa-sŏng’s collusion posed a serious threat, as he commanded elite frontier troops in P’yŏngan Province as the P’yŏngan byŏngsa (Military Commander). He had enhanced his forces by reorganizing the sumigun—military units responsible primarily for grain contributions— into regular soldiers and developing Iron carts(ch’ŏlch’a) equipped with spears, swords, and matchlocks.23
On March 14, 1728, Ch’oe Kyusŏ, a retired official, informed the court that rebels were gathering in southern Kyŏnggi’s Yangsŏng region and intended to rise the next day.24 This intelligence, coupled with the spreading panic within the capital, prompted King Yŏngjo and his ministers to implement urgent defensive measures to safeguard both Hanyang and Pukhansansŏng.
The capital city(Tosŏng) is the vital essence of the nation. If it is firmly defended and secured, then surely there will be no other cause for concern. The formation of the capital is that of a single mountain fortress. […] It upholds the Royal Ancestral Shrine and the Altars of Soil and Grain above, and shelters the people below. From the high ministers down to the common people, all have their parents and wives and children here; if they muster the strength to fight to the death, the capital can assuredly be defended safely.25
Upon receiving confirmation of the uprising on March 14, 1728, the Chosŏn court convened to discuss countermeasures. Although evacuation to Pukhansansŏng was considered, concerns over its limited capacity led King Yŏngjo to resolve to defend Hanyang and implement defensive measures.26 The Three Military Commands (Samgunmun) tightened surveillance over the city gates and ferry points along the Han River, with the Hullyŏn-dogam assigned to urban defense and the Ŏyŏngch’ŏng and Kŭmwiyŏng tasked with reconnaissance.27
On March 15, 1728, as rebel forces advanced toward the capital through Yongin—located slightly north of Yangsŏng—the Chosŏn court moved promptly to reinforce its defenses, for example by replacing county magistrates in Suwŏn, Kwangju, Yangju, and Jangdan with trusted military officers, including Yi Yŏjŏk, who was appointed to Jangdan. At the same time, the Tribunal for Interrogations (Ch’ugukch’ŏng, 推鞫廳) was established to identify internal collaborators.28
The following day, March 16, further measures were taken to secure the capital. The Hullyŏn-dogam and Ŏyŏngch’ŏng were assigned to guard the city gates, while the Suŏch’ŏng and Kŭmwiyŏng secured major Han River crossings such as Yongjin, Kwangjin, and Songp’ajin, thereby reorganizing both the inner and outer defensive lines.29
Meanwhile, efforts to organize a counteroffensive intensified. Following a series of developments, Pyŏngjo P’ansŏ(Minister of War) O Myŏnghang was appointed Supreme Field Commander(Saro Tosunmusa) to assume overall command. He organized the Sunmuyŏng, a counterinsurgency force composed of 1,400 elite troops drawn from the Hullyŏn-dogam and Kŭmwiyŏng. The Sunmuyŏng launched its campaign at dawn on March 18.30
On March 17, interrogations of captured rebels confirmed that Yi Sa-sŏng, the military commander of P’yŏngan Province, had colluded with the insurgents. The court immediately dispatched a Sŏnch’ŏn’gwan (宣傳官) to the P’yŏngan Provincial Command to arrest Yi before his forces could threaten Hanyang directly.31
As concerns mounted within the Chosŏn court over the potential advance of elite forces from the P’yŏngan Provincial Command, the strategic significance of Pukhansansŏng came to be newly recognized. Located at the terminus of the Ŭiju-ro connecting P’yŏngan Province to Hanyang, Pukhansansŏng and the T’angchundae area were identified as key positions for the defense of the capital. King Yŏngjo emphasized the necessity of securing Pukhansansŏng, referring to it as the “throat of the capital.”32
Accordingly, beginning on March 18, the court initiated efforts to strengthen the defenses of strategic points stretching from P’yŏngan-do to Pukhansansŏng, integrating them into the broader security framework of Hanyang. On March 18, Cho Ŏm, a former defense commander of Ch’unch’ŏn, was appointed Kwansŏngjang of Pukhansansŏng. He was given control over the fortress’s facilities, supplies, garrison troops, and the Sŭngyŏng monks.33
The next day, efforts were made to secure the Ŭiju-ro corridor. Three thousand troops from the Hwanghae Kamyŏng were deployed at Dongsonryŏng, a key pass between Hwanghae and P’yŏngan Provinces, while 300 soldiers from the Hwanghae Pyŏngyŏng were stationed at Ch’ŏngsŏktong, a strategic point between Hwanghae and Kyŏnggi Provinces. Meanwhile, Jeong Hyŏk-sŏn, magistrate of P’aju, fortified crossings along the Imjin River to secure the last major river line before Hanyang.34
On March 20, defense efforts were initiated around T’angchundae and Koam, areas adjacent to Pukhansansŏng. To strengthen the defense, 3,600 troops from the Changdan right command, under the authority of the Chongyungch’ŏng, were stationed at T’angchundae. Jang Bung-ik, was appointed as Jin’eodaejang(鎭禦大將) to lead these troops.
Upon his appointment, Chang Bung-ik arrested An Ch’u, a spy sent by Yi Sa-sŏng to monitor the capital. This swift action disrupted the rebel network and prompted Yi Sa-sŏng to surrender without resistance.35
Around 2,000 troops from the Changdan Right Command were mobilized for the counterinsurgency following the arrest of Yi Sa-sŏng on March 23, while approximately 1,600 remained at T’angchundae under Yi Yŏjŏk and later Yu Sŏngch’u. They maintained order until Yi In-jwa’s capture on March 24.36 Afterward, the Hunryŏndogam(訓鍊都 監) dispatched pyohagun(標下軍), including sunnyŏngsu(巡令手), to assist with command. The Changdan troops were disbanded on March 28 as the rebellion subsided.37
Meanwhile, Yu Chŏk-gi, magistrate of Yangju, was appointed Tongno Jin’eosa(Eastern-Route Defense Commissioner, 東路鎭禦使) and led 1,500 troops to garrison Koam, a strategic point linking Yangju, the capital, and Pukhansansŏng.38 An additional 800 troops from Chunch’ŏn were stationed nearby to reinforce the eastern approaches.39
To reinforce key sectors, the court released gunpowder and bullets stored at Pukhansansŏng to the Changdan troops at T’angchundae and the Yangju force at Koam. These coordinated measures substantially strengthened the defensive line along the main route from P’yŏngan Province to Pukhansansŏng, ensuring rapid response capabilities in the event of renewed hostilities.40 Acknowledging their effectiveness, Chief State Councilor(Yŏngŭijŏng, 領議政) Yi Kwang-jwa remarked that the region north of the Han River was now secure.41
The initial stage of the Musin-ran saw the defense of the Pukhansansŏng region operate effectively. Following the contingency plans formulated during King Sukchong’s reign, forces of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng were stationed at T’angch’undae, while the defense of Pukhansansŏng itself was carried out under the leadership of the Kwansŏngjang.
The court strengthened the defense line toward Ŭiju by sealing off areas such as Tongsŏllyŏng, Ch’ŏngsŏktong, and the Imjin River region. Defensive forces were also deployed to the Koam area, a strategic bridgehead on the eastern approach to Pukhansansŏng and the capital. As a result, the security of the capital was maintained. Pukhansansŏng and T’angch’undae thus functioned not as sanctuaries, but as forward defense outposts.
The military operations around Pukhansansŏng during the Musin Rebellion offered several lessons. First, the military effectiveness of units such as the Pyohagun, the Pokmagun—a pack-horse transport corps that kept grain and munitions moving—, and the Mabyŏng(cavarly) was confirmed.
Mabyŏng and Pyohagun not only pursued Yi In-jwa’s rebels but also handled scouting and dispatch duties, and the Changdan Garrison left its Pyohagun and horsemen at T’angchundae until the campaign’s end. The Pokma-gun, meanwhile, sustained the front with steady resupply.42
The campaign demonstrated that the lightly equipped and often poorly trained Sogogun, when deployed as scouts(ch’ŏkhu) and ambush parties(pokpyŏng), could still deliver decisive results.43 A Changdan sogogun detachment seized the key collaborator An Ch’u, while contingents from the Chongyungch’ŏng and Suŏch’ŏng patrolled the roads to Chinwi and Suwŏn and watched the main Han-gang ferries, reporting every suspicious movement. These actions led to the arrest of rebel leaders and helped stabilize the front.44
At the same time, the Musin-ran exposed significant flaws in the Pukhansansŏng defense system. Shortcomings emerged in command coordination between fortress and field units, the adequacy of fortification facilities, the reliability of supply lines, and the effective allocation of manpower.
Cho Hyŏn-myŏng said, “The Samgunmun officers in Pukhansansŏng do not obey the Kwansŏngjang; during the 1728 defense this lack of unified command caused serious confusion, so I propose we establish a formal rule requiring all such officers to follow the Kwansŏngjang henceforth.””45
The command system at Pukhansansŏng was riddled with overlaps. In the early eighteenth century, rules assigned the Kwansŏngso responsibility for emergencies, coordinating Samgunmun detachments and Sŭngyŏng monks. Yet its chief, the Kwansŏngjang, ranked only senior third(chŏng samp’um), below the junior second(chong ip’um) commanders of other camps. During the Musin-ran, he could control the Kwansŏngso and monk troops but lacked authority over the Samgunmun officers.
When we defended the fortress in the Musin year (1728, Yŏngjo 4), we could scarcely hold even a single path by the West Gate, having scraped together only a few a-byŏng guards and some monks and townspeople. […] 46
Standing-troop shortages compounded the sector’s weakness. At Pukhansansŏng the Kwansŏngso could muster only a-byŏng guards and a few monks—barely enough to cover one stretch of the West Gate. T’angchundae, lacking a standing garrison of its own, was temporarily reinforced by troops from Changdan underscoring its reliance on short-term deployments.47
Fortification failures were no less stark. T’angchundae Fortress, begun late in Sukchong’s reign, was left unfinished and by early Yŏngjo had decayed so badly that “children gathering firewood could clamber over the wall.”48 Outer nodes—Imjin crossings, Ch’ŏngsŏktong, and others—still lacked fortifications and organized defenses, leaving the whole line exposed.
Song In-myŏng, Right State Councillor, reported: “[…] Judging from the Musin year (1728, Yŏngjo 4), grain should not be stored in warehouses near the capital, as it could feed the rebels. […] During that revolt we had to press men and horses into service to haul rice from Kangch’ang (the river granaries) to Tangch’unch’ang, and the effort was painfully straitened. If we store grain at Tangch’unch’ang now, we will face no such worry in a future emergency. […]49
Wartime logistics proved fragile. Most of the kunhyanggok—military grain—stored at Pukhansansŏng and P’yŏngch’ang, along with the reserve stock at Tangch’unch’ang, had already been depleted by loans to the Hojŏ (Ministry of Taxation) and by famine-relief shipments before the Musin-ran erupted. When the revolt broke out, only a fraction of the stored reserve grain (yugogok) remained.
Because Tangch’unch’ang never received firm peacetime regulations, the court had to improvise. Rice was hurriedly transferred from Kangch’ang—the river granaries—into Tangch’unch’ang and other depots around the capital, a measure that revealed how thin the emergency buffer had become, underscoring the limits of Kangch’ang and the need to relocate granaries to safer sites.
Arms and gunpowder also became scarce. Gunpowder and shot from the Samgunmun and the Kungi-si were quickly exhausted following the arrival of additional field units. Troops of the Changdan Right Command stationed at T’angchundae petitioned their home counties for resupply, revealing the system’s incapacity to sustain extended operations.50
The Musin-ran revealed that Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae should function as vital outer bastions-the “throat of the capital” rather than designated sanctuaries. This change in strategic perception became a major clue to the improvement of the defense system in the area b. Its details will be examined in the next chapter.
Defense Reforms of Pukhansansŏng after the Musin-ran
Through the complete suppression of the Musin-ran in 1728, the Chosŏn court was able to assess both the strengths and limitations of the existing defensive system around Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae. The campaign also provided valuable lessons regarding the composition and deployment of forces. Notably, the use of Pukhansansŏng not merely as a royal sanctuary but as a forward defensive outpost for the capital yielded tangible results. Based on these experiences, the Chosŏn court initiated a gradual reorganization of the defensive system at Pukhansansŏng during the latter half of the eighteenth century.
Before the full-scale reorganization of Pukhansansŏng defense sytem in the 1740s, the Chosŏn court concentrated on reinforcing the outer defensive network. By the 1730s, fortifications at key points such as P’yŏngyang, Anju, and Hwangju in P’yŏngan and Hwanghae Provinces had been strengthened,51 and in 1731, the Yŏhyŏn-jin(礪峴鎭) was established at Yŏhyŏn near Kaesŏng with a force of four companies(哨) tasked with guarding both Yŏhyŏn and Ch’ŏngsŏktong.52 These measures reflected lessons learned during the Musin-ran, particularly the importance of securing key routes such as Tongsŏnryŏng and Ch’ŏngsŏktong, and contributed to strengthening the corridor along the Ŭiju-ro leading from the northern frontier to Pukhansansŏng and the capital.
After reinforcing the defense of the outer areas, the Chosŏn court also improved its management of military supplies. In 1736, the operational system of reserve grain at T’angch’unch’ang was reorganized, allowing the state to secure over 18,000 sŏk of taedong rice annually from 11 counties in the Kyŏnggi region. This reduced seasonal fluctuations in the grain reserves at T’angchundae.
By the early 1740s, additional kunhyanggok(military grain) was secured for the Kyŏngrich’ŏng at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae by recovering rice lent to agencies like the Hojo and Sunhyech’ŏng and transporting grain from P’yŏngan Province. These efforts added approximately 30,000 sŏk of rice and reflected lessons from the Musinran, where shortages of stored grain had hindered defense operations, laying the groundwork for the subsequent reinforcement of the capital’s outer defense system.53
By the mid-18th century, following a series of earlier reforms, the Chosŏn court had laid the foundation for reorganizing the defense of the capital and the surrounding areas of Pukhansansŏng. Around this time, regional tensions also resurfaced, particularly due to renewed hostilities between the Qing and the Zunghar Mongols. Responding to signs of instability, including the Qianlong Emperor’s inspection of Shenyang, the Chosŏn government began reassessing its defense strategy.54
As a result, from 1745 to 1746, fortifications around the capital were reinforced under the Samgunmun, and in December 1746, a draft of the Susŏngchŏlmok was prepared to formalize defense plans involving both the Samgunmun and local residents.55 This shift of focus toward capital defense also prompted adjustments to the outer defensive network. Responsibility for the defense of Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae—previously assigned to various commands—began consolidating under the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng.
In 1747, to strengthen wartime logistics, major granaries along the Han River—including those managed by the Hojo and Sunhyech’ŏng— were relocated inside the capital.56 With the relocation of the Sŏnhyech’ang to Samch’ŏng-dong, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, previously based there, was consequently moved to T’angchundae. As the Samgunmun became focused on capital defense under the Susŏngchŏlmok system, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng was officially reassigned in May 1747 to oversee the defense infrastructure, provisions, and troops at both T’angchundae and Pukhansansŏng, thereby assuming responsibility for the outer defense of the capital.
In May 1747, the Chosŏn court relocated the headquarters of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng from Samch’ŏng-dong inside the capital city(Tosŏng) to T’angchundae. Through this measure, the military organization of both Pukhansansŏng and T’angch’undae was unified under the authority of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng., unifying what had previously been fragmented among various agencies, including the Kyŏngrich’ŏng, Samgunmun, Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, Kwansŏngso, and Sŭngyŏng. In particular, as the Vice Commander(Chunggun) of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng concurrently assumed the role of Kwansŏngjang, the Kwansŏngso organization was absorbed into the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng. This restructuring enabled a more integrated regional defense posture.
The wartime defense formation for Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae was to consist of approximately 12,730 troops, including personnel from the headquarters, Naeyŏng, Kwansŏngso, and auxiliary units such as logistics support troops(Kunsubo, 軍需保). In case of emergency, over 6,000 troops from the Oeyŏng(Outer Divisions) stationed at Changdan and Namyang were designated for mobilization, though Suwŏn forces were excluded from this contingency plan.
Following the 1747 reorganization, the military structure of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng and the defensive forces around Pukhansansŏng continued to expand throughout the late 18th century. The most notable development was the reinforcement of the Pyŏhagun, which had played a key role during the Musin-ran. By the 1760s, a standing force of around 1,000 soldiers—drawn from local residents—had been established under the command of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng. Under King Chŏngjo, additional increases were made, with more than 100 troops each added to the Pyŏhagun and the monastic units of the Sŭngyŏng.
With these reinforcements, in the final years of the 1700s, the standing force at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae reached nearly 1,500. Given that 1,000 troops from the Changdan Defense Command had successfully held T’angchundae during the Musin-ran, this strengthened standing force significantly improved the region’s defensive capacity— particularly through the central role of the Pyŏhagun, which had proven effective in both defense and suppression during the rebellion.57
In the latter half of the 18th century, the defense of the northwestern region of Kyŏnggi and the Imjin River area, located outside Pukhansansŏng, was also strengthened. In 1754, two new military outposts, Imjinjin and Changsan-jin, were established along the Imjin River, equipped with fortress facilities. In 1765, the existing Changdan Defense Command was relocated to P’aju, and a new rear division (Huyŏng) was created in Changdan, expanding the military organization.
As a result, the total number of troops under the Outer Divisions (Oeyŏng) of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng increased by 2,692. This reinforcement aimed to strengthen the outer defenses of Pukhansansŏng, particularly the Imjin River—considered the final major natural barrier to the north and a key route toward Ŭiju. The restructuring of the defensive lines enabled a more systematic and multi-layered approach to intercept possible incursions, with P’aju, Koyang, Kyohwa, and Chŏksŏng guarding the southwestern riverbanks, and Changdan, Majŏn, Saknyŏng, and Yŏnch’ŏn responsible for the northeastern banks.58
Although the reign of King Chŏngjo saw organizational changes within the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, these did not necessarily lead to a weakening of its overall defensive capacity. Some have pointed to the establishment of the Changyongyŏng—which absorbed the Suwŏn Central Garrison, the largest unit within the Outer Division—and simultaneous reductions in the Inner Division as evidence of declining effectiveness in the defense of Pukhansansŏng and the outer capital region.
This view warrants a more nuanced reconsideration. Suwŏn troops had already been excluded from the Pukhansansŏng defense zone by 1747. Even in the early Yŏngjo reign, the Inner Division was being downsized, while the standing pyohagun forces expanded. By Chŏngjo’s later years, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng could mobilize around 16,530 troops —well above the 1747 standard of 12,730. These shifts suggest that, despite structural changes, the institution maintained and even reinforced its capacity to fulfill its core defense duties.59
This quantitative expansion was accompanied by organizational reforms and the consolidation of military operations. Standing forces from the Headquarters, Nae’yŏng, and Kwansŏngso—including the Pyŏhagun —engaged in both scheduled and ad hoc drills such as chungsun-si and kwanmuchae, while also fulfilling various military duties, including royal escorts and rotational service within the garrison.60
Tongjigyŏngyŏnsa Yun Yu(尹游) stated:
“During the recent royal procession to the royal tomb, Your Majesty ordered the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng to take charge of the scouts(ch’ŏkhu; 斥候) and ambush units (pokpyŏng; 伏 兵)... Scouts and ambush units were first initiated in the musin year (戊申年), and at that time, only the Suŏch’ŏng and Ch’ongyungch’ŏng were each tasked with handling the eastern and western sectors, respectively.“61
However, the most notable changes emerged in the Oeyŏng units. Following the Musin-ran, in which auxiliary troops effectively performed scout and ambush missions around T’angchundae and the Han River, such operations became institutionalized. From 1728 onward, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng conducted scouting and ambush operations during annual royal processions to ancestral tombs in the Sŏdo(西道, Western Region) of Kyŏnggi.62
By the late 18th century, the deployment of Sog’o-gun from the Oeyŏng of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng had been institutionalized for royal visits to nineteen ancestral tombs in the Sŏdo, including Myŏngnŭng (明陵) and Soryŏngwŏn(昭寧園) in regions such as Koyang and P’aju.63
These units were assigned to scout, ambush, and chŏnŏgun(傳語軍, message relay) duties. As shown in Table 3, formal protocols specified the placement of officers and soldiers for each task at designated locations along the route. Although training for the sogogun had largely ceased by the late 18th century, reconnaissance duties such as scouting continued to be performed. This allowed the sogogun units under the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng’s Oeyŏng to maintain a degree of military capability.64
In the latter half of the 18th century, the defense system of Pukhansansŏng made notable progress not only in troop organization and military structure but also in fortification and logistical management. The reconstruction of the T’angchundaesŏng, which had remained incomplete since the reign of King Sukchong, was resumed, resulting in the conversion of the section between Hanbukmun and Hyangnobong into a stone fortress by 1764.65 Upon completion, the area was restructured into the Yŏnyungdae(鍊戎臺), a military training ground and strategic outpost on the capital’s periphery.66
Facility maintenance continued through the late 18th century, including regular repairs to the ramparts of Pukhansansŏng and soil reinforcement( pot’o) on the eastern ridge of T’angchundae.67 Meanwhile, management of military grain(kunhyanggok) underwent significant improvements following the relocation of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng to T’angchundae in 1747. By 1749, military grain previously overseen by multiple offices was unified under the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng and redistributed in a seasonal loan-repayment system.68
Further reforms under King Chŏngjo culminated in 1794, when regulations were established to address grain loss from interest-based loans and to abolish the practice of sasumi(私受米, individual distribution). 69 These measures stabilized the operation of military grain provisioning at Pukhansansŏng by the end of the century.70
Improvements were also made in the production and management of weaponry. In 1754, powder and shot production units known as the Yakhwan’gye in the Samnam and Haesŏ regions were relocated to T’angchundae, and their operational costs(yakhwan’ga) were placed under the control of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng.71 This marked a shift from the previous practice of merely storing weapons provided by the Samgunmun and Kungi-si, enabling the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng to establish its own armaments management system.
Building on this system, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng significantly expanded its arsenal in the decades that followed. By the early 19th century, it had secured over 13,000 matchlocks and more than 1,000 artillery pieces—including mokmopo(木母砲), pulanggi-p’o(佛朗機砲), and wiwŏn-p’o(威遠砲)—sufficient to arm its garrison forces stationed at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae.72
New types of firearms such as the Ilwabongjŏn(一窩蜂箭) and Chohwa sunhwan-p’o(造化循環砲) were also developed under the leadership of Ch’ongyungsa Ku Sŏn-haeng during the later years of Yŏngjo’s reign.73 This level of production enabled the comprehensive equipping of troops and the strategic placement of artillery throughout key defensive positions.
As a result of these developments, the latter half of the eighteenth century saw a marked consolidation of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng’s defense system around Pukhansansŏng, grounded in the lessons learned from the Musin Rebellion. In the event of an enemy incursion via the Ŭiju route, over 16,000 troops could be mobilized under centralized command and deployed across key fortified zones—including the Imjin River line, Pukhansansŏng, and T’angchundaesŏng. Backed by gunpowder-based weaponry and systematically managed grain depots for both soldiers and civilians, the system was prepared to sustain prolonged resistance. As a result, the outer defenses of the capital were significantly strengthened during this period.
Conclusion
From the late seventeenth century onward, the defense system around the Pukhansan and T’angchundae area began to be reorganized in earnest. During the early eighteenth century, up to the reign of Kyŏngjong, this region was developed as a potential alternative to existing royal sanctuaries such as Kanghwado and Namhansansŏng. Fortified structures like Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundaesŏng were constructed, and military supplies including grain and weapons were stockpiled. Under the command of the Kwansŏngso, a defense strategy was established: the Samgunmun—Hunryŏndogam, Ŏyŏngch’ŏng, and Kŭmwiyŏng—would defend Pukhansansŏng, while the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng was tasked with the defense of T’angchundae.
The Musin-ran of 1728 marked a critical turning point. The mobilization of troops and military operations in the Pukhansansŏng area at that time revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the existing defense system. Moreover, the events confirmed the strategic importance of the region not as a sanctuary (pojangch’ŏ) but as a forward defensive outpost for the capital.
Based on the experience of command confusion during the rebellion, the facilities, supplies, and military organization of Pukhansansŏng and T’angch’undae were subsequently unified under the authority of the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng. Defensive forces in the outer Imjin River region were also reinforced. Enhancements to fortifications, military grain stores, and weaponry were steadily carried out.
With the reorganization of the defense system, Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundaesŏng became key sites for various military drills and missions conducted by the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng in the latter half of the 18th century. Through this process, Pukhansansŏng came to serve as a strategic outer stronghold for the defense of the capital.
As a result, the reorganization of the defense system at Pukhansansŏng and T’angchundae clearly illustrates the shift in Chosŏn’s capital defense strategy during the eighteenth century—from a sanctuary-based model to one focused on the defense of the capital itself. The Musinran served as one of the key catalysts for this transformation and holds significant historical importance. Furthermore, the Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, which was reorganized in the aftermath of the Musin-ran to oversee the Pukhansansŏng area and manage the capital’s outer defenses, can be seen as the military command that best embodies this historical development.
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